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Abstract 
The use of incentives to encourage sustainable natural resource use is widespread in 
conservation. Yet, the relative or combined effects of conservation interventions on 
resource use can be difficult to predict. This is particularly so in contexts with weak 
institutions or poorly defined property rights, conditions that typify forest commons. 
In this study, I investigate the effect of different policy options, currently being 
implemented or under consideration in a protected area in Cambodia, on the resource 
appropriation of indigenous smallholder farmers in order to develop a framework for 
predicting the effectiveness of conservation interventions.  
I begin by evaluating the progress made towards two project targets relating to the 
security of natural resources important for local livelihoods, showing that, whilst 
security issues exist, the project has so far been successful in protecting key resources. 
I also evaluate an existing programme of indigenous land titling, which is shown to be 
consistent with conservation goals but vulnerable to interference from land grabs. 
Using two approaches for predicting behavioural response to planned interventions, 
experimental games and scenario analysis, I demonstrate that collective performance 
payments are more effective than individually contracted payments or increased law 
enforcement effort. Previous research has shown that externally imposed rule 
enforcement can undermine existing norms for cooperation, particularly in contexts 
where social cohesion is high. I build upon this research by demonstrating that 
exogenous rule enforcement, when coupled with reward payments that have been 
found to encourage high levels of cooperation, can increase resource extraction 
compared to when payments are offered in isolation.   
The research presented highlights the difficulty of predicting the effect of policies 
designed to reduce resource use, particularly when interventions interact to increase 
the institutional complexity in which resource use decision-making takes place, but 
offers a novel framework for the investigation of intervention effectiveness. 
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Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Problem statement 
Following growing recognition, from the 1980s onwards, that the conservation of 
biodiversity is intrinsically linked to the well-being of people living in areas of 
biological wealth (Milner-Gulland et al., 2014), a number of policy paradigms have 
emerged in which the dominant logic rests on resolving trade-offs between the 
interests of local people and those pursuing an agenda of conservation (Adams & 
Hulme, 2001; Brown, 2002; Adams et al., 2004; Wells & McShane, 2004; Sunderland 
et al., 2007; Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009; McShane et al., 2011; Persha et al., 2011). 
Central to all of these approaches has been the desire to create or alter the level of 
incentives to reduce the impact of those people whose actions threaten biodiversity, 
whether through the enforcement of rules restricting resource use (Gibson et al., 2005; 
Keane et al., 2008), facilitation of alternative, less-damaging sources of income 
(Brandon, 1996; Salafsky & Wollenberg, 2000), strengthening of property, access or 
management rights (Singleton, 2000; Carlsson & Berkes, 2005) or, more recently, 
direct payments or payments for the provision of environmental services (Ferraro & 
Kiss, 2002; Pagiola et al., 2004; Wunder, 2007; Ferraro, 2011). Whilst all of these 
approaches seek to change the incentives governing behaviour, their success is reliant 
upon the institutional context in which they are applied (Barrett et al., 2001; Brown, 
2003; Clements et al., 2010). There is, however, currently a paucity of research aimed 
towards increasing understanding of how to facilitate the establishment of effective 
conservation institutions, the “rules of the game” which govern human interactions 
(North, 1990), particularly in the face of social, economic and environmental change, 
or towards influencing behavioural change in order to achieve positive outcomes for 
conservation (Cowling, 2014).  
In recent years, increasing attention has been given to evidence-based approaches to 
improving conservation decision-making and to evaluating whether or not 
conservation policies have been successful in achieving their stated goals (Pullin & 
Knight, 2003; Sutherland et al., 2004; Stem et al., 2005; Ferraro & Pattanayak, 2006; 
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Pullin & Knight, 2009). Yet the success of conservation policies is difficult to define 
or measure and may be highly dependent on the local social, political, economic and 
institutional context, which can lead to significant uncertainty (Adams et al., 2003; 
McShane et al., 2010). Despite recent advances, such as the application of quasi-
experimental matching approaches (e.g. Andam et al., 2008; Andam et al., 2010; 
Arriagada et al., 2012; Ferraro & Hannauer, 2014; Clements et al., in press; Clements 
& Milner-Gulland, in press), impact assessments are difficult to do well, are 
expensive (Agrawal, 2014) and are conducted after policies have been implemented. 
As such, even if approaches, such as adaptive management (Salafsky et al., 2002; 
Stem et al., 2005), have been put in place, opportunities for improvements, time or 
goodwill may be lost in the interim. Consequently, the ability to estimate the 
effectiveness of policies prior to implementation (either in absolute terms or relative 
to alternative policy options), through approaches such as management strategy 
evaluation (Bunnefeld et al., 2011; Milner-Gulland, 2012; Nuno, 2013), offers the 
potential to get things right first time and guide policy decision-making to minimise 
the risk of unnecessary policy failures.  
These concerns are particularly relevant for the conservation of tropical forests where 
current international policy developments are poised to provide substantial additional 
funding in the next few years through initiatives to reduce emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+; Ebling & Yasué, 2008; Miles & Kapos, 
2008). Hitherto, the clearance of tropical forests has proved challenging to address 
(Geist & Lambin, 2002; Chomitz et al., 2007). Between 1990 and 2010 alone global 
forest resources were lost at a net rate of approximately 6.8 million hectares per year 
(FAO, 2010). With the advent of REDD+ initiatives, there is renewed optimism in 
some circles that efforts to protect forests can be successfully supported. Yet in order 
for this to happen, it will be necessary to channel potential carbon revenue effectively 
to deliver actual behavioural change by those responsible for deforestation (Brown et 
al., 2008). This is especially difficult in the context of weak institutions (Barrett et al., 
2001) and unclear property rights (Hardin, 1968), conditions that typify forest 
commons and for which resource extraction is most likely to be unsustainable.  
The proximate causes of deforestation are highly complex and governed by wide 
ranging factors, such as rising human populations, immigration, property rights, 
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commodity prices, market access, as well as the development and integration of new 
technologies (Laurance, 1999; Lambin et al., 2001; Geist & Lambin, 2002; Chomitz 
et al., 2007; DeFries et al., 2010). Due to the complex nature of many of these drivers 
it is consequently difficult to draw conclusions on the wider importance of different 
determinants of forest depletion (Scrieciu, 2007), and hence set policy. The evidence 
with regard to the association between small-scale, rural households, increased market 
access and deforestation is particularly contradictory. As rural households often have 
little access to capital or alternative livelihood activities, expansion into marginal 
open-access forested land is an attractive option (Barbier, 1997). Increased access to 
capital does not, however, necessarily reduce the rate of deforestation, as it frequently 
leads to investment requiring or facilitating land clearance (Wunder, 2001; Pendleton 
& Howe, 2002). In other cases, the creation of new market opportunities can lead to a 
transition away from agriculture as a primary source of income and reduce pressure 
on forest resources. As such, it is doubtful that a direct causal link between poverty 
and deforestation exists in the general case but the fact remains that poor rural 
households are frequently direct agents of deforestation (Sunderlin et al., 2005). 
Given this, it is important for policy initiatives, such as REDD+, to consider not only 
the role of small-scale resource users in forest clearance but also the impact of forest 
protection measures on rural livelihoods and behaviour (Brown et al., 2008). In areas 
principally under threat from small-scale deforestation, decision-makers must develop 
appropriate policy interventions, which seek to maximise the incentives for local 
people to reduce clearance whilst adhering to the principle of doing no harm.  
This study seeks to contribute to our understanding of these issues by concentrating 
on the complex inter-relationships between human livelihoods, land-use management, 
and the protection of forests for the purposes of climate change mitigation and 
biodiversity conservation. This research is focussed on a single protected area, 
managed for the protection of biodiversity and the enhancement of local livelihoods, 
in Cambodia, a country with one of the highest rates of percentage forest cover loss 
globally (Hansen et al., 2013). The study site is currently in the final stages of 
accreditation as a voluntary REDD+ project and has been identified as one of two 
national REDD+ demonstration sites. Hence, the findings of this study will contribute 
directly to management decisions at the study site. Revenue generated by the REDD+ 
project will be used to fund site management interventions, including benefit sharing 
 
14 
with 20 villages located within or adjacent to the site that have signed agreements to 
participate in the project. As one of the principal causes of deforestation within site 
boundaries is the expansion of agricultural land by smallholder farmers from 
participating villages (WCS, 2013), the success of the project hinges on the ability of 
site managers to incentivise these farmers to halt forest clearance. As such, the site 
provides a significant opportunity to study the potential impact of alternative policy 
options for the prevention of smallholder forest clearance. 
1.2. Aims and objectives 
The overall aim of this study was to investigate the effectiveness of different forest 
conservation policy interventions currently implemented or planned for Seima 
Protection Forest in terms of delivering behavioural change amongst small-scale 
resource users. 
The objectives of the study were as follows: 
1. Characterise household livelihood strategies and economic well-being and 
assess progress towards project livelihood targets for the period 2007 to 2012. 
2. Investigate household land use and rule compliance under existing 
conservation management interventions for the period 2004 to 2012. 
3. Elucidate individual expectations of changes in land use strategies under a 
range of future scenarios of conservation interventions and market conditions. 
4. Identify implications for incentive-based conservation policy making, and 
make recommendations for intervention design at the study site. 
1.3. Thesis outline 
In addition to the introduction, the thesis is split into six further chapters:  
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the project study site, Seima Protection Forest, 
and the livelihood strategies and practices of the people who live there, as well as 
summarising the history and proposed future of conservation management at the site. 
Chapter 3 focuses on assessing the livelihoods and economic well-being of 
households living within the study site and evaluates the progress made towards two 
site management goals (ensuring household resource security and access to sufficient 
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agricultural land) during the period 2007 to 2012. Household economic well-being is 
shown to have improved over this period, even among vulnerable groups, except in 
the most remote villages which still have limited access to emerging markets. Partial 
progress has been made in relation to the two management goals: ensuring household 
resource security and sufficient access to agricultural land, with household resource 
security and access to agricultural land largely stable. The theory of change based 
approach, as applied here, is found to be vulnerable to data and indicator selection 
issues. 
The results presented in this chapter appear in: 
Travers, H. & Evans, T. (2013) Development of a social impacts monitoring system 
for the Seima Core Protection Forest REDD+ Demonstration Site. Wildlife 
Conservation Society, Phnom Penh. 
Chapter 4 investigates household land use and rule compliance in two villages under 
one of the principal interventions implemented at the study site, a programme of 
participatory land use planning and tenure reform. I show that participatory tenure 
reform can be consistent with positive outcomes for conservation, but that this process 
is vulnerable to disruption from external interests in the form of immigrant 
households and powerful land speculators.  
This chapter is under revision at Land Use Policy as: 
Travers, H., Winney, K., Clements, T., Evans, T.D., Milner-Gulland, E.J. A tale of 
two villages: an investigation of conservation-driven land tenure reform in a 
Cambodian Protection Forest. 
Chapter 5 applies a behavioural games approach to the investigation of resource user 
behaviour in a commons dilemma under a series of experimental treatments designed 
to mimic policy options under consideration for the study site. The interaction 
between rewards and penalties is examined, showing the potential for weakly 
enforced penalties to “crowd out” reductions in resource use observed when rewards 
are offered in isolation. 
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This chapter is under second review at Ecological Economics as:  
Travers, H., Clements, T., Milner-Gulland, E.J. Applying the carrot and stick in a 
Cambodian commons: an experimental games approach to the investigation of 
conservation incentives. 
Chapter 6 uses a scenario-based approach to investigate future smallholder land 
clearance within the study site under a series of potential policy options and market 
conditions. Collective payments or payments into a communal fund in return for 
households choosing to halt clearance were found to be most effective at reducing 
clearance relative to the business as usual baseline scenario, provided that other 
members of the village reciprocated.  
Chapter 7 provides a discussion of the main findings described in preceding chapters 
and identifies opportunities for further study.  
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Chapter 2 
2. Seima Protection Forest 
2.1. Introduction 
The study was conducted in Seima Protection Forest (SPF), a protected area located in 
the Eastern Plains Landscape of Cambodia, which covers an area of 2,927 km2 and is 
located in north-eastern Cambodia, at the southern end of the endemic-rich Annamite 
Mountains (Figure 2.1). The site is managed by the Forestry Administration (FA), 
with technical and financial assistance provided by the Wildlife Conservation Society 
(WCS) as part of a long-term conservation programme. SPF is located in part of a 
large former logging concession held by the Malaysian company, Samling 
International Ltd. Commercial logging operations in this concession were halted in 
1999, due to increasing royalties for felled timber, and a nationwide moratorium on 
logging was introduced in 2002. Since 2002, the site has been managed for 
biodiversity conservation and local livelihoods enhancement. In September 2009, the 
area was gazetted as a formal Protection Forest by Prime Ministerial Subdecree #143, 
which separated the site into a core protection zone (1885 km2) and buffer zone (1042 
km2).  
 
Figure 2.1: Location of Seima Protection Forest in Cambodia (from Evans et al., 2012a). 
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2.2. Biophysical characteristics 
The site contains a complex mosaic of habitats types, ranging from sparse deciduous 
dipterocarp forest in the lowland northwest to dense tropical evergreen forest in the 
eastern region along the Vietnamese border (Walston et al., 2001, Evans et al., 2003). 
The terrain is largely hilly and elevations range from 100m in flatter lowland areas up 
to 700m on the Sen Monorom Plateau. The site is of significant importance for 
biodiversity conservation, containing at least 41 animal species listed as globally 
threatened (Evans et al., 2012a).  
2.3. Human geography 
History 
Cambodia is home to several minority indigenous peoples, the majority of whom live 
in remote forested upland areas (ADB, 2002), often in and around gazetted protected 
areas such as the study site. Although little is known about the remote forested areas 
of Cambodia prior to French colonial rule, it is thought that the study area was 
sparsely settled by several indigenous groups, who maintained trading links with 
lowland areas (McAndrew et al., 2003). During French rule, aside from a small 
number of rubber plantations, the area remained largely autonomous (Evans et al., 
2003). However, following independence from France in 1954, Cambodia’s minority 
indigenous peoples came under increasing pressure from successive regimes to 
integrate into Khmer society, culminating in mass forced resettlements during the 
Khmer Rouge period (1975-79). At this time, villages within SPF were cleared and 
the majority of people moved to Khao Gniek District in the lowland north of 
Mondulkiri Province (McAndrew et al., 2003). While some households began to 
return to their villages after the fall of the Khmer Rouge, the majority of returnees did 
not do so until the 1980s and 1990s.  
The study site now supports a rapidly increasing human population. In 2008, 
population density had reached 5.4 people/km2, with the significant majority of 
households belonging to the indigenous Bunong people (the original inhabitants prior 
to the Khmer Rouge period; Pollard & Evans, 2008). The remaining population is 
comprised chiefly of Khmer immigrants, who have moved to the area from 
neighbouring lowland provinces in search of land, or who belong to former Khmer 
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Rouge cadres that have been demobilised in the area. In addition to migrants who 
have settled permanently in the project area, there is also a significant transitory 
migrant labour force that travels to the uplands from neighbouring provinces as a 
means of extending the agricultural season. These temporary workers rarely feature in 
official statistics but are thought to be an important component in the pattern of 
agricultural expansion seen in the project area because of the extra labour they 
provide. 
Bunong culture and institutions 
A typical Bunong household is made up of a married couple, their children (including 
those who have married but not yet moved out) and any surviving parents who are too 
frail to live alone. Household members jointly farm their land and mostly share food 
and income. Many of the households in a typical settlement are closely related by 
blood or marriage and there are strong traditions of sharing and interest-free loans 
between family and close neighbours, providing a key livelihood coping strategy 
(Evans et al., 2003). Most households have two residences, a permanent house in the 
main settlement and a smaller camp close to their fields, which may be some distance 
away.  
The Bunong have a deep connection with the natural environment. As with most of 
the minority indigenous peoples in Cambodia, the Bunong have a strong animalistic 
belief system (Kuoy, 2013), which is linked to many rituals and ceremonies 
throughout the year in worship of the spirits that they believe inhabit the hills, forest 
and streams around each settlement (Evans et al., 2003). These beliefs are 
incorporated into customary laws, which prohibit clearance of forest in the immediate 
vicinity of settlements, in burial forests or in so-called spirit forests (Fox et al., 2008).  
Traditionally, the governance structure was village-based, with no higher-level 
institutions (Scott, 2009). Today, traditional village level institutions survive 
alongside state administrative roles (e.g. village chief), protected area authorities (e.g. 
FA, police and military police) and NGOs (e.g. WCS and local development partners), 
such that institutional controls on behaviour are both formal and informal. Village 
elders (purahn ban) play important roles resolving disputes, presiding over 
ceremonies and advising other villagers about the harvest of natural resources or 
clearance of forest (UNDP, 2010). The spokesman for the village elders (antreahn) 
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also performs a key mediation role, brokering resolutions to disputes and awarding 
sanctions for those considered to have broken rules. Sanctions typically take the form 
of gifts, such as chickens or rice wine, to aggrieved parties or to the whole village if 
the offence is judged to be serious. In several villages, these institutions have merged 
such that the traditional role of mediator often falls to the village chief, a political 
appointment. Internally within the village, new institutions are emerging through the 
creation of resource management committees associated with various NGO 
interventions. While these committees are ostensibly based on traditional institutional 
structures, with village elders making up the majority of committee members, the 
roles and responsibilities of the committees are more formalised and larger in scope 
than would traditionally have been the case. 
Livelihoods 
Although livelihood strategies throughout the project area depend on the terrain, the 
majority of indigenous households would traditionally have cultivated hill rice and a 
diverse range of vegetable and fruit crops to meet their subsistence needs, 
supplemented by the consumption and sale of forest products (most notably liquid 
resin collected from tapped dipterocarp trees). In a survey of resin-tappers, Evans et al. 
(2003) found that the sale of liquid resin on average contributed $338 to total 
household incomes annually. In upland areas, rice is traditionally grown in rain-fed 
sloped fields, which are cultivated for a period of two to three years before being 
allowed to return to fallow. This type of farming is carried out in a rotational system 
with new fields cleared on a regular basis from land previously set to fallow. However, 
these rotational periods were severely disrupted by the forced evictions carried out by 
the Khmer Rouge, with the result that many areas that would previously have been 
part of the rotational cycle now hold 40 years or more of forest growth. In lowland 
parts of the project area, there is some rotational farming but the majority of 
households practice more productive, but sedentary, paddy rice cultivation. As 
traditional livelihood systems relied heavily on small-scale swidden agriculture, only 
a modest proportion of communal lands were cultivated at any one time. While 
swidden land use has often been considered to have a negative impact on forest 
ecosystems and subjected to efforts to ‘stabilise’ agricultural production (e.g. Lao 
land reforms; Ducourtieux et al., 2005; Lestrelin, 2010), there is evidence to suggest 
that such systems can be sustainable (Fox et al., 2000).  
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Although the majority of indigenous households in project villages maintain 
traditional livelihood strategies, there has been an increasing trend towards the 
adoption of commercial agriculture observed throughout the uplands region (Fox et 
al., 2008; Milne, 2013). This is bringing more and more families into the market 
economy, although it should be noted that the Bunong have a long history of trading 
(McAndrew, 2009). The introduction of cashew, and more recently cassava, is 
thought to have contributed to significant expansion in the area of land farmed per 
household (T. Evans, pers. comm.). This expansion is also thought to have affected 
fallow cycles, with many plots now being planted with cashew rather than being 
allowed to return to fallow.  
2.4. Site management  
The majority of Cambodia’s protected area network was created during the 1990s, 
and is managed by the Ministry of Environment (MoE). However, little was 
understood about the areas gazetted due to on-going conflict during this period. As 
such, PAs created at this time were little more than paper parks (Wilkie et al., 2001), 
and many continue to be so. From 2002, a series of Protected Forests have been 
created by Prime Ministerial sub-decree and are managed by the FA. Consequently, 
the Cambodian protected area network is made up of sites managed either by the MoE 
or FA. Most of theses site are located in remote forested areas, with lower population 
densities and higher poverty levels than more accessible parts of the country (World 
Bank, 2009). Under the 2005 Forestry Law and 2008 Protected area Law, livestock 
grazing and the extraction of “traditional subsistence” levels of timber and NTFPs by 
local communities are permitted. Commercial logging and clearance of forest are, 
however, illegal.  
The main threats to wildlife at the study site come from the illegal clearance of forest 
and both commercial and subsistence hunting (Walston et al., 2001, Evans et al., 2003, 
Evans et al., 2012a). Until 2012, the majority of forest losses were thought to be 
caused by small-scale agricultural expansion and clearance by immigrant households. 
In addition to these small-scale land grabs, there has been a significant increase in the 
area of forest cleared by economic land concessions (ELCs). The granting of these 
large scale, agro-industrial plantations has increased dramatically across the country, 
with ELCs covering 381,121 ha granted in 2012 alone (of which over 70% were 
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within existing protected areas; ADHOC, 2013). In response to growing unrest, a 
moratorium on the granting of new ELCs was introduced in 2012, although 
applications that are claimed to have been “in the pipeline” continue to be approved 
(ADHOC, 2013). In addition to land grabs, another threat to wildlife and local 
livelihoods is illegal logging. Loggers commonly target high value timber species, 
including those tapped by local villagers for the collection of liquid resin, and hunt 
while camped in the forest. Recent discussions with villagers throughout the protected 
area have highlighted the loss of resin trees as a growing concern, particularly in areas 
located close to those granted as ELCs (unpublished data). Conservation activities to 
mitigate these threats have focused on law enforcement, community engagement, 
biological monitoring and participatory land use planning. Consequently, there are 
many more controls on resource use than in the past, with timber, land and certain 
wildlife species subject to legal protection. However, the collection of liquid resin is 
permitted throughout the site and the trees from which the resin is collected are 
protected under law. Sanctions for those individuals caught extracting resources 
illegally are minimal and typically comprise the confiscation of tools and whatever 
harvest the individuals have been caught with.  
Proposals for carbon financing of forest conservation in the area are well advanced, 
and are being led by WCS at the request of the Cambodian government. These 
proposals focus on the core protection zone, with participating villages located within 
or in close proximity to this zone (Figure 2.2). These villages are divided into 17 key 
villages (those with farmland or residential land in the project area) and three other 
user villages (those documented to have regular, significant forest use in the project 
area but no agricultural or residential land inside). In the key villages, the whole 
village is involved in most aspects of the project, as most or all families are natural 
resource users; in the other user villages project activities are focused only on those 
families identified as being regular users of the project area (which in certain cases is 
only a small minority of all families). The majority of villages within the site are 
comprised of a number of discrete settlements, which can often be located several 
kilometres from each other but still belong to the same administrative village unit. In 
many cases similar conditions are found in each of the settlements but in one or two 
cases livelihood opportunities may be significantly different (for instance if one 
settlement is more inaccessible than others). 
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Figure 2.2: Landscape showing the location of the 17 key villages and 3 other user villages participating with the project and identified for inclusion in the social 
monitoring framework (from WCS, 2013).  
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Under the Seima Protection Forest REDD+ Demonstration Project, WCS is providing 
technical assistance to the FA to develop a site-based carbon offset project under the 
REDD+ framework. Credits will be generated in the core protection area of SPF, 
which is a designated national REDD+ demonstration site (FA, 2010). The project is 
currently undergoing validation against the two leading voluntary market standards, 
the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS), which focuses on quantifying emission 
reductions, and the Climate, Community and Biodiversity (CCB) Standard, which 
focuses on assuring social and environmental co-benefits. Conservative projections 
suggest the site can generate emissions reductions of 300,000 tCO2e per year beyond 
baseline levels (WCS, 2013). Revenues from the sale of credits generated by the 
REDD+ project are expected to expand opportunities for conservation activities, 
including greater emphasis on incentive based approaches (Milne et al., 2012). 
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Chapter 3 
3. Assessment of progress towards social targets of the Seima 
Protection Forest conservation programme 
3.1. Introduction 
There is increased awareness of the need for more effective monitoring and evaluation 
of conservation outcomes and impacts. Enhanced monitoring would enable 
conservation practitioners to assess the effectiveness of conservation policies, add 
transparency and accountability to decision-making, detect potential issues and 
identify possible remedial actions (Margoulis et al., 1998; Ferraro & Pattanayak, 
2006; Stem et al., 2005). Where commitments have been made to minimise or 
eliminate negative impacts on local people or to deliver positive benefits, effective 
social monitoring and assessment of impacts is essential (Brockington & Schmidt-
Soltau, 2004). To be effective, social impact assessments must be able to differentiate 
between different groups and measure changes in well-being across groups, 
particularly those considered to be most vulnerable to environmental change (Adger, 
2006; Daw et al., 2011). Such assessments can also bring practical benefits to the 
implementation of conservation policies, particularly in early stages, by improving 
understanding of the social context in which conservation operates and identifying 
existing social and economic trends under current conditions (Brechin et al., 2002).  
One of the key challenges surrounding any impact assessment is the concept of 
attribution, defined here as the ability to ascribe particular observed social changes, 
such as household well-being, directly to project activities and not other drivers of 
change (Richards & Panfil, 2011). As conservation projects typically operate within 
highly complex and dynamic social environments (Berkes, 2004), the concept of 
attribution becomes particularly important. Without it, social changes (both positive 
and negative) may be attributed to project activities, even if these changes would have 
occurred if no project activities had taken place at all. Such issues can be addressed by 
using quasi-experimental matched methodologies, in which control areas are 
identified that resemble the project site but where no project activities are conducted 
(e.g. Naughton-Treves et al., 2011; Clements & Milner-Gulland, in press; Clements et 
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al., in press). However, these approaches are costly and it can be difficult to identify 
conditions that closely match project sites or that are not subject to alternative 
interventions. Matched approaches have also been subject to criticism regarding the 
ethics of repeatedly surveying people who are not benefiting from project activities 
(Richards & Panfil, 2011). In development economics, where matching techniques are 
also applied, there are concerns that matching compares poorly with the results of 
randomised controlled trials (Duflo et al., 2008). An alternative approach to impact 
assessment, which is recommended for use in guidance issued by the Climate, 
Community and Biodiversity Association (CCBA), utilises the theory of change 
(ToC; Richards & Panfil, 2011). This approach is claimed to overcome the issue of 
attribution by testing a priori hypotheses regarding cause-and-effect relationships 
between project activities and social outcomes, and relies upon the careful selection of 
monitoring indicators that reflect attributable social changes. This has the advantage 
over quasi-experimental approaches that there are no requirements to identify control 
areas or survey households not directly affected by the project, but attribution is less 
robust in the absence of a counterfactual.  
Although the framework of reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD+) brings little new to the table in terms of how conservation is 
implemented on the ground (Blom et al., 2010; Clements, 2010), its emergence has 
been greeted enthusiastically by some conservation organisations and national 
governments, who perceive its potential to secure funding for the long-term protection 
of forested areas. Whether or not this potential is realised remains to be seen. Yet due 
to its regulated nature and significant investment in readiness activities, REDD+ has 
been well placed to incorporate and develop requirements for the assessment of the 
social impacts associated with its implementation. At the national scale, a set of seven 
safeguards for REDD+ implementation was agreed at the Conference of the Parties 
for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 
Cancun in 2010. Included in these safeguards, was the commitment to incentivise the 
“protection and conservation of natural forests and their ecosystem services, and to 
enhance other social and environmental benefits” (UNFCCC, 2010). This was 
supported a year later by Decision 12/CP.17 of the UNFCCC Durban Outcome, in 
which party states agreed to implement a national level safeguards information system 
to systematically monitor how REDD+ safeguards are being addressed (UNFCCC, 
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2011), and reiterated by the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ in 2013 (UNFCCC, 
2013). These developments have been matched at the project level, where voluntary 
projects certified as meeting the Climate, Community and Biodiversity (CCB) 
standards, must demonstrate that there has been a net positive impact on local 
communities as a result of project activities (CCBA, 2013). As such, REDD+ 
activities implemented at both national and project scales should benefit local people 
and include a component to assess the social impacts associated with those activities. 
In order to satisfy the requirements for social impact assessment for projects applying 
for certification under the CCB standards, PA authorities at SPF designed a social 
monitoring framework for the study site (WCS, 2013). This framework is based on 
the ToC-based approach to social impact assessment of REDD+ projects 
recommended by the CCBA (Richards & Panfil, 2011). Under this methodology, 
“causal chains” are used to conceptualise linkages between project goals and activities. 
To do this, project proponents made use of a conceptual model previously created in 
2006, and updated in 2011 as part of the development of the REDD+ project at the 
site, which linked project targets to conservation activities and to direct and indirect 
threats (Figure 3.1; WCS, 2013). Indicators were selected to measure progress 
towards each target.  
In this chapter, I investigate social trends in the 20 villages participating in the 
REDD+ demonstration project at Seima Protection Forest for the period between 
2007 and 2012, utilising the indicators selected for the social monitoring framework 
described above. The aim of this analysis is threefold:  
1. to provide a baseline picture of trends in site demography, household 
economic well-being and resource security to inform the analyses presented in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
2. to evaluate the social impacts of activities implemented at the study site in 
advance of REDD-linked social programmes in relation to two key stated 
targets of conservation management of the site: 
 increase security and productivity of natural resources to support local 
livelihoods 
 ensure sufficient farmland to support the livelihoods of current 
residents  
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GOAL 
A well-managed forest landscape that supports increasing wildlife populations and improving livelihoods for the people who currently live there 
Maintain the variety, integrity, 
and extent of all forest types 
Increase populations of wildlife of 
conservation concern 
Sufficient farmland to support the 
livelihoods of current residents 
Increase security and productivity of natural 
resources to support local livelihoods 
1. Develop the key legal 
and planning documents 
needed to manage SPF 
2. Reduce forest crime 
through direct law 
enforcement 
3. Establish sustainable 
community use of land and 
natural resources; adapt to 
climate change 
4. Support alternative 
livelihoods that reduce 
pressure on forest and NR; 
adapt to climate change 
Population 
growth, in-
migration, better 
access 
Undefined 
borders and 
regulations for 
the SPF 
Clearance for land 
concessions and 
other projects 
Forest clearance/grabbing by individuals 
Over-fishing, over-hunting of wildlife 
illegal logging and overexploitation of NTFPs 
Land alienation and 
legal conflict 
Limited land 
productivity 
Weak traditional 
institutions and 
lack of voice 
Scarcity of sustainable 
dev. livelihood 
opportunities, on and off 
farm 
5. Effective monitoring 7. Sustainable finance 6. Effective administration 
Future 
climate 
change? 
[Impacts not 
yet known] 
TARGETS 
DIRECT  
THREATS 
INDIRECT  
THREATS 
DIRECT 
INTERVENTIONS 
SUPPORTING 
INTERVENTIONS 
 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual model developed by PA authorities for Seima Protection Forest REDD+ Demonstration Project (from WCS, 2013)  
 
29 
3. to investigate the appropriateness of the indicators selected for these two 
targets as part of the monitoring framework for social impact assessment at the 
site. 
For this analysis, I designed a household survey, which was undertaken in 2012, to 
supplement existing monitoring activities at the study site and to build upon the 
results of a complementary survey undertaken across the same landscape in 2007. 
Where data were previously lacking, the 2012 survey creates a baseline for the 
indicators selected by project proponents for the assessment of social co-benefits and 
impacts expected to arise from the REDD+ project under development at the site. For 
data collected in both 2007 and 2012, progress towards project targets is evaluated by 
assessing the trends in selected indicators. As such, the 2012 survey forms a key 
component of the social monitoring system developed by PA authorities for the 
REDD+ project. In addition to the analysis of social trends and impacts of 
conservation activities at the study site, I present a discussion of lessons learned from 
the implementation of this survey and associated implications for future social impact 
assessment at the site. 
3.2. Methods 
Indicator selection 
For each indicator selected to measure progress towards the two project targets 
concerning local livelihoods, I identified the expected trend that would indicate that 
progress had been made towards the respective project target (Table 3.1). In all cases, 
the business as usual trend (i.e. in the absence of project activities) was thought to be 
negative, and so a positive trend was not necessarily required to indicate a positive 
impact, as a stable trend could indicate that the project was having at least some 
positive effect. In these cases, however, an observed negative trend would be 
inconclusive in light of a lack of a counterfactual.  
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Table 3.1: Selected indicators for the two social management targets identified for Seima 
Protection Forest. The expected trend that would indicate progress towards project targets is 
given for each indicator. 
Project target Indicator  With-project expected trend 
(2007-2012) 
1. increase security 
and productivity of 
natural resources to 
support local 
livelihoods 
1. resin tree ownership: 
 1a. no. of households  
 1b. no. of trees per 
household 
1c. reported number of 
meat meals in a week 
1d. reported household 
resource security 
increased or stable security, 
abundance and productivity of 
harvested natural resources  
2. ensure sufficient 
farmland to support 
the livelihoods of 
current residents  
2. land ownership 
measures:  
 2a. average holdings 
 2b. % landless  
increased average area of 
household land holdings, stable 
or reduced proportion of 
landless households  
Target 1: increase security and productivity of natural resources to support local 
livelihoods  
Security of natural resources can be understood in a number of different ways, which 
may reflect aspects of tenure (i.e. the legal rights of resource users to access, use or 
claim ownership of resources) or the sustainability of resource use. In the context of 
the project target evaluated in this chapter, resource security is taken to mean the 
long-term supply of the forest-derived natural resources upon which local livelihoods 
depend. The project target is, therefore, interpreted as a stated intention to manage the 
study site in such a way as to ensure the long-term protection and sustainable supply 
of key natural resources within SPF. This is a difficult quantity to measure, as changes 
in the use of different forest products may be caused by a number of factors, such as 
varying demand or changes in stock levels. For this reason, three separate indicators 
were selected to measure progress towards the target in addition to a poverty score 
derived for each household. These included two variables focussed on household 
access or use of resources (household resin tree ownership and the number of wild 
meat meals eaten by a household in a week) and a third variable looking at reported 
perceptions of household resource security as defined above.  
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Resin tree ownership: 
As liquid resin has previously been shown to provide a significant proportion of 
household income at the project site (Evans et al., 2003), the trees from which resin is 
collected are considered to be an important household resource. These trees are 
subject to customary tenure rules, which give ownership rights to individual 
households. As such, tree ownership is an important indicator of the security of 
natural resources that support local livelihoods. The total number of trees that can be 
tapped is finite and considered to be saturated (i.e. all trees mature enough to be 
tapped are already owned by a household; Clements, 2012). The transfer of ownership 
is largely through inheritance. When children reach marrying age and form new 
families, they are typically given a small number of trees by their parents. Few trees 
are reported to be sold. The biggest threat to resin trees comes from illegal logging, 
particularly in areas close to economic land concessions (H. Travers, pers. obs.). 
Although local communities respect customary ownership of resin trees, illegal 
logging teams target resin tree species because of the high value of the dipterocarp 
timber. Consequently, the loss of trees to illegal loggers has the potential to reduce 
total resin tree stocks and, hence, undermine local livelihoods. Stability in the number 
of households that own trees and the number of trees owned by resin tapping 
households would indicate that resin trees are being successfully protected. As resin 
tree species are some of the most valuable timber species in the project area, resin tree 
numbers also provide an indication of the success of wider forest protection.  
Meat meals: 
Wild protein sources are important for rural households, particularly the poor (Milner-
Gulland & Bennett, 2003). As such, the number of meals eaten that contain wild meat 
(including fish) could be an indicator of natural resource security. Stable consumption 
would indicate that wild meat resources are sufficiently stocked to be able to continue 
to support extraction, although this would not necessarily indicate that extraction 
levels were sustainable into the longer term. However, as households within the 
project area become better off or more farming-dependent, some households may 
switch to alternative meat sources, such as farmed livestock or imported fish, as has 
been noted in other contexts (Brashares et al., 2004; Wilkie et al., 2005). A decline in 
the average number of wild meat meals eaten under such circumstances would not 
necessarily indicate a decline in wild stocks. However, a decline in the number of 
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wild meat meals concurrent with a decline in the total number of meat meals eaten 
(from both wild and farmed sources) could be expected to be indicative of a reduction 
in wild stock levels. Hence this ratio was chosen as the indicator. 
Perceived resource security: 
The final indicator selected to measure household resource security was simply the 
reported perceptions of those households interviewed for the 2012 livelihood survey. 
Each respondent was asked whether they felt secure about their access to natural 
resources, including agricultural land, resin trees and other forest resources, and the 
reasons why they felt this way. 
Target 2: sufficient farmland to support the livelihoods of current residents 
The second target identified in the conceptual model for the project is to ensure that 
sufficient farmland is available to support current livelihoods. Limited land 
productivity is a direct threat to sustainable livelihoods in the project area, as low 
yields and extensive land use practices increase the demand for smallholder farmers to 
clear more forest in order to meet their production needs. Two indicators were 
selected by WCS to monitor this target: average household land holdings and the 
proportion of households without any land at all. 
Household land holdings: 
Household land use patterns have changed dramatically in the period between the two 
surveys in 2007 and 2012. In part this is due to the emergence of cassava, which was 
introduced in 2005/6 by Vietnamese traders. This crop has changed the prevailing 
agricultural system practiced in the project area, with a wave of cassava adoption 
spreading throughout SPF as access to villages improves and the prices offered by 
traders increase. The emergence of cassava, and to a lesser degree other cash crops, 
has increased the incentive for farmers to claim extra land by clearing more forest. It 
is expected that increased land tenure security amongst many of the project villages as 
a result of project activities will encourage farming households to make the most of 
this opportunity, whilst restricting encroachment into conserved areas (see Chapter 4). 
Of the 20 project villages, 15 villages have received or are in the process of applying 
for communal land tenure in recognition of customary land rights (A. Diment, pers. 
comm.). Land designated to communal title is managed by a village committee, which 
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then grants plots to individual households. For many households, this process is 
expected to give them access to greater areas of agricultural land and, hence, the 
average area of household land holdings is an important indicator of the success of 
this programme. However, unrestricted expansion of agricultural lands remains a 
threat. As such, it is important also to monitor the number of households that hold 5 
ha or more land. The threshold of 5 ha was selected, as this is the area that households 
are limited to by community regulations governing communally titled areas or legally 
in the case of individual land titles. 
Land alienation: 
As commercialisation of agriculture spreads throughout the project area, household 
livelihoods are increasingly dependent upon access to land. As such, households are 
becoming progressively more vulnerable to land alienation. At the same time, 
pressure from immigrant households and influential external interests is serving to 
increase the price of land and draw in additional land speculation. More widely, land 
disputes between local communities and large companies have increased dramatically 
throughout Cambodia (ADHOC, 2013). Whilst SPF has largely been unaffected by 
the impacts of the widespread granting of ELCs, three rubber concessions have 
recently been granted in the buffer zone, illustrating the increasing threat of 
dispossession and land alienation to local livelihoods. Minority indigenous 
communities, such as those found in the project area, are particularly vulnerable to 
dispossession as a result of debt, misinformation, weak political voice or extortion. In 
order for the project to achieve its target of sufficient land for local communities, it 
will be necessary to simultaneously protect communities from the threat of land 
alienation. As such, the extent of landlessness within the project area is an important 
indicator against which to measure success. 
Vulnerable groups 
One of the key requirements of any social impact assessment is to be able to detect 
project impacts on different socio-economic groups within target communities, 
particularly those considered most vulnerable to change or adverse impacts. To this 
end, I identified several potential vulnerable groups (Table 3.2).  
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Table 3.2: Hypothesised vulnerable and special interest groups identified for the impact 
assessment. These groups are not exclusive and so it was possible for households to be classified 
as belonging to more than one group. 
Potential vulnerable 
households 
Reason for testing 
widow-headed  widow-headed households are likely to be more vulnerable 
to shocks and have fewer livelihood opportunities.  
dependent  households that consist entirely of an elderly couple (and 
possibly grandchildren) may be more vulnerable to shocks. 
These households are also likely to have fewer physical 
resources as these are often given to their children upon 
marriage. 
landless landless households lack the means to grow their own food 
and may be dependent on daily wage labour opportunities. 
Landlessness can also be a sign that the household has fallen 
into debt and has sold their land as a consequence. Not all 
landless households are poor, as some households may 
consciously choose to focus on other livelihood activities. 
non timber forest 
product (NTFP) 
collectors 
NTFP collectors have been classified here as non-timber, 
non-liquid resin collectors. Commonly collected NTFPs 
include rattan, bamboo, honey and wild fruit and vegetables. 
Although there is a degree of overlap between the two 
groups, many NTFP collectors do not have resin trees to 
support them. NTFPs are thought to offer a safety net to 
households that experience hard times, and those households 
that collect them may be particularly vulnerable to losses in 
forest resources. 
labour sellers households that are dependent on daily wage opportunities, 
which are low in some villages, are more likely to have poor 
access to important resources, such as land and resin trees. 
indigenous  as the majority of households in the project area are 
indigenous, there is little evidence to suggest that they are 
more vulnerable than any other group. It is possible that this 
may change in the future, however, as there have been 
increasing numbers of migrant households and indigenous 
households can be vulnerable to land alienation.  
resin tappers resin tree owners are not necessarily a vulnerable group, 
having access to a resource that is less subject to fluctuating 
yields than some crops. Tappers with few trees are more 
vulnerable to losses, however, and this group is of special 
interest to the project as it seeks to protect forest resources 
with the project area. 
Once vulnerable groups were selected, trends for these groups could be investigated 
in addition to those for the overall population. In some instances, certain groups were 
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identified for monitoring despite not proving vulnerable overall because of their 
special interest to the project (e.g. resin tappers, indigenous households).  
Household livelihood survey 
Twenty target villages were identified through initial consultations between PA 
authorities and potential forest users in the REDD+ project area. A quantitative 
household livelihood survey was conducted in all of these villages between April and 
July 2012. This survey was designed to complement a livelihood survey conducted in 
2007 to create a social baseline against which impacts of the REDD+ project could be 
assessed. As such, the survey was designed for repeated iterations over the period of 
the REDD+ project, which influenced some aspects of the design. The survey 
interviews were conducted by a Cambodian organisation, the Centre for Development 
Orientated Research in Agriculture and Livelihood Systems (CENTDOR), which 
specialises in independent monitoring and evaluation of rural development projects. 
The survey was carried out in this way in order to minimise the risk that interview 
respondents tailored their responses to what they thought PA authorities wanted to 
hear.  
In all bar three villages, at least 30 households were randomly selected for inclusion 
in the survey, with 622 households interviewed overall. In the remaining three 
villages, there were insufficient households in the village at the time of the survey to 
be able to sample at least 30, and so all available households were sampled. For 
villages that are separated into discrete settlements, the sample was proportionally 
stratified by settlement. For example, if a village comprised two settlements of 200 
and 100 households, the team would survey 20 households in the larger settlement 
and 10 in the smaller. Within each settlement, households were randomly selected 
from a list of households kept by the village chief. Where possible, interviews were 
conducted with those individuals identified as the household head. In cases where the 
household head was unavailable for extended periods, their spouse was interviewed 
instead. Interviewers followed a structured questionnaire with a final qualitative 
section focusing on perceptions of livelihood changes. All interviews lasted for 
approximately one hour, with respondents compensated for their time. 
The 2007 survey was conducted by the monitoring and evaluation unit of Cambodian 
Centre for Development and Study in Agriculture (CEDAC), which was subsequently 
 
36 
established as CENTDOR in 2008. For this survey, 400 households from 14 villages 
were interviewed, with sampling approximately proportionally stratified by village, 
such that the majority of interviews were conducted in more populous villages. As in 
2012, households were randomly sampled in each village and interviews were 
conducted with the household head. 
The basic necessity survey 
Although the 2012 survey was designed to produce compatible results with those 
produced by the 2007 survey, there were methodological differences between the two 
surveys, so that improvements could be made to the protocol used and to the content 
of the questionnaire. The most significant of these differences was in the handling of 
household economic well-being. The 2007 survey focused heavily on the collection of 
income data but as livelihood strategies within project villages are vulnerable to 
stochastic events, such as poor weather or flooding, income data can be highly 
variable both spatially and temporally. This can make comparisons between different 
parts of the landscape or different years difficult. For example, the rice harvest of 
2006 was particularly poor and many households who were interviewed during the 
2007 survey had been badly affected. Conversely, the rice harvest of 2012 was 
generally good. Hence, any comparison of incomes between the two years would be 
biased and likely to suggest a greater improvement in economic well-being than was 
actually the case.  
In order to overcome this issue, an alternative metric of household economic well-
being was selected: the household poverty score derived from following the basic 
necessity survey method (Davies, 1997). This is a survey instrument that provides a 
participatory poverty index of sampled households, which is derived from ownership 
and access data for a list of household assets and services. For the 2012 survey, a list 
of 40 different assets and services was compiled at a workshop held at the FA’s Seima 
headquarters in April 2012 (see CENTDOR (2012) for a more detailed description of 
the workshop). This workshop was attended by 24 participants from villages located 
in the three different livelihood zones, who were selected to represent different socio-
economic groups with each village by project staff with a good knowledge of each 
community. Following the adapted definition used by Clements et al. (in press), basic 
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necessities were defined as the “minimum requirement for living that all households 
of the community should have and no-one should not have.” 
Each household sampled was asked whether they had access to or owned each item on 
the list. For each item the respondent was also asked whether they believed that item 
to conform to the definition of a basic necessity. Each household’s poverty score was 
calculated by adding the weighting for each item (calculated from the proportion of 
respondents who agreed that an item was a basic necessity) that that household had 
access to or owned, provided that at least 50% of respondents thought that those items 
were basic necessities. For example, if a household owned four items, which were 
thought to be basic necessities by 41%, 22%, 86% and 79% of respondents 
respectively, their poverty score would be 0.86 + 0.79 = 1.65. These scores were then 
converted to a proportion of the total possible score. In 2012, 32 of the original 40 list 
items were thought to be basic necessities by over 50% of households sampled. Items 
that less than 50% of people would think were basic necessities were included in the 
list to make respondents think carefully about whether each item conformed to the 
definition and to future proof it against potential increases in wealth. 
Comparison of 2007 and 2012 household poverty scores 
A basic necessity survey component was not included as part of the landscape-wide 
livelihood survey in 2007, but data were collected on 11 assets and services that 
appeared as items in the 2012 list. Two methods were tested to derive an adjusted 
poverty score for 2007, using ownership data for just these 11 items.  
The first method simply found a reduced poverty score for the 11 items for which data 
was collected in 2007 by summing the 2012 weightings for each item owned. This 
gave a reduced score based on 2012 perceptions of whether or not those items met the 
definition of a basic necessity. In the second method, a new score for households in 
2012 was calculated using the 21 items for which no data was collected in 2007. This 
adjusted score was then regressed against dummy ownership variables for the 11 
items using the linear mixed modelling method described below, which provided 
linear coefficients for each item plus a best linear unbiased predictor for each village. 
A predicted poverty score for the 21 items not covered by the 2007 survey was then 
calculated from these coefficients and added to the score for the 11 items included in 
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both surveys. This gave an estimate for both time periods of the poverty score derived 
for all 32 items, as opposed to the score for only the 11 items common to both surveys 
given by the first method. 
Before comparisons could be made between the two time periods, it was necessary to 
test the extent to which the adjusted poverty scores calculated using the two methods 
were representative of the score calculated for the full 32 items used to calculate the 
overall poverty score for each household in 2012. Pearson's product-moment 
correlations comparing the adjusted scores with the full poverty score were found for 
households sampled in 2012. These showed that the reduced score derived using the 
first method provided a closer correlation (correlation coefficient = 0.90) with the 
original full score and so this method was preferred as the basis for making 
comparisons between the two time periods.  
In order to compare the reduced poverty scores from the two surveys in greater detail, 
a linear mixed model was constructed following the approach described below, with 
reduced poverty score as the response variable. The final model included some 
explanatory variables that were different to those used to investigate the overall 
poverty score in 2012. Two changes were necessary because the survey data collected 
in 2007 did not allow for the calculation of household adult male equivalence and no 
data were collected regarding labour constraints. Consequently, total household size 
was used as a substitute for adult male equivalence and whether a household was 
labour constrained was omitted from the model. A third change was made to 
substitute a dummy variable for landlessness for the reported area of land claimed per 
household, as landless households are one of the vulnerable groups identified above. 
Finally, a survey year dummy variable was added to test for changes in poverty score 
between the two surveys and an interaction term between this dummy variable and the 
distance to the nearest market was also included. 
Data analysis and statistical modelling 
One of the main issues that had to be addressed before making comparisons between 
the results of the 2007 and 2012 surveys was the difference in sampling density 
between the two surveys and the difference in the villages included in each survey. In 
2007, sampling in each village was done on an approximately proportional basis, with 
the consequence that very few interviews were conducted in some of the smaller 
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villages. In 2012, the sampling design was modified to make it easier to monitor 
variations in indicator trends between villages over time. Consequently, different 
sampling densities were used for the two surveys. For each time period, weighted 
means and standard errors were calculated for each indicator using sampling weights 
for each village equal to the number of households in a village at the time of the 
survey divided by the number of households sampled during that survey. As the 
number of villages included in the survey was increased in 2012 to ensure that all 20 
project villages were monitored, comparisons are made solely on the basis of those 
villages that were sampled in both surveys but excluding Kmom and Sre Andaol, as 
land use data for these two villages were considered unreliable for the 2007 survey.   
Due to the sampling design of the two surveys and the overall aim of the monitoring 
programme, analyses of longitudinal trends were based on comparing the results of 
cross-sectional analyses of each time period (rather than a panel analysis), as it was 
felt that this approach offered multiple advantages over the length of the REDD+ 
project. Cross-sectional sampling does not carry the risk of participant attrition to 
which repeat surveys are vulnerable, nor does it put so much of a burden on 
respondent households. Furthermore, newly arrived or formed households would 
continually need to be added to a repeated survey. Finally, it can be very difficult to 
match households between surveys, particularly if the household head dies, members 
move away or the children marry and form new households.  
Statistical modelling was conducted to give a greater understanding of indicator 
trends and the socio-economic groups associated with different activities. Continuous 
variables were analysed using linear mixed models (LMMs) and binomial or 
Bernoulli variables were analysed using generalised linear mixed models (GLMMs). 
For each analysis, a number of household demographic and livelihood variables were 
investigated as explanatory variables (see Appendix A; Table A.2 for a description of 
the household variables investigated). For analyses in which the data from all sampled 
households were included, the area of land reported by each household was 
transformed by taking the natural logarithm of reported area plus the square of the 
first quantile divided by the third quantile. This constant was added to account for 
zero values.   
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Backwards stepwise model selection was carried out on the basis Akaike information 
criterion values (AIC; Akaike, 1974). If candidate models had a ΔAIC value of less 
than two then the most parsimonious model was selected, otherwise the model with 
the lowest AIC was selected (Burnham & Andersen, 2002). Marginal and conditional 
R2 statistics were calculated for LMMs following the method proposed by Nakagawa 
& Schielzeth (2013). These can be interpreted as the variance explained by the fixed 
effects and whole model respectively. Selected models were checked for residual 
normality, heteroskedasticity and correlations between fixed effects and the residuals. 
Over-dispersion in binomial logistic regression models was checked by comparing the 
sum of squared Pearson residuals with the approximate residual degrees of freedom. 
No issues were found. 
3.3. Results 
Population and immigration 
In 2006, the total number of households in the project villages and settlements for 
which data are available for both time periods (17 villages plus two settlements) was 
1838 (Evans, 2007). In 2012, the household population for the same villages and 
settlements had grown to 2768, representing an overall annual growth rate in the total 
number of households of 7.1%. However, this growth was not distributed equally 
between the project villages. Three villages (O Am, O Rona and Sre Preah) alone 
account for 75.3% of the increase in the total number of households and if these 
villages are excluded from the calculations, the resultant annual growth rate in the 
total number of households is reduced significantly to 3.8%. As these three villages 
are located closest to the district capital of Keo Seima District (Figure 2.2), this result 
suggests that much of the overall increase in the number of households is due to 
immigrant Khmer households from other provinces moving into the project area in 
search of land. This is further evidenced by the resultant shift in the proportion of 
indigenous households in the project area. In 2006, the percentage of indigenous 
households in comparable project villages (i.e. those with sufficient data in both time 
periods to be able to make a comparison) was 67.2% but this had dropped to 54.6% 
by 2012, a reduction of over 10% in just 6 years. Until a recent drive to title 
household claims to land in 2012/13, the vast majority of land claims from migrant 
households were illegal. However, land claimed by immigrant households was 
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excluded from negotiations over indigenous land title, which reduced the legal 
entitlement of the native Bunong communities to the natural resources on which their 
livelihoods depend. As of yet, this wave of immigration has been restricted to the 
southern lowland part of the protected area but recent improved road access to other 
parts of the project area has already increased the level of immigration (H. Travers, 
pers. obs.). As such, any conservation activities planned for the project site must take 
account of the effect that migrating households may have. 
Household poverty score 
The main metric used for assessing the economic well-being of households from the 
20 participant villages was the score derived from the basic necessity survey, which 
ranges from 0 to 1 (with higher scores indicating better off households). The poverty 
scores for households sampled in 2012 range from 0.10 to 0.82 (for weightings used 
to calculate household poverty scores see Appendix A; Table A.1). This clearly 
illustrates the extent of the difference in economic well-being between the poorest and 
best off households in the project area. The distribution of scores is approximately 
normal with a mean score of 0.44 (SE = 0.13; Figure 3.2). Once differences in the 
number of households in each of the villages across the project area were accounted 
for, the adjusted average household poverty score for the landscape increased to 0.47 
(SE* = 0.04).   
 
Figure 3.2: Distribution of full household poverty scores from the 2012 quantitative household 
livelihood survey. 
A linear mixed model was constructed in order to investigate the demographic and 
livelihood factors that were most strongly correlated with household economic well-
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being, with household poverty scores as the response variable and village as a random 
effect (Table 3.3). Included in the final selected model were nine explanatory 
variables: three related to household demographics and six related to livelihood 
strategy or opportunities. This correlates very closely with a similar analysis of basic 
necessity poverty scores for households in northern Cambodia (Clements et al., in 
press). 
Table 3.3: Coefficient estimates for the LMM with the full household poverty score for 2012 as 
the response variable. Standard errors are given in parentheses. 𝑹𝒎
𝟐  = 0.363, 𝑹𝒄
𝟐 = 0.416. Resin 
tree ownership at the intercept was taken to be 0-50 trees.  
Variable Estimate  t value  
intercept 0.487 (0.018) 27.148 
adult male equivalence +0.005 (0.002) 2.203 
widow -0.038 (0.012) -3.127 
ln(area of land + 0.3738) +0.050 (0.006) 8.073 
owns 51-150 resin trees +0.031 (0.011) 2.943 
owns > 150 resin trees +0.055 (0.017) 3.164 
shop owner +0.080 (0.014) 5.585 
labour seller -0.064 (0.009) -7.355 
employed +0.034 (0.012) 2.892 
service provider +0.034 (0.015) 2.268 
labour constrained -0.025 (0.008) -3.036 
distance to nearest market [km] -0.002 (0.000) -5.850 
The resultant linear coefficients estimated by the model provide a useful guide to 
understanding which socio-economic groups are most economically vulnerable. The 
results suggest that the most disadvantaged households with respect to poverty scores 
were households with little or no productive land, households with few or no resin 
trees, households in which the husband had died, households that were part of the 
wage labour market and households that reported being labour constrained. Of the 
seven hypothesised vulnerable groups presented in Table 3.2, only widow-headed, 
landless and labour selling households were found to have reduced poverty scores. 
Ethnicity was not a significant explanatory factor of household poverty score. This is 
likely to be due in part to other variables associated with being an indigenous 
household that were included in the model (e.g. resin tree ownership) but also the fact 
that indigenous households are the majority ethnic group within the project area. 
Interestingly, no effect was found from being an NTFP user despite the collection of 
NTFPs commonly being associated with poorer households (Wunder, 2001), although 
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this is possibly because households with many resin trees (and hence wealthy) spend 
longer in the forest and will collect other NTFPs at the same time.  
The strongest effect on household poverty score of all those identified was for the 
reported area of productive land claimed by each household. As reported areas were 
log transformed and a constant added to account for skewness and the presence of 
zero values respectively, interpretation of the resulting coefficient estimate is not 
straight forward. Plotting the estimated relationship between household poverty score 
and reported productive areas overcomes this problem and shows that the reported 
area under cultivation is strongly associated with economic well-being for the range 
of areas reported in the survey (Figure 3.3). It is also clear that households with little 
or no land were strongly disadvantaged. 
 
Figure 3.3: Estimated relationship between the full household poverty score and the total 
reported area claimed per household. The vertical dashed line is drawn at the mean area of 
productive land claimed per household. 
In addition to the effects of household explanatory variables, much of the variation in 
household poverty scores was accounted for by the inclusion of the village that each 
household was resident in as a random effect in the model and the distance of the 
village from the nearest all day market. The effect of distance to the nearest market, 
which is a good proxy for the remoteness of each village, is such that for the most 
remote village, Sre Khtong, household poverty scores decrease by 0.16. This is 
strongly indicative of the reduced livelihood opportunities in more remote villages, as 
fewer traders come to those villages and the cost of transporting goods is higher. The 
residual effect associated with each village can be seen through estimating best linear 
unbiased predictors (BLUPs) for the village random effect, which for the purposes of 
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this analysis can be conceptualised as the equivalent of the linear coefficients found 
for the explanatory variables. Plotting the BLUPs for each village shows that, despite 
quite large 95% confidence intervals, there is significant difference in the effect that 
the conditions in different villages (excluding remoteness) have on household poverty 
scores (Figure 3.4).  
 
Figure 3.4: BLUPs for the village random effect. The x-axis shows the effect of living in a 
particular village in terms of the difference to the full household poverty score from the intercept. 
Error bars show the 95% confidence interval for each village.  
Adjusted poverty scores were used to compare household economic well-being 
between 2007 and 2012. For the 11 items used to create the adjusted poverty scores, 
these scores ranged from 0.08 to 0.83 in 2007 and from 0 to 1 in 2012 (Figure 3.5). 
Correcting for the different numbers of households in each of the villages surveyed in 
both 2007 and 2012 gives average adjusted poverty scores of 0.42 (SE* = 0.07) for 
2007 and 0.50 (SE* = 0.07) in 2012. Despite similar means for the two surveys, there 
is a right-hand skew for households in 2012. 
A linear mixed model was constructed to investigate changes in adjusted poverty 
score in greater detail (Table 3.4). The effect of the survey year dummy variable 
shows that there was a significant increase of 0.15 in the adjusted household poverty 
score between the two surveys in 2007 and 2012. This showed that, on average, 
households have access to or own more of those items classified by their peers as 
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basic necessities. As such, these results confirm that household economic well-being 
has improved over the period between the two surveys. However, with the exception 
of distance to the nearest market, no interaction terms were included in the model. 
This suggests that there have been no significant improvements in equity, despite 
overall improvements in economic well-being, as some socio-economic groups 
maintain their advantage while others remain more economically vulnerable.  
 
Figure 3.5: Comparison of the distribution of adjusted household poverty scores between the 
2007 and 2012 quantitative household livelihood surveys.  
Table 3.4: Coefficient estimates for the LMMs with the adjusted household poverty score as the 
response variables. Standard errors are given in parentheses. 𝑹𝒎
𝟐  = 0.330, 𝑹𝒄
𝟐 = 0.335. 
Variable Estimate  t value  
intercept 0.358 (0.023) 15.542 
household size +0.020 (0.003) 7.145 
widow +0.054 (0.018) -3.289 
landless -0.064 (0.019) 2.726 
owns 51-150 resin trees +0.033 (0.015) 2.218 
owns > 150 resin trees +0.069 (0.025) 4.644 
shop owner +0.112 (0.024) -8.804 
labour seller -0.116 (0.013) 3.377 
employed +0.071 (0.021) 7.306 
service provider +0.059 (0.022) -2.927 
survey year (2012) +0.146 (0.020) 2.672 
distance to nearest market:survey year (2007) -0.001 (0.000) -2.218 
distance to nearest market:survey year (2012) -0.003 (0.000) -6.200 
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One exception to this can be found by comparing the effect of the interaction terms 
between the distance to the nearest market and the survey year dummy variable on 
household poverty scores. In 2012, the effect of living further from the nearest market 
was three times stronger than for 2007. For some of the most remote villages, this 
increased disadvantage due to distance from market centres is sufficient to offset the 
gains suggested by the survey year. As such, households in these villages have 
effectively experienced no improvement in household poverty scores. These results 
suggest that, whilst overall levels of household economic well-being are improving 
across the project area, development is occurring at different rates. Households in the 
most remote villages have yet to experience much or any benefit, while those 
households living in villages close to market centres are developing more rapidly.  
Resource security 
Resin tree ownership 
In 2007, 216 out of 398 households (54.3%) reported owning resin trees, 
approximately the same proportion as in 2012, when 301 of the 622 households 
sampled (48.4%) reported owning resin trees. Applying population weightings for 
each of the villages sampled in both surveys gives an adjusted proportion of 0.45 
(SE* = 0.11) of households owning trees in 2007 and 0.34 (SE* = 0.15) in 2012. 
Given population growth between the two surveys, this result suggests that, whilst the 
proportion of households that own resin trees has decreased, the absolute number of 
resin tree owners may have increased slightly (741 in 2007 to 864 in 2012). Of those 
households that reported owning trees, the average number owned in villages 
surveyed in both years was 93 trees in 2007 and 99 trees in 2012 respectively. This 
suggests that, as both the absolute number of households with resin trees and the 
average number of resin trees owned has increased between 2007 and 2012, the total 
number of resin trees being tapped may also have increased. However, the differences 
found between the two years are within confidence intervals and so it is not possible 
to say this with any certainty. Similarly, though, there is no evidence of a significant 
decrease in resin tree numbers.  
In order to assess the trends in resin tree ownership in more detail, a generalised linear 
mixed model, with a resin tree owner dummy variable as the response was 
constructed (Table 3.5). Five explanatory variables were included in the final model: 
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household size, indigeneity, landlessness, whether the village sampled was situated in 
the core zone and a dummy variable for the year of the survey. The variable with the 
greatest effect was whether a household lived in the core zone, which significantly 
raised the probability that households would own resin trees. Indigenous households 
were also significantly more likely to own resin trees. Household size was positively 
correlated with the probability of owning resin trees and landless households were 
found to have a reduced probability of tree ownership, although the effects of both of 
these variables were marginal. A small effect was also found for the survey year 
dummy, which shows that households experienced a marginal drop in the probability 
of owning resin trees between the two survey years. This drop does not necessarily 
indicate a decline in the security of this important resource. The number of resin trees 
suitable for tapping within a certain area is limited and it is thought that all available 
trees are tapped (Evans et al., 2003). Hence, as the population grows, it is to be 
expected that the proportion of households with trees might fall. Provided that the 
decline in the proportion of resin tree owners was not coupled with a fall in the 
number of resin trees owned per household, it is considered likely that tree numbers 
were relatively stable.  
Table 3.5: Coefficient estimates for the GLMM with the probability of owning resin trees. The 
difference in probability was found by a reverse transformation of the logit link function used in 
the GLMM for households of sample average size. Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
Significance values: ** = P < 0.01; *** = P < 0.001.  
Variable Estimate P  
intercept 0.013 (0.065) *** 
household size +0.007 (0.002) *** 
indigenous +0.118 (0.044) *** 
landless -0.023 (0.005) ** 
in core zone +0.418 (0.260) ** 
survey year (2012) -0.020 (0.004) *** 
To check this, a linear mixed model was constructed to estimate the number of trees 
owned by each resin tree owning household, correcting for household socio-economic 
factors. The only variable that was found to be correlated with the number of resin 
trees owned was the adjusted household poverty score (Table 3.6), a relationship that 
has already been observed (Table 3.4). The dummy survey year variable was not 
included in the final selected model, suggesting that there was no significant change 
in the number of resin trees owned per household between the two surveys. This 
stability in the number of trees per household suggests that the observed decline in the 
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proportion of resin tree owning households is likely to be due to the increase in the 
number of households in the study area rather than a decline in the absolute number of 
households involved in tapping. One caveat to this result is that both the marginal and 
conditional R2 statistics for the model are low, which may suggest that reporting of 
resin tree numbers is unreliable. 
Table 3.6: Coefficient estimates for LMMs, with the natural logarithm of trees owned by resin 
tree owning households as the response variable. Standard errors are given in parentheses. 𝑹𝒎
𝟐  = 
0.034, 𝑹𝒄
𝟐 = 0.149. 
Variable Estimate  t value  
intercept 3.848 (0.129) 29.753 
adjusted poverty score +0.080 (0.020) 3.914 
In 2012, respondents were also asked if they had been affected by companies or 
outsiders logging their resin trees in the past five years. In total, 23 households (3.7%) 
from 10 different villages responded that they had lost trees, at an average of 115 each. 
It is possible that the number of trees reported as lost has been inflated in individual 
cases, and in some villages it is surprising that so many trees were reported lost by 
one household but no other households had seemingly been affected. While the 
number of losses does not appear to be high enough to have significantly affected the 
average number of trees owned by resin tapping households, the reported losses 
represent a significant loss of potential income for those households affected and 
indicate that some logging of resin trees is occurring within the landscape. 
Wild Meat Meals 
In 2007, the average number of meals that contained meat from any source was 14.2 
(68% of meals), of which 4.4 meals (21% of meals) contained wild meat. In 2012, the 
average number of meat meals was 11.3 (53.7% of meals), of which 3.6 meals (17% 
of meals) contained wild meat. There are very strong spatial effects associated with 
the number of wild meat meals consumed. As such it is difficult to explain the 
differences in consumption patterns without taking account the variation between 
villages. Correcting for variation between villages, by applying population weights to 
calculate a weighted average, gives an adjusted population-wide average number of 
meat meals 12.9 per household (of which 2.9 meals contained wild meat) in 2012. 
Comparing adjusted values for households in villages sampled by both the 2007 and 
2012 surveys shows that the average number of meat meals decreased from 15.8 
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meals per week in 2007 to 13.5 meals per week in 2012 and wild meat meals eaten 
decreased from 5.2 to 3.1.  
A generalised linear mixed model was constructed in order to understand which 
socio-economic variables were correlated with the number of wild meat meals 
consumed in 2012 (Table 3.7). The results of this model reveal a significant effect of 
household opportunity to hunt or fish on the number of wild meat meals eaten: resin 
and NTFP collectors spend more time in the forest, service providers spend longer in 
the village and widows and labour constrained households have less time available to 
hunt or fish than larger households or those with available labour. The effect of 
household poverty score also suggests that consumption of wild meat declines with 
increasing household economic well-being, although households that are in debt eat 
fewer wild meat meals a week (possibly because they sell any meat that they catch).  
Table 3.7: Coefficient estimates for the GLMM with the number of wild meat meals consumed 
per household in one week in 2012 as the response variable. The difference in the number of wild 
meals eaten was found by a reverse transformation of the logit link function used in the GLMM 
for an average household (i.e. assuming sample average adjusted poverty score, household size, 
education level and distance to nearest market). The difference in number of wild meat meals 
consumed provides an estimate of the effect of belonging to each of the different socio-economic 
groups included in the model. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance values: ** = 
P < 0.01; *** = P < 0.001. 
Variable Estimate P  
intercept 1.605 (0.530) *** 
adjusted poverty score -0.665 (0.014) *** 
household size +0.055 (0.018) ** 
number of years education +0.093 (0.014) *** 
resin tree owner +0.422 (0.113) *** 
service provider -0.391 (0.131) ** 
NTFP collector +0.997 (0.128) *** 
widow -0.311 (0.111) ** 
in debt -0.430 (0.070) *** 
household labour constrained -0.398 (0.065) *** 
feels resources secure +0.217 (0.095) * 
distance to nearest market +0.040 (0.011) *** 
in core zone +1.561 (0.861) ** 
The estimates for village level explanatory effects (distance to nearest market and 
whether the village is inside the core zone) reveal a similar picture, with households 
in those villages close to all-day markets eating markedly fewer wild meat meals than 
more remote villages were alternative meat sources are less available. Households 
living in villages located inside the core zone were found to eat significantly more 
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meat meals per week than those living outside the core zone, suggesting that 
conservation activities may be having a positive effect on household protein intake or 
that there is lower availability of alternative protein sources, such as market-bought 
fish. Alternatively, this result may be an artefact of lower enforcement effort in more 
remote villages. Together, these results demonstrate the relative importance of spatial 
effects on the number of meat meals consumed per household as opposed to those 
associated with belonging to different socio-economic groups. Overall, a complex 
pattern emerges, with the number of wild meat meals consumed determined by 
availability (living within the forest), the time available to households to spend 
hunting or fishing, the resources available to each household and opportunity to 
choose alternative meat sources. Consequently, whilst the number of wild meals eaten 
appears to have declined, it is difficult to attribute this decline to a reduction in stock 
levels. However, as the total number of meat meals eaten from any source has also 
decreased slightly, it is possible that there has been a decline in stocks that households 
have not been able to replace.  
Perceived household resource security 
The results to the question on whether survey respondents felt secure regarding the 
resources upon which they rely showed little variation between villages, with the 
exception of O Chrar, O Rona and Sre Khtong (in which lower than average levels of 
resource security were reported and which had all been recently affected by 
concessions or illegal logging) and Pu Trom (in which higher than average security 
was reported and which has an elephant sanctuary located close by with strong links 
to the local community and ties to the conservation project). In total, 271 households 
(44.9% of those that responded to this question) felt secure about their resources. 
Correcting for population differences between villages gives a marginally different 
adjusted figure for the whole project area of 47.6%. Of those households that felt 
secure about their resources, the presence of conservation in the area was cited by 
59.8% of respondents (Figure 3.6). For those that did not feel secure about their 
resources, concessions (56.9%) and illegal logging (33.1%) were cited as the two 
biggest threats. 
A GLMM was constructed to understand which households felt most secure about 
their resources, with the probability of feeling secure as the response variable (Table 
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3.8). All of the explanatory variables included in the final model were found to be 
associated with feeling insecure (i.e. having a lower probability of feeling secure) and 
were related to those households who rely on natural resources the most. Households 
who collect NTFPs, have many resin trees or live in the core zone were found to feel 
the least secure, all of whom are most reliant on natural resources. In many respects 
this is unsurprising, as those with the most to lose could be expected to be most 
concerned about the security of the resources upon which they rely, but it does show 
that there is progress to be made with regard to increasing the security of natural 
resources at the site.  
 
Figure 3.6: Reasons given for why respondent households felt secure about their resources 
Table 3.8: Coefficient estimates for the GLMM with the probability of feeling secure about 
natural resources important for livelihoods. The difference in probability was found by a reverse 
transformation of the logit link function used in the GLMM for an average household (i.e. 
assuming sample average number of resin trees per household). Standard errors are given in 
parentheses. Significance values: * = P < 0.05; ** = P < 0.01; *** = P < 0.001. 
Variable Estimate P  
intercept 0.618 (0.054) ** 
NTFP collector -0.210 (0.045) *** 
no. resin trees -0.001 (0.000) * 
in core zone -0.145 (0.068) * 
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Sufficient farmland to support livelihoods 
Household land use 
In 2007, the weighted average area of productive land claimed per household for the 
villages sampled in both periods was 1.8 ha, with 70 households (20.2%) reported to 
be landless. In 2012, the weighted average area of productive land for the same 
villages had increased to 2.3 ha per household, with only 32 households (7.2%) 
landless. Across the full 20 project villages, the weighted average land holding was 
found to be 2.4 ha per household. Amongst those households with land, the average 
reported area of land held increased from 2.2 ha to 2.6 ha per household between 
2007 and 2012. However, it is likely that these figures do not reflect the true extent of 
increases in land use (see Chapter 4).  
A linear mixed model of the log-transformed area of land claimed per household was 
constructed for land owning households (Table 3.9). The results of this model show 
the variable with the greatest explanatory power in both time periods is the adjusted 
household poverty score, with an increase of 0.1 in household poverty score found to 
be associated with a 19.1% increase in household land. It is likely that this 
relationship acts in both directions. Better off households are more able to acquire 
additional land and have the resources to cultivate it, while acquiring more land is 
likely to bring in greater earnings and, therefore, increase household economic well-
being. A dummy survey year variable was not included in the final model, which 
suggests that in real terms, despite increases in household economic well-being 
between the two surveys, there has been no significant increase across the landscape 
in the area of land held by households. As with the model of the number of resin trees 
owned, both the marginal and conditional R2 statistics are low. Given that no other 
correlation was found, this supports the argument that reporting of areas is unreliable.  
Table 3.9: Coefficient estimates for LMM with the log transformed reported area of land claimed 
per household as the response variable. Standard errors are given in parentheses. 𝑹𝒎
𝟐  = 0.175, 
𝑹𝒄
𝟐 = 0.216. 
Variable Estimate  t value  
intercept -0.439 (0.095) -4.608 
adjusted poverty score +1.908 (0.162) 11.767 
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The proportion of households that reported owning more than 5 ha was also virtually 
unchanged between the two surveys, with 5.5% of households with more than 5 ha in 
2007 and 4.8% in 2012. This suggests that the number of households complying with 
community regulations or legal restrictions on land ownership may be relatively 
stable, although it is difficult to give too much credence to these figures given that 
interview respondents are unlikely to admit to rule breaking.   
Land alienation  
The results of the two household livelihood surveys show that the percentage of 
landless households decreased between 2007 and 2012 (20.2% and 7.2% respectively). 
Correcting for variation between villages by applying population weights gives 
slightly revised figures of 19.8% landless households in 2007 and 8.3% in 2012. 
These figures suggest that complete land alienation is less of a problem than before. A 
generalised linear mixed model was constructed to investigate the probability of 
households being landless in the two surveyed time periods in more detail (Table 
3.10). Household poverty score, whether the household owned resin trees and a 
dummy survey year variable were all included in the final selected model. The 
relationship between landlessness and poverty score has already been shown, and the 
model confirms that households with lower poverty scores have a higher probability 
of being landless than those with higher scores. Resin tree owning households were 
also considerably less likely to be landless. This is unsurprising, as owning resin trees 
is closely associated with household well-being. For a household of average poverty 
score, the probability of being landless fell by 0.15 between the two surveys, 
suggesting that progress has been made towards reducing the extent of land alienation 
in the study site. This is particularly heartening given that a programme of 
participatory land use planning has been the one of the major conservation activities 
implemented over this period.  
Table 3.10: Coefficient estimates for the GLMM with the probability of a household being 
landless as the response variable. The difference in probability was found by a reverse 
transformation of the logit link function used in the GLMM for an average household (i.e. 
assuming sample average household poverty score). Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
Significance values: ns = P > 0.05; *** = P < 0.001. 
Variable Estimate P 
intercept 0.214 (0.083) ns 
adjusted poverty score -0.039 (0.001) *** 
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resin tree owner -0.143 (0.024) *** 
year (2012) -0.154 (0.019) *** 
In 2012, interview respondents were also asked if they had lost any land to companies 
in the last 5 years. Ten households (1.6%) from seven villages reported losing land, at 
an average of 3.3 ha each. As with resin tree losses, the magnitude of these losses is 
unsubstantiated but suggests that households remain at risk of losing land to 
companies granted economic land concessions.  
3.4. Discussion 
In general, the overall status of the indicators considered in this chapter is largely 
encouraging, particularly the improvements in household economic well-being 
observed generally and for all vulnerable groups. Whilst some groups continue to be 
at a disadvantage relative to other households, this has not prevented them from 
experiencing an overall improvement in economic well-being, as has been reported 
elsewhere in Cambodia (Clements et al., in press). The only caveat to this picture of 
landscape-wide development is for households located in the most remote parts of the 
project area, where distance to market centres offset the gains in economic well-being 
observed elsewhere. It is expected, however, that the economic well-being of these 
households will be found to have improved at the next iteration of the quantitative 
livelihood survey, as access to this part of the project area is improving year by year. 
Of the two social targets examined, progress has been made in relation to aspects of 
both of them. For the target to increase natural resource security, the results relating to 
the three of the main indicators considered suggest, on balance, that the key resources 
upon which people’s livelihoods depend continue to be protected. Whilst the 
probability of a household owning resin trees has fallen marginally, this can largely be 
attributed to the increasing number of households living in the study site and the 
number of resin trees owned by those households that have trees appears to be stable. 
The number of wild meat meals per week has fallen but it is not clear whether this is 
associated with increased availability of alternative protein sources or a decline in 
stock levels. Perceptions of resource security were not recorded in 2007 so a 
comparison between the two years was not possible. However, nearly half of all 
households feel secure about their resources, of which the majority attribute this 
feeling to conservation activities.  
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For the second target of ensuring sufficient farmland to support household livelihoods, 
progress was more clear-cut. Most positive was the significant reduction in the 
percentage of landless households, a group shown to have lower household economic 
well-being than those with at least some productive land. As one of the main 
interventions undertaken by the project in this period has been a programme of 
participatory land use planning and indigenous land titling, in which the indigenous 
communities of six villages have now been granted communal land title, this trend 
demonstrates encouraging progress towards the project target (Evans et al., 2012b). 
This is particularly encouraging given the high rates of landlessness across the 
country (UNDP, 2011). The average land held per household was less encouraging, as 
this does not appear to have changed. However, there are issues with using reported 
areas (as discussed below) and it is thought likely that the area of household land has 
in fact increased (see Chapter 4). 
Of the indicators investigated, most concerning are project-wide population trends 
and the percentage of households that feel insecure with regard to key natural 
resources: land, resin trees and forest products. Whilst the majority of the rise in 
household numbers has been centred on the lowland area close to the Keo Seima 
district town of O Am, other parts of the project area are experiencing higher than 
average growth. Immigration is a particular concern, as it is often cited as a reason 
why households feel insecure regarding their natural resources and is a significant 
driver of forest loss nationwide (Chan, 2008; McMahon, 2008; Biddulph, 2011). 
Efforts to curb immigration (mostly centred on the enforcement of protected area 
boundaries and community land use planning) are on-going but current trends remain 
a concern. So too does the percentage of households worried about their resources. In 
this case, the majority of households cited economic land concessions and illegal 
loggers as the main threats. It is expected that project efforts to protect resources from 
both of these threats will improve as a result of accreditation of the SPF REDD+ 
demonstration project and, hence, the percentage of households concerned for their 
resources is expected to fall. However, the level of perceived insecurity in relation to 
key natural resources is a concern, as it is throughout the country (Chan, 2008; 
Grimsditch & Henderson, 2009; Biddulph, 2011).  
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Data issues 
Whilst the picture presented by the results is generally positive, the quality of the data 
used must be taken into account. Many of the indicators considered were selected in 
such a way to minimise issues that can arise in areas where education and literacy 
rates are low and responses highly variable. For instance, one aspect of household 
livelihoods that is of particular interest is the income households receive from 
different livelihood activities. Whist data for this was collected in both the 2007 and 
2012 surveys, collection of income data can be subject to multiple issues, particularly 
if long recall periods are used (Bernard et al., 1984). Consequently, household 
poverty score was preferred for making comparisons in household economic well-
being between the two time periods. However, it was not possible to completely 
eliminate some of these sources of uncertainty, such as area estimation and short-term 
recall.  
Area reporting is particularly difficult. The majority of plots are irregularly shaped 
and are often located on steeply sloping ground that makes estimation problematic, 
even for experienced individuals and despite efforts to improve the quality of area 
data collection. During the implementation of the 2012 quantitative livelihood survey, 
trained CENTDOR enumerators paid particular attention towards assisting 
respondents in answering area questions as accurately as possible. In some cases, area 
estimation may also have been improved by the manner in which households sell their 
cassava. Often cassava yields are now sold on the basis of field area and an 
assessment of quality, not on actual yield, with cassava traders supplying the labour to 
harvest whatever the field yields (S. Milne, pers. comm.). Fields are measured as part 
of this process, which may aid some farmers in becoming more aware of their field 
sizes. These cases are the exception, however, and so area estimation remains an issue. 
In addition to the difficulties in estimation, there are also concerns that farmers may 
choose to deliberately misreport areas, particularly if they have cleared forest illegally 
outside of agreed community boundaries or have exceeded area limits. Analysis 
presented in Chapter 4, for which household plots were measured with GPS units, 
found significantly higher household land areas than those reported during the 2012 
livelihoods survey in the two villages sampled as part of this analysis. This is a 
concern, and it shows that more rigorous methods are required to collect data relating 
to the area under cultivation for each household.  
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Possibly the largest source of error in the data presented does not come from 
misreported values but from activities that were not covered by the 2012 survey for 
reasons of cultural sensitivity and because the CCB manual for REDD+ impact 
assessments states that illegal activities do not need to be considered when assessing 
the social impacts of projects (Richards & Panfil, 2011). In landscapes such as SPF, 
where involvement in small-scale illegal activity is high, this can lead to problems in 
interpreting the data. For example, if the project is successful in reducing illegal 
logging or forest clearance (both important targets with respect to REDD+), it is 
conceivable that household economic well-being indicators will reveal a net decline. 
Certain vulnerable groups, who may become involved in illegal activities for lack of 
alternative options, are likely to be disproportionately affected. In this situation, there 
are potentially complex trade-offs and synergies between conservation objectives. 
Effective action towards one project target (reduced deforestation or degradation) may 
seem to penalise progress towards another (increased economic well-being) for some 
groups (e.g. households involved in illegal logging) but benefit others (e.g. resin 
tappers). These trade-offs may even occur within the same household (i.e. a 
household may benefit from improved protection of resin trees but lose out if they are 
involved in illegal logging or land clearance). Under CCBA guidance, however, 
negative impacts from illegal activities can be ignored, but it is difficult to attribute 
reductions in household economic well-being to successful project activities without 
monitoring involvement in illegal activities. Complementary qualitative monitoring 
approaches, which can significantly improve understanding of research contexts 
(Drury et al., 2011), may serve to minimise the confounding effect of economic gains 
from illegal activities but it cannot be assumed to be eliminated entirely.  
Indicator selection 
One of the principal objectives of the 2012 quantitative livelihood survey was to test 
the appropriateness of the indicators selected as part of the social monitoring 
framework. The monitoring of social impacts resulting from project activities in a 
context such as SPF, where livelihood strategies are going through a period of 
significant change as a result of improved access and greater integration with the 
market economy, is highly complex, which makes it difficult to select indicators that 
reflect changes that are directly attributable to project activities or threats (as 
evidenced, for example, by the difficulties in interpreting trends in wild meat 
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consumption). However, identifying suitable alternative indicators is also difficult. 
For example, in order to assess progress towards the target of ensuring sufficient 
farmland to support household livelihoods, an understanding of how much land is 
needed to be sufficient is first required. This is problematic, since both agricultural 
productivity and livelihood strategies vary. A household that grows cash crops may 
require less land than one that grows rice. In this instance, it may be sufficient to ask 
each household if they are able to feed themselves without difficulty all year round, 
but subjective questions such as this are vulnerable to bias or strategic responses. 
Consequently, one of the key pieces of information required to assess progress 
towards this project goal remains illusive.  
This difficulty in selecting alternative indicators or indicators which provide clear 
evidence of positive or negative trends undermines the suitability of applying the 
theory of change based approach to impact assessment recommended by the CCBA. 
Although this approach has advantages in comparison to other more robust 
approaches, such as the use of matched samples (e.g. Arriagada et al., 2012; Clements 
& Milner-Gulland, in press) or randomised trials, it can be difficult to accurately 
assess impacts in contexts that are subject to strong external drivers of change in the 
absence of a counterfactual. Employing complementary qualitative methods, which 
would allow the project team to discuss the causes of observed trends with local 
communities, may reduce the challenge of interpretation. In addition, further 
refinement of some of the indicators included in the monitoring framework may be 
required. It is recommended that the causal chains presented within the conceptual 
model (Figure 3.1) are refined following the completion of the proposed qualitative 
discussions. In this way, the interpretation of changes in the status of different 
individual indicators can be improved and placed within the framework of each causal 
chain. For example, the interpretation of indicators related to the target of improved 
resource security should be considered in the context of changes to indicators for both 
the relevant direct and indirect threats identified in the causal chain for this target. If 
indicators change in the expected direction at each stage along the causal chain, 
greater confidence can be given to the resulting conclusions.  
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Chapter 4 
4. A tale of two villages: an investigation of conservation-
driven land tenure reform in a Cambodian Protection Forest 
4.1. Introduction 
Sparsely populated, resource rich forest habitats have frequently been subject to 
exclusionist policies by former colonial or national governments, repeatedly failing to 
recognise the rights of the people living inside such areas (Colchester, 2004). 
Biodiversity conservation has a particularly chequered past in this regard, with the 
protectionist ‘fences and fines’ approach dominating conservation practice throughout 
much of its history (Adams, 2004). Given the high biodiversity value of many forest 
habitats and often weak political representation of forest peoples, it is no surprise that 
this approach has brought conservation practitioners and forest inhabitants into 
conflict (Brockington & Igoe, 2006). More recently, Government efforts to meet 
commitments made under the Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) to set aside 
areas for the protection of biodiversity have brought further accusations of ‘green 
grabbing’ (Fairhead et al., 2012).  
From the 1980s onwards, however, there has been increased recognition of the 
customary rights of indigenous peoples (IPs), with both international and national 
legislation slowly moving to reflect this. This has been reflected within conservation, 
with article 8(j) of the CBD, decision 7.23 of the 2005 CBD Conference of the Parties 
and the CBD's 2010 Aichi target 18 all requiring signatories to respect the rights and 
practices of indigenous and local communities. Beyond international agreements, 
there has been increasing acceptance within conservation organisations that the rights 
of local communities must be considered, which has resulted in a movement towards 
the principle of ‘doing no harm’ as a minimum requirement (Adams et al., 2004).  
This change of approach is well reflected in the increasing trend towards the adoption 
and recognition of various forms of indigenous or community conserved areas 
(ICCAs). As of 2008, it was estimated that ICCAs encompassed over 400 million ha 
in 28 of the world’s 30 most forested states, a significant increase on similar 
 
60 
calculations from 2002 (Sunderlin et al., 2008). This represents a significant step 
forward in the recognition of customary tenure rights, although rights-related issues 
are often not the primary impetus behind the adoption of ICCAs (Berkes, 2009). One 
argument in support of ICCAs lies in their perceived effectiveness in providing 
greater protection benefits in comparison with more traditional forms of conservation 
management. Whilst there is no guarantee that ICCAs result in positive biodiversity 
outcomes, there is some evidence that points in this direction (for a review see 
Shahabuddin & Rao, 2010). Furthermore, as payments for environmental services 
schemes become increasingly widespread, clarification of disputed or informal tenure 
arrangements becomes ever more necessary to ensure that payments are effective and 
customary rights holders do not lose out (Engel et al., 2008; Milne & Niesten, 2009; 
Larson, 2011). 
In part, the success of rights-based approaches is dependent on the manner in which 
they are implemented. The rise of ICCAs was preceded by greater interest in 
participatory approaches to conservation (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Berkes, 2004) 
and in this regard participatory land use planning approaches have gained 
considerable support. Such approaches are thought to be an improvement on top-
down land use planning methods, ensuring that the process is more inclusive, makes 
greater use of local knowledge, reduces the risk of future disputes and supports local 
level institutional development (McCall & Minang, 2005; Cronkleton et al., 2010). 
Concerns have been raised, however, regarding the effect of participatory land use 
planning approaches on local land use and the degree to which land access ultimately 
reflects power arrangements within a village. In an investigation of pilot participatory 
land use planning projects in Laos, Lestrelin et al. (2011) found evidence to suggest 
that, despite village participation, the process resulted in maintenance of the status 
quo, with the extent of individual households’ access to land dependent on their 
power to negotiate with village elites. Despite participatory land use planning 
approaches being widely applied in multiple contexts and for different purposes, 
published case studies are rare and outcomes are often left unevaluated (Bourgoin, 
2012). Where case studies have been published, there is a distinct lack of analyses 
looking at how different groups within villages have been affected by and comply 
with the institutional changes brought about by participatory tenure reform 
instruments. 
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In this chapter, I seek to redress this gap. I evaluate the implementation of indigenous 
land titling, a product of a participatory land use planning process, in two villages in 
the Cambodian uplands, investigating at the household level how land use has 
evolved following the initiation of this process. I do this in the context of a dynamic 
but varying socio-economic landscape that is driving significant land use and 
demographic change. In this way, it is possible to compare the performance of tenure 
reform in two villages that have been exposed to different levels of social and 
economic change. 
An analysis of household land use change and compliance with both the legally 
binding zonation of community lands and community-agreed rules governing land use 
within community titled areas is presented. The land holdings of individual 
households had been measured at the beginning of the titling process in each village. 
These were re-measured for a sample of households in each village and compared 
with the size, location and use of the holdings to that recorded as part of the process. 
These data were used to evaluate the extent to which the indigenous customary lands 
and the agreed conservation areas of the two communities have been successfully 
protected from land conversion from forest to agriculture. The extent of individual 
household land use change since the start of the land tenure reform process was 
analysed, in the context of rapidly changing social and economic circumstances (in 
particular, immigration of poor landless households). Within this analysis, I 
investigate the effects of different socio-economic characteristics thought to affect 
land use decision-making, including ethnicity, available household labour, livelihood 
options, wealth and residency, on the behavioural response of households to land 
tenure reform. Household understanding of the tenure reform process and perception 
of tenure security in each of the study villages were also examined. This provides a 
valuable case study from which to draw lessons, not only for the implementation of 
land tenure reform for Cambodia’s minority IPs, but for participatory approaches to 
land use planning more widely.  
4.2. Indigenous land tenure reform in Cambodia 
Cambodia is home to several minority indigenous peoples. Although customs and 
practices vary between groups, Cambodia’s minority IPs have typically operated 
under a traditional system of collective customary land tenure with a strong spiritual 
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connection to the surrounding landscape, particularly forests (Baird, 2000; ADB, 
2002; Baird & Dearden, 2003; Fox et al., 2008; Simbolon, 2009). Traditional 
livelihood systems were largely based on small-scale swidden agriculture, with only a 
small proportion of communal lands cultivated at any single point in time. In recent 
years, however, there has been a shift in many communities away from traditional 
agricultural practices, with increasing reliance on the production of commercial and 
tree crops (Fox et al., 2008).  
Largely unaffected by the private property regime of French colonial rule, 
Cambodia’s IPs came under increasing pressure to integrate into Khmer society after 
independence, culminating in forced integration and mass resettlements during the 
Khmer Rouge period (1975-1979). Following Vietnamese invasion in 1979, 
Cambodia’s minority groups were allowed to return to their ancestral lands, although 
many did not return until the 1990s. After the 1991 peace accord, a series of laws 
aimed at reforming land ownership was enacted, most notably the 2001 Land Law. 
From the perspective of indigenous communities, the 2001 Land law is particularly 
important as it provides the legal basis to secure customary land rights as well as 
safeguarding these rights until such a time as the legal title is granted. Once title is 
granted, these lands are classified as state private lands, meaning that they remain the 
property of the state but have no public interest (Oberndorf, 2005). As such, 
communities do not hold the right to dispose of their land. In order to apply for 
indigenous communal tenure (ICT), a community must first register as an indigenous 
community (IC) and be recognised as such by the Ministry of the Interior. Progress 
towards ICT has been slow, with only eight villages having received title at the time 
of writing (a further 190 are planned; Milne, 2013).  
Despite legal reform recognising the rights of IPs and rural smallholder framers, land 
disputes, alienation and large-scale land grabbing are frequent and widespread. While 
large-scale land acquisitions are by no means a recent phenomenon in Cambodia, the 
situation has been greatly exacerbated in recent years. The human rights NGO 
ADHOC reports that 2,657,470 ha (approximately 17% of the total land area of the 
country) had been granted as economic land concessions (ELCs; areas of up to 10,000 
ha granted to industrial companies for intensive agriculture), as of December 2012 
(ADHOC, 2013). Not only has this had extreme implications for Cambodian 
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smallholder farmers but also for conservation. In 2012 alone, ELCs covering 381,121 
ha were granted, of which over 70% are within existing protected areas. Given the 
high degree of overlap between Cambodia’s indigenous peoples and the country’s 
protected area network, efforts to secure the customary rights of IPs may also serve as 
added protection from ELCs for protected areas.  
4.3. Land tenure reform in the two villages 
The research presented in this chapter was undertaken in two villages, Andong 
Kraloeng and O Rona, in Mondulkiri Province, northeastern Cambodia (Figure 4.1). 
Both villages are located within Seima Protection Forest (SPF; Chapter 2). The 
predominant minority indigenous group in the area are the Bunong, who belong the 
Mon-Khmer language family (Bourdier, 2009). During the Khmer Rouge period, the 
area was almost totally abandoned, as households living there were forcibly resettled 
in the lowland north of Mondulkiri Province, with the majority of families returning 
in the 1990s and early 2000s. The resulting loss of knowledge regarding customary 
land use led PA authorities to initiate a programme of working with indigenous 
communities to map their customary use areas and to plan future land use. This 
programme, which was piloted in Andong Kraloeng in 2003 and later expanded to 
include other villages, involved a series of consultations with local communities, 
following procedures based on the government’s manual for participatory land use 
planning (Rock, 2001).  
Andong Kraloeng is a Bunong village, consisting of six smaller sub-village 
settlements, located within the densely forested core zone of SPF on the main road 
between Phnom Penh and the provincial capital, Sen Monorom. Despite being 
situated along the main road, it has been little affected by immigration from other 
provinces. In 2011, a sub-decree was passed recognising the rights of the Andong 
Kraloeng IC, making them the third IC nationally to be granted rights over their 
customary land (UNOHCHR, 2011). The second study village, O Rona, is located at 
the edge of SPF and the adjacent Snoul Wildlife Sanctuary, managed by the Ministry 
of Environment (MoE), and consists of five smaller sub-village settlements. 
Historically, the village was an indigenous Bunong community but in recent years it 
has been heavily affected by an influx of immigrant Khmer families seeking land. As 
the village is situated close to both the district capital and the border with Vietnam, it 
 
64 
is considerably more integrated into the market economy than Andong Kraloeng. This 
has affected traditional livelihoods, with a greater reliance on commercial agriculture 
readily apparent amongst Bunong households. It also presents a greater threat to 
community lands from speculators and immigrants; at the time that the land tenure 
reform process was initiated in 2005, there were 35 claims to land inside the 
traditional village boundary from households living in other villages. 
 
Figure 4.1: Map of Seima Protection Forest (2,927 km2), showing the location of the two study 
villages.  
At the start of the ICT process in both villages, a provisional Indigenous Community 
was set up. Under Cambodian law, formal recognition by the Ministry of the Interior 
of a community’s status as an indigenous community is a legal pre-requisite for 
applications for ICT. For each IC, PA authorities facilitated the selection of a 
management committee, with committee members drawn mainly from traditional 
village elders. Every indigenous household living in the village at that time elected to 
join. Following this, the former extent of customary use was investigated using a 
variety of sources (including historical topographical maps, aerial surveys, forest 
inventories and local knowledge) and all land holdings within the provisional village 
area were mapped by PA authorities. On completion, a series of areas was created 
delineating different land uses (Table 4.1). These included areas designated for 
current and future agriculture, as well as community forest in which the only form of 
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resource use permitted is the collection of non-timber forest products (NTFPs). These 
zones are managed by the IC committee.  
Table 4.1: Details of the participatory land use planning process in the two study villages. Land 
inside areas designated for agriculture is a mix of cultivated land and forest that, as yet, has not 
been cleared.  
 Andong Kraloeng O Rona 
land use designations:   
residential/agriculture 1,323 ha 1,477 ha 
NTFP forest 23,584 ha 2,274 ha 
spirit forest 43 ha 44 ha 
burial forest 27 ha - 
total village area 25,003 ha 3,795 ha 
   
IC formed/land mapped 2003 2005 
ICT application 2008 2009 
ICT zones redrawn 2010 Dec 2012 
ICT granted 2011 2013 
   
Population (heads):   
start of PLUP process 390 (2004) 573 (2006) 
June/July 2012 563 1041 
   
number of households:   
start of PLUP process 89 (2003) 121 (2006) 
June/July 2012 124 229 
In addition to the creation of the different land use areas, the ICT process supported 
the agreement of a series of rules governing household land use, made enforceable by 
traditional village sanctions, to assist in the management of village land. These 
regulations, which were largely drawn up from informal traditional practices, were 
designed to allow the IC to plan for future growth but also to protect traditional 
livelihoods. As such, limits were put on the area of paddy land and tree crops allowed 
for each household. A village constitution, which details the formal composition of 
the committee, the goals of the IC and criteria for IC membership, was also drawn up.  
The main difference between the procedure followed in O Rona and that of Andong 
Kraloeng was the number of Khmer migrant families living in the village at the time 
of the ICT process. Under the 2001 Land Law, households are entitled to claim 
ownership of occupied land provided their claim had been uncontested for at least five 
years prior to the promulgation of the law. Land claimed after 2001 is not eligible for 
private ownership and under law remains state property. Although the ICT process in 
O Rona included every household living in the village, Khmer families were only 
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permitted to retain the land they already occupied. Any expansion of their land within 
those areas identified for future agricultural use would be illegal under the 2001 Land 
Law. This created a two-tiered system within the village, with Khmer immigrant 
households granted fewer rights than their returnee Bunong neighbours. This was not 
an issue in Andong Kraloeng as there were no Khmer households in the village at the 
time of the ICT process. In both villages, the rules governing land use within the 
village area apply only to Bunong households and to the Khmer households present 
during the ICT process, as recent settlers are not permitted to claim any land within 
community titled areas. Newly formed households of married children of IC members 
automatically become members of the IC, with the accompanying land use rights and 
responsibility to abide by community regulations.  
4.4. Methods 
Fieldwork for the research was carried out in both villages between May and July 
2012, and consisted of a series of focus group discussions, household structured 
interviews and land use mapping.  
Focus group discussions 
The aim of the focus group discussions was to gain a better understanding of land use 
practices and to investigate local perceptions regarding land issues. Each focus group 
consisted of 8-15 participants and lasted approximately two hours. In each village, 
one focus group was held with members of the IC committee responsible for the 
management of community area. In O Rona, three additional focus group discussions 
were held, which separated participants who had been present at the time of the initial 
planning exercise and those who had not, as there is a strong distinction in rights 
between newly arrived and resident households. In Andong Kraloeng, immigration 
rates are low and the population relatively homogeneous, so this was not deemed 
necessary. 
Household interviews and land use mapping 
Structured household interviews and land use mapping were conducted for 114 
households, with 44 sampled in Andong Kraloeng and 70 in O Rona (approximately 
one third of the households in each of the study villages), stratifying proportionally by 
sub-village settlement and randomly sampling within each stratum. No households 
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living outside either of the villages were sampled. This approach provided a cross-
sectional sample and was selected to ensure that both newly arrived immigrants and 
newly formed households (e.g. through marriage) were included in the study. As the 
original land use mapping process included every plot of land within each community 
zone, a cross-sectional survey design provided sufficient matches between the two 
time periods to allow for simple panel analyses. 
The purpose of the structured interviews was to collect socio-economic and land use 
data for each household, as well as gathering information on perceptions of land 
issues and knowledge of the ICT process. Where possible, all interviews were 
conducted with the head of each household and lasted for approximately 45 minutes. 
Following the completion of each interview, all land parcels held by the respondent 
household were measured by walking the parcel edge and recording the path taken on 
GPS. Observations were made regarding the crops grown, the likely age of those 
crops and adjoining land uses and owners to triangulate information given during 
interviews.  
Land use mapping check 
A set of 100 random points was sampled across each village area, and the owner of 
the land at each point identified, in order to check whether information about sensitive 
plots was being withheld during the interviews. Given that a significant proportion of 
households hold land illegally, it was considered likely that participants might opt to 
withhold sensitive plots. As sampling within each village was incomplete and did not 
cover land claimed by outside interests, uncertainties existed regarding whether the 
team had been shown all plots used by the households sampled. Recent land cover 
analysis (WCS, 2013) and satellite imagery were used to identify areas under 
cultivation. Random points were generated within un-visited areas of cultivated land 
for each settlement using ArcMap version 10.0. Local guides or members of the 
village ICT committees assisted in identifying the landowner at each point. The 
names collated were then cross-checked against the list of households already 
interviewed to ascertain whether any plots had been withheld. This provided a 
measure of the number of withheld plots for each village. In cases where plots had 
been withheld, the household head was re-interviewed and the plot mapped. 
Interviewers were careful at this stage to stress that they were clarifying the details 
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given during the original interview and to avoid any inference that the respondent had 
deliberately misled the research team.  
Spatial compliance analysis 
Land use compliance was measured against two sets of criteria: with the law and with 
IC regulations governing land use within community boundaries. Plots measured in 
2012 as part of this research were compared with those of each household as 
measured during the previous ICT process and with the various boundaries created 
through the ICT process. In certain cases, records were incomplete, which had the 
effect of reducing the overall sample size for the compliance analyses to 105 
households. These spatial comparisons were carried out using Quantum GIS version 
1.8.0. A margin of error of 0.05 ha or 5%, depending on which was greater, was used 
to allow for differences in digital and physical boundaries.  
For Andong Kraloeng, these analyses were made more complicated as boundaries 
were changed in 2010. This created a situation where plots that had previously been 
compliant were made non-compliant and vice versa. In the former case, plots were 
considered to be compliant for the purposes of this analysis, despite the boundary 
changes. In the latter case, plots were considered non-compliant if they were outside 
community agricultural areas when initially cleared, but compliant if they were within 
community agricultural areas when cleared. For both cases, it was necessary to use 
reported plot age, triangulated against observations made during plot measurement, to 
check whether the plot had been cleared at the time the boundaries were changed. For 
O Rona, the boundaries had not been changed at the time of the survey so this was not 
an issue. In both villages, however, it was necessary to correct for whether or not each 
household was a member of the IC. In Andong Kraloeng, all non-members of the IC 
were excluded from holding land within the community area, but at the beginning of 
the ICT process all households were members of the IC. In O Rona, non-IC 
households that were present in the village at the beginning of the ICT process were 
allowed to keep the land they owned at that time but any further expansion was 
prohibited, while households that had moved to the village afterwards were excluded 
from claiming any land.  
In addition to analysing land use compliance with the law, compliance with five 
regulations governing land use within IC managed areas was also checked. These 
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were regulations banning: 1) buying, selling or renting land, 2) clearance of spirit or 
burial forest, 3) exceeding 2 ha of land for tree crops (such as cashew or rubber) per 
household, 4) exceeding 1 ha of land for cultivation of paddy rice per household and 
5) exceeding 5 ha of land under any form of cultivation per household. In each case, if 
these regulations had been broken prior to the rules being drawn up, then the 
household was considered compliant provided that there were no new infractions. For 
example, if a household cultivated 7 ha of land prior to the start of the ICT process, 
they were allowed to keep all 7 ha. If, however, they subsequently cleared more land 
within the community area, they were judged to be non-compliant with the 5 ha area 
limit. For the purposes of this analysis, only land within the community titled areas 
was considered, as the IC regulations only govern land use within these areas.  
Statistical modelling 
Linear and generalised linear mixed models (LMMs; GLMMs) were selected using 
backwards step-wise selection methods based on the small sample size corrected 
Akaike Information Criterion (AICc; Akaike, 1974; Burnham & Anderson, 2002)1. 
Models with the lowest AICc were selected except in cases where a more 
parsimonious model was found with a ∆AICc value of less than two. The variable 
settlement, which referred to each sub-village settlement surveyed, was included as 
the only random effect in all models (see Appendix B; Table B.2 for a list of the 
explanatory variables considered for each model).  
In order to model the area of household land claimed illegally, a hurdle modelling 
approach was used to account for the high number of zero values (Mullahy, 1986). 
Compliance with the 2001 Land Law was modelled first using a simple binary 
variable. Subsequent modelling of correlates of illegal land area claimed was carried 
out only for those households with some illegal land. All area variables were 
transformed using natural logarithms. In cases where area variables contained zero 
values, a constant equal to half the lowest non-zero value was first added to all data 
points. The exception to this was for the model of total area claimed per household. 
For this model, three zero value data points were removed and the sensitivity of the 
                                                 
1 All statistical analysis was carried out using R version 2.15.1, on RStudio version 0.97.314. Within R, 
the lme4 package version 0.999375-36 was used to analyse all models. 
 
70 
coefficients tested. Removing these data points did not have a significant effect on the 
model estimates and greatly aided interpretation of the results.   
In each case, once the final model had been selected, visual validation was conducted 
to check for residual normality, heteroskedasticity and possible correlations between 
fixed effects and the residuals. Over-dispersion in binomial logistic regression models 
was checked by comparing the sum of squared Pearson residuals with the 
approximate residual degrees of freedom. No issues were found in any checks. 
Marginal and conditional R2 statistics for LMMs were calculated following Nakagawa 
& Schielzeth (2013).  
4.5. Results 
Land Use Change in the Two Villages 
Andong Kraloeng 
In Andong Kraloeng, 44 households were interviewed, of which 43 currently claim 
land (for plan of mapped fields see Appendix B; Figure B.1). The area claimed by 
these households totalled 133 ha, with 119 ha in cultivation. This represents a 
significant expansion in the average area of land under cultivation per household, 
from 1.0 ha in 2004 to 2.7 ha in 2012 (Table 4.2). Extrapolating this land use for the 
entire village population gives a total area under cultivation of 334 ha, which remains 
a small fraction of the 1398 ha granted to the IC for agricultural and residential 
purposes, and shows that there remains considerable scope for agricultural expansion.  
A shift away from traditional indigenous land use systems was observed. Such 
systems tend to be highly diverse, with many different crops commonly grown in 
small amounts around the edge of the same parcel of land (Baird & Dearden, 2003), 
but the discussion here is limited to changes in the dominant crop in each field. The 
most dramatic change observed is the transition to commercial agriculture. In 2004, 
the average area under some form of cash crop cultivation (principally cashew) was 
0.6 ha per household, or 60% of the land under cultivation. Much of this land, 
however, was also used to grow non-cash crop upland rice intercropped with the main 
cash crop. For instance, 0.5 ha per household, equivalent to half of all land use within 
the village, was used for cashew plantations with rice grown underneath or between 
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young trees. On average, 85% of cultivated land had rice as the dominant or 
intercropped crop. By 2012, the average area of cash crops had risen to 2.5 ha per 
household, or 93% of the area cultivated, making the increase in cash crops greater 
than the observed increase in overall land use. The majority of this increase is 
accounted for by the emergence of cassava, a crop that was unrecorded in 2004. In 
2012, the average cultivated area of cassava was 1.8 ha per household (67% of the 
cultivated area), with 1.4 ha per household intercropped with cashew. In contrast, the 
importance of rice had dropped, with only 0.2 ha (7% of the cultivated area) per 
household cultivated with rice as the dominant or intercropped crop.  
Table 4.2: Mean area [ha] given to different land uses per household for the two villages at the 
time fields were mapped by PA authorities as part of the ICT process and in 2012. The 
percentage of average household area given to each land use is shown in parentheses. As 
intercropping is common practice, percentages do not sum to 100. 
Land use 
Andong Kraloeng O Rona 
2004 2012 2006 2004 
all cultivation  1.0 2.7 3.1  4.8 
cash crop (cassava, 
cashew and rubber) 
0.6 (62) 2.5 (93) 2.9 (94) 4.2 (88) 
tree crop  0.7 (68) 1.4 (50) 2.8 (90) 1.9 (40) 
rice 0.9 (85) 0.2 (7) 0.8 (26) 0.6 (13) 
cassava 0.0 (0) 1.8 (67) 0.1 (3) 3.0 (63) 
Not only does this show an increasing reliance on producing cash crops, but it also 
shows a breakdown of traditional rotational farming. As of 2012, cashew (a tree crop) 
was present in approximately 50% of cultivated land, much of which was formerly 
used for growing rice. As cashew is considered to have a 20 year productive life span, 
land that would formerly be returned to fallow, and therefore collective ownership, is 
now being retained as individually held land (albeit within communal title) through 
the planting of cashew.  
O Rona 
The average land holdings in 2012 for the 70 households sampled in O Rona was 4.8 
ha (for plan of mapped fields see Appendix B; Figure B.2), significantly more than in 
Andong Kraloeng. This represents an increase of 1.7 ha (or 55%) per household from 
2006, when fields were mapped as part of the ICT process. As with Andong Kraloeng, 
these figures demonstrate a rapid expansion in the land being cultivated. There was a 
significant difference observed in the area of land claimed between households that 
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were part of the IC and those that were not. For households that were sampled in both 
2006 and 2012, members of the IC claimed on average 6.3 ha in 2012 (up from 4.2 ha 
in 2006), whereas non-IC members claimed only 3.5 ha in 2012 (up from 2.5 ha in 
2006). This, however, represents a similar rate of growth for both types of household. 
Commercial agriculture was already widely practiced in 2006 in O Rona, with some 
form of cash crops grown on 94% of agricultural land. In 2012, the proportion of 
agricultural land involved in commercial cropping was essentially unchanged (88% of 
cultivated lands), although the absolute area was much increased. The main observed 
difference between the two time periods was the change in intercropping practices 
between commercial and subsistence crops. In 2006, 59% of agricultural land (1.8 ha 
per household) had a commercial crop as the dominant crop but was intercropped 
with rice. This had fallen to just 5% of cultivated land (0.2 ha per household) by 2012. 
Overall, the area per household on which rice was grown had contracted slightly from 
0.8 to 0.6 ha per household. In contrast, though, the area on which it was grown as the 
dominant or sole crop had increased from 0.2 to 0.6 ha per household, largely through 
new areas suitable for paddy farming being cleared. This shows an increasing 
delineation between areas assigned to growing cash crops and to subsistence rice 
cultivation.  
As with Andong Kraloeng, the most dramatic shift in O Rona has been the uptake of 
cassava, which was first introduced in 2005. Less than 0.1 ha per household was 
being grown in 2006 but this had increased to over 3 ha per household by 2012. This, 
in part, is driving the changes observed in rice growing practices, as cassava is often 
sold to traders by the field. Households, often those short of labour, agree a sale price 
set by the area of their field and quality of the cassava, as opposed to harvesting and 
processing the cassava themselves. Consequently, it makes sense for households to 
have separate plots for different crops, even within the same field.  
The emergence of cassava has also changed the area given to tree crops. In 2006, the 
average household had 2.8 ha of tree crops, largely intercropped with rice, but by 
2012 this had dropped to 1.9 ha and was intercropped with cassava instead. This 
demonstrates a trend reported during household interviews that some farmers have 
chosen to replace areas previously planted with tree crops with cassava. Overall, 
however, the reduction in area planted with tree crops does not indicate a return to 
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traditional rotational cultivation as cassava is being grown year after year, despite 
fears of declining yields.  
Household land holdings 
The selected model for the total log transformed area of land claimed by each 
household in 2012 included three significant explanatory variables (Table 4.3): the 
age of the head of the household, whether or not they had arrived after the ICT 
process was initiated and an adjusted poverty score based on the basic necessity 
survey methodology (Davies, 1997; see Appendix B for an explanation of how this 
score was calculated). This meant that neither the household's livelihood options nor 
available labour had a significant effect on land holdings. 
Table 4.3: Parameter estimates for the household land holdings LMM, with ln(area) as the 
response variable. One random effect was included in the model: settlement. The full list of 
variables modelled, plus their explanations, are given in Appendix B; Table B.2. Standard errors 
are given in parentheses. 𝑹𝒎
𝟐  = 0.382, 𝑹𝒄
𝟐 = 0.410. 
Variable Estimate t value 
intercept -2.365 (0.528) -4.478 
age +0.016 (0.006) 2.459 
poverty score +4.166 (0.667) 6.828 
immigrant -1.025 (0.194) -3.132 
There was a positive effect of age on household land holdings, predicting an increase 
of 1.6% in the area claimed for every year increase in the age of the household head. 
A much stronger correlation was found for the adjusted poverty score. In this case, a 
0.1 increase in adjusted poverty score was found to result in an increase of 52% in the 
total area claimed. This results in a predicted 272% difference in the total area of land 
claimed between the best off and poorest families. Immigrant households, however, 
were found to have smaller land holdings, with the model estimates predicting that 
households that arrived after the ICT process had started had 103% less land on 
average.  
Household compliance 
Compliance with the 2001 Land Law 
Overall, there were high levels of non-compliance in both study villages, although 
distinct differences in behaviour between the two were observed. In Andong Kraloeng, 
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26% of cultivated land had been cleared outside agreed boundaries, whereas the 
figure for O Rona was 47%. Similarly, while 52% of sampled households in Andong 
Kraloeng were found to have some illegal land, this figure was 79% in O Rona. 
Comparing the performance of the indigenous communities within each village 
reduces this difference slightly, with 49% of IC member households non-compliant in 
Andong Kraloeng and 67% in O Rona.  
In order to investigate compliance further, a GLMM, with a binary household 
compliance variable as the response, was constructed to look at whether or not a 
household claimed any illegal land (for a model summary table see Appendix B; 
Table B.3). Only two explanatory variables considered for selection were included in 
the final model; whether the household was part of the village IC and the natural log 
transformed area claimed by each household. The difference in compliance between 
the two villages was accounted for by the inclusion of the settlement lived in by each 
household as a random effect in this model.  
As the interpretation of logistic regression coefficients is not intuitive for log 
transformed variables with constants added to account for zero values, the effect of 
the area claimed by each household on the probability of compliance with the 2001 
Land Law is plotted for both IC and non-IC member households (Figure 4.2). Among 
non-IC member households, only those with very little land are likely to comply with 
the law. This result is, perhaps, unsurprising, as non-IC members have little right to 
land within either village. As the majority of sampled non-IC member households live 
in O Rona, this result strongly reflects the two-tiered system that was created there. In 
fact, the three non-member households that have not claimed land illegally hold no 
land at all and provide labour for other households. None of the 20 sampled non-IC 
member households that were present in the village in 2006 was found to be 
compliant with the law in 2012.  
Comparing the curves for IC and non-IC households reveals a strong positive effect of 
being an IC member on compliance. This effect diminishes rapidly, however, as the 
area of household land holdings increases. The predicted probability of being 
compliant with the law for an IC member claiming the average area of land is just 
over 0.2, illustrating the very low levels of compliance for families with average or 
greater land holdings (Figure 4.2).  
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Figure 4.2: Predicted probabilities of compliance with the 2001 Land Law for non-IC and IC 
households. The vertical dashed line shows the average area claimed per household for the whole 
sample. 
The second part of the compliance hurdle analysis comprised a linear model with the 
log-transformed area of illegal land held by non-compliant households as the response. 
Three explanatory variables were included in the final model (Table 4.4): the total 
land holdings of each household, whether households were members of the IC and 
whether the household head was Bunong. This final variable was possible because 
several Khmer men had married Bunong women and moved into their wives’ home 
villages. Under the rules drawn up by each IC, these households automatically 
became IC members even though the head of the household was Khmer. The results 
of this model again show a strong correlation between compliance and the total area 
of land claimed by each household. In this case, an increase in the total area of 1% 
resulted in a 1.1% increase in the area of illegal land held per household, suggesting 
that households hold legal and illegal land in roughly equal proportions.  
Table 4.4: Parameter estimates for the illegal household land holdings, with ln(illegal area) as the 
response variable. P values significant at the 95% confidence level are shown in bold. The full list 
of variables modelled, plus their explanations, are given in Appendix B; Table B.2. Standard 
errors are given in parentheses. R2 = 0.613. Significance values: * = P < 0.05; *** = P < 0.001. 
Variable Estimate P 
intercept -0.359 (0.156) * 
ln(area) 1.084 (0.107) *** 
IC member -0.500 (0.246) * 
indigenous -0.521 (0.245) * 
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More informative, from the perspective of evaluating the outcomes of the ICT process, 
are the effect estimates for being an IC member at the time the ICT process was 
initiated and for the household head identifying themselves as indigenous. The effects 
of these two variables are comparable, with an approximate 65% reduction in the 
predicted area of illegal land held in both cases. This suggests that, even among those 
households that had held land illegally, there is a positive effect on compliance from 
being a member of an IC. The second of these two results suggests that, holding the 
effect of being an IC member constant, households with indigenous heads hold less 
illegal land than those with heads from non-indigenous backgrounds.  
Compliance with Community Regulations 
The second aspect of household compliance considered was whether households 
complied with the set of five regulations that were drawn up as part of the original 
agreements in each village and which govern land use within community titled areas. 
Overall, IC regulations experienced a higher rate of compliance than observed for the 
2001 Land Law. In Andong Kraloeng, 77% of households were found to be compliant 
with all five IC regulations considered. In O Rona, the figure was lower, with 52% of 
households compliant.  
In Andong Kraloeng, three of the rules were obeyed by every household sampled: 
those prohibiting the buying and selling of land, clearing land in spirit and burial 
forest and exceeding 1 ha of paddy land (Table 4.5). The regulation with the lowest 
level of compliance was the limit on tree crop area, with all households who were not 
totally compliant breaking this rule. This reflects the changes in the traditional 
rotational cultivation system observed earlier. In O Rona, only the ban on clearance of 
burial or spirit forest was completely observed (Table 4.5). In contrast to Andong 
Kraloeng, nearly 50% of households were found to be breaking total area restrictions 
within the community titled area. In part, this was due to non-IC member households 
claiming land that they had not possessed in 2006. At 68%, the compliance rate for IC 
members was still lower than in Andong Kraloeng, but higher than for the village 
overall.  
A mixed model approach to analysing IC regulation compliance was deemed 
unnecessary in this case, as no difference in compliance was attributed to different 
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settlements. Instead, a generalised linear model (GLM) was produced, with three 
explanatory variables included in the final selected model: the log-transformed total 
household land holdings, whether the household was an IC member and whether the 
household held some illegal land (Figure 4.3; for coefficient estimates see Appendix 
B; Table B.4).  
Table 4.5: Percentage of respondent households that were found to have complied with the five 
community land use regulations. Only land inside the community agricultural areas was 
considered. 
Regulation Andong Kraloeng O Rona 
max 5 ha total area 92 56 
max 1 ha paddy land 100 94 
max 2 ha tree crop cultivation 77 81 
spirit/burial forest  100 100 
no buying/selling land 100 92 
   
all regulations 77 52 
 
Figure 4.3 Predicted probabilities of compliance with IC regulations. The vertical dashed line 
shows the average area claimed per household for the whole sample. 
Increased household land holdings are associated with a significant reduction in the 
probability of compliance with the set of five IC regulations. This effect is most 
striking for non-IC members (Figure 4.3). It is also clear from comparing the curves 
for non-IC and IC member households that once again there is a strong positive effect 
on compliance associated with a household belonging to the village IC. Again, this is 
expected given the two-tier system in place in O Rona, in which non-IC members 
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were afforded little right to land. Crucially, non-member households are not 
represented on the committee that manages community land. It is unsurprising, 
therefore, that households do not comply with regulations on which they have no say. 
Interestingly, the correlation between compliance with IC rules and compliance with 
the 2001 Land Law was negative. Comparing the curves in Figure 3 for households 
with and without illegal land for both IC members and non-IC members separately, it 
is evident that households with illegal land have a greater probability of being 
compliant with the regulations governing land use in community areas over the full 
range of total land holdings. This implies that households may seek to circumvent IC 
regulations by clearing land outside of community areas, rather than breaking the 
regulations within the titled area.  
Perceptions of ICT  
In addition to differences in land use, understanding and perceptions of the ICT 
process differed significantly between the two villages. In Andong Kraloeng, 90% of 
IC respondents displayed some understanding of the land use plan (this figure was 
only 46% of IC respondents in O Rona). There was also a much greater level of 
understanding in Andong Kraloeng that the responsibility for monitoring and 
sanctioning households who were non-compliant with the land use plans was split 
between the committee and the protected area authorities. Whilst 44% of IC 
respondents in Andong Kraloeng mentioned the committee when asked who enforced 
the land use plans, the figure in O Rona was only 17%. 
With respect to how the land use plans were perceived, community members in 
Andong Kraloeng were more likely to view the land use plans positively and to feel 
secure about their land tenure. In O Rona, IC members frequently queried the validity 
of IC regulations and restrictions on area, citing the failure of committee members (i.e. 
those charged with managing community resources) and other community leaders to 
observe them. The average land holdings for such leaders in O Rona was 8.6 ha, well 
above the limit of 5 ha set down in IC rules. Conversely, community leaders in 
Andong Kraloeng claimed an average of just 2.9 ha, which is below the village 
average. IC members in O Rona also felt less secure regarding their land tenure. Only 
6% of respondent reported that they felt secure in their tenure, with most respondents 
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worried about economic land concessions or powerful immigrants taking their land 
(in comparison 72% of IC respondents in Andong Kraloeng felt secure). 
4.6. Discussion 
This research reveals households in two villages responding to land tenure reform and 
drivers of land use change in different ways. In Andong Kraloeng, compliance with 
both the legal land use plans that were created as part of the tenure reform process and 
the community regulations that govern land use in community areas was relatively 
high. In O Rona, a village that has been strongly exposed to market forces and 
immigration, compliance rates were much lower, with extensive illegal land clearance 
within conservation areas and illegal settlement of Khmer migrants observed. The 
reasons behind these differences are complex and multi-faceted, yet they provide 
valuable lessons for further implementation of ICT in Cambodia, and participatory 
land use planning approaches more widely.  
The most significant difference between the two villages is the degree to which they 
have been exposed to outside interests. Milne (2013) reports that over 500 ‘outsiders’, 
ranging from smallholder farmers to influential politicians, claim land inside the 
provisional community area in O Rona. This is in addition to the families that have 
moved into the village unopposed. As a direct result of losing land to these outside 
interests, the boundaries of the O Rona ICT have been substantially redrawn from 
those that were included in the original ICT application. That application contained 
plans for 1477 ha to be granted for communal agriculture and residential use, while 
only 648 ha has been included within the redrawn boundaries. The remaining 829 ha 
has been lost to outside interests or non-IC households in the period between the 
original application and receipt of ICT. Furthermore, the entire proposed western 
NTFP forest area, which initially covered an area of 446 ha, has either already been 
deforested or has been included as part of the 648 ha designated for community 
agricultural use to compensate for the losses in this area. 
It is debatable how much individual households have been involved in the sale of 
community land to outsiders. Private access to land designated for indigenous 
community title claims is often achieved through the use of intimidation, 
misinformation and stealth (Fox et al., 2008; Milne, 2013). Under the 2001 Land Law, 
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communities are not granted disposal rights, which makes it illegal to sell land within 
ICTs, but this has not stopped sales. Although little evidence of direct sales of land 
parcels was found, a recent study of tenure policy changes introduced to O Rona after 
the research presented here was completed reports frequent selling of plots by Bunong 
to migrant Khmer families or outside land speculators (Milne, 2013). Such sales are 
considered shameful and, hence, frequently carried out in private (Fox et al., 2008). 
As such, reported compliance with the ban on buying and selling land in O Rona may 
under-estimate actual sales. However, a comparison of land mapped for IC 
households matched between the two time periods (and for whom the head of the 
household has remained the same) shows that 74% of the land mapped in 2006 has 
been retained. Given that households are expected to have given some of this land as 
wedding gifts when their children married, it is possible that the selling of land that is 
in use by IC households has been overstated (although this does not preclude the 
selling of previously unclaimed community land).  
Whilst the extent to which IC households have been involved in the sale of land to 
outside interests is unclear, it is evident that the influx of external claims on 
community land has had a negative impact on IC households. In interviews, IC 
members frequently expressed frustration at their inability to exclude outsiders and 
the loss of community land. For example, one woman said that “before people used to 
try to stop the immigrants, but now we fear outsiders because they are rich and 
powerful.” It is clear to them that their claim on the land, although recognised under 
law, is insecure, thereby eroding one of the main benefits of the provision of tenure. 
This in turn was used as a justification for clearing outside of designated community 
areas. As one man put it, “we have to clear outside the community boundaries because 
there is no more land available”. Despite these pressures, however, the ICT process 
appears to have been partially successful in conservation terms, as IC members were 
less likely to claim illegal land and when they did claim illegal land, they claimed 
65% less land than non-IC members.  
In Andong Kraloeng, the IC has made a concerted effort to prevent large scale 
migration into the village, making access to land for outside interests significantly 
more difficult (albeit the village is under less pressure than O Rona). In part, this can 
be attributed to the village situation at the time land use planning was initiated. Unlike 
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in O Rona, where the two-tier system was necessitated in response to already high 
levels of in-migration from non-indigenous households, Andong Kraloeng had very 
few migrant households settle in the village prior to ICT. Of the 44 households 
sampled in this research, only five were non-IC households. This has contributed to a 
stronger sense of community identity and ownership of customary lands, as well as 
greater belief in their right to exclude outside interests from their land. Consequently, 
villagers report having turned away numerous migrant households since receiving 
ICT. As such, those conditions most commonly associated with positive outcomes for 
tenure reform have been achieved and compliance (particularly in regard to IC rules) 
has benefited (Ostrom, 1990).    
Despite the generally positive situation for Andong Kraloeng, there appears to have 
been a breakdown of the traditional rotational cultivation system in response to the 
emergence of cash crops over the past decade. This does not necessarily represent a 
failing of the ICT process as no system can be expected to remain static over time, 
particularly in the face of rapidly changing socio-economic conditions. It does, 
however, underscore the importance of allowing for possible changes as part of the 
planning process and of ensuring that the institutions that are created to manage 
community areas have the capacity to be able to respond to those changes. As 
agriculture becomes more commercialised in Andong Kraloeng, it remains to be seen 
whether social institutions within the village can adapt, particularly if it brings 
influential households into conflict with IC regulations. The results of the household 
analyses support this, with those households with greater land holdings (i.e. older, 
more affluent and more established households) more likely to be non-compliant with 
community boundaries and regulations and also found to hold more illegal land if 
non-compliant.  
The results regarding the perceptions of IC members of the IC committees in each 
village suggest that the social processes and institutions that support the management 
of community land may play an important role in maintaining compliance with the 
defined community boundaries and regulations. In Andong Kraloeng, committee 
leadership is strong, with committee members seen to be compliant with community 
regulations and legal boundaries, and ordinary community members display a greater 
awareness of the committee’s role in managing community land. In O Rona, where 
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the overall perception the IC committee is poor, the ICT process is largely considered 
to be an externally imposed intervention, and not supported.  
This has important implications for how ICT and participatory land use planning 
approaches are implemented elsewhere. In other villages in SPF, for example, 
improved road access to more remote villages, and the increasing threat of land 
alienation caused by economic land concessions, has led to the acceleration of the ICT 
process. Whilst this has been forced by the changing conditions to which these 
villages are exposed, the FA and WCS must be careful to ensure that the necessary 
support is given to local social institutions, which are critical to the successful 
implementation and sustainability of IC managed lands. With its origins in the 
recognised need to support and empower local voices, this lesson is also particularly 
relevant to the implementation of participatory land use planning approaches more 
broadly. 
Similarly important is the need to ensure on-going compliance monitoring, both 
within community areas and the wider protected area, and to provide external support 
for this where required. The considerable loss of community lands in O Rona, and the 
perceived inability of IC members to prevent it, demonstrates that simply supporting a 
community through the legal processes required to apply for tenure is not sufficient. 
External political support may be necessary to assist communities in excluding 
outside interests from illegal land grabs. Without this, the security that the 
establishment of tenure should introduce may not materialise, leading to some of the 
issues observed in O Rona.  
It may also be necessary to provide stronger enforcement of community boundaries. 
Unenforced boundaries will fail to induce sufficient incentive for local institutional 
development and effective management of community resources. In Andong 
Kraloeng, where the threat of external land grabbing is low and available land is far 
from scarce, 26% of cultivated land has still been cleared illegally. While it is possible 
that this is due to a lack of understanding of the rules that govern land use or of where 
the boundaries of each area lie, it is more likely that these areas have been cleared 
despite an understanding that to do so would be illegal. Effective policing of such 
infractions is likely to increase the incentive for committees to manage land use 
within community areas more effectively. This is supported by the result of the 
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community regulation compliance model, which suggested that households may offset 
their non-compliance with community rules (to which they may feel more social 
pressure to comply) through land use outside of community boundaries. As such, 
protected area authorities should support community monitoring and exclusion of 
outside interests within community boundaries, whilst ensuring adequate enforcement 
of community expansion beyond those boundaries. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown how two contrasting villages have coped with 
implementing tenure reform. In one village, the evidence presented provides support 
for the proposition that tenure reform in protected areas conducted with the 
participation indigenous communities can be consistent with positive outcomes for 
biodiversity conservation (in this case, retention of protected forest cover), whilst 
providing communities with the rights to customary lands. In the other village, these 
positive effects have been largely negated by severe disruption from outside interests, 
powerful market forces and a failure in leadership on the part of those local 
institutions created to manage communal lands. In such cases, it is in the interests of 
both communities and those seeking to further conservation for local people to be 
provided with the institutional support necessary to protect and manage their 
resources effectively.   
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Chapter 5 
5. Applying the carrot and stick in a Cambodian commons: an 
experimental games approach to the investigation of 
conservation incentives 
5.1. Introduction 
The institutional arrangements that govern individual behaviour can have substantial 
consequences for the management of natural resources (Ostrom et al., 1990). In 
situations where property rights are undefined or unenforced, extraction of resources 
is limited by the ability of users to exploit them, their preferences to do so and the 
institutions that govern extraction. Understanding behaviour under different 
institutions is central, therefore, to the development of policies aimed at managing 
resource extraction.  
A common approach regarding open access environments is to predict extraction 
based on the theory of rational self-interest, as characterised in Hardin’s ‘tragedy of 
the commons’ (Hardin, 1968). Although this model accurately predicts behaviour in 
many instances, it has been consistently shown to underestimate cooperative 
behaviour under certain conditions (Gintis, 2000). Other studies have shown that 
social norms, defined loosely as the standards or shared beliefs within a group 
regarding how an individual ought to behave, can have a significant impact on 
cooperative behaviour (Sethi & Somanathan, 1996; Ostrom, 2000; Biel & Thøgersen, 
2007), with the extent to which norms affect behaviour heavily dependent on 
individual preferences. Experiments investigating the cooperative behaviour of 
individuals have found evidence to suggest that only a minority of subjects free ride, 
with most being willing to cooperate if others reciprocate (Fischbacher et al., 2001; 
Rustagi et al., 2010). These results suggest that, although some individuals conform to 
the model of rational self-interest, they are unlikely to form the majority. Adding this 
to the results of studies of social norms provides strong evidence to suggest that when 
individuals are faced with a social dilemma there are many more determinants of 
behaviour than assumed by the simplistic model of rational self-interest.  
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In addition to personal behavioural preferences, the institutional conditions under 
which individuals make decisions are also a significant determinant of behaviour. For 
example, a study of 15 ‘small-scale’ societies found that the behaviour measured 
across different experimental games varied depending on the conditions present in 
each setting (Henrich et al., 2005). Such experimental games are a common tool in 
behavioural economics and have been applied to investigating the effects of different 
institutions on behaviour, including resource extraction (e.g. Ostrom et al., 1994). 
Games can be used to examine the role of socio-economic variables in decision-
making and have the potential to enable the investigation of behaviour under 
conditions that mimic the effects of different policies (Cardenas & Ostrom, 2004). 
The results of such studies are varied and wide ranging but show that developing 
appropriate institutions and governance systems is central to effective management of 
resources (Vollan & Ostrom, 2010). 
In this chapter, I present the results of a series of experimental games to investigate 
how certain institutional arrangements affect extraction from a common pool resource 
(CPR). I focus on the individual behaviour of smallholder farmers in a CPR setting 
subject to combined institutional conditions. In so doing, I follow a similar 
experimental design to that described in Travers et al. (2011), which enables the 
comparison of the relative effects of different conservation interventions by 
considering multiple treatments within the same experiment. These include external 
enforcement and reward payment regimes similar to those found under the 
mechanism of payments for environmental services (PES). Such payments are being 
increasingly widely used in the context of protected area management, in conjunction 
with more traditional enforcement activities, with conservation organisations 
providing payments both collectively and directly to individuals in return for 
engaging in, or desisting from, particular activities (for examples of how both 
payment structures have been applied in northern Cambodia see Clements et al., 
2010).  
The effect of enforcement of exogenous rules on behaviour has been the focus of a 
number of experimental studies in the lab (e.g. Beckenkamp & Ostmann, 1999) and in 
the field (e.g. Cardenas et al., 2000; Cardenas, 2004; Velez et al., 2006; Vollan, 2008; 
Reichhuber et al., 2009), although the results are often contradictory. There is 
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evidence to suggest that under certain conditions existing pro-social behaviour can be 
undermined ("crowded out") by rule enforcement, most notably when the probability 
of detection is low, penalties for non-compliance are weak or intrinsic social cohesion 
high (Ostmann, 1998; Cardenas et al., 2000; Vollan, 2008). Further evidence suggests 
that even when cooperation is not reduced by enforcement, crowding out can occur 
once enforcement has been removed (Reeson & Tisdell, 2008).  Elsewhere, it has 
been shown that exogenously imposed rules have the potential to reduce extraction 
and increase the efficiency with which subjects negotiate game environments, even 
when detection probabilities are low (Reichhuber et al., 2009; Travers et al., 2011). 
This variation in the observed effect of exogenous regulation has also been found 
within studies. For example in a study in rural Colombian villages, Velez et al. (2006) 
found that the effect of exogenous resource controls varied significantly between 
groups depending on the background of the participants. As such, it would appear that 
while external enforcement institutions can be effective at reducing extraction from a 
CPR, it is difficult to predict the outcome of such institutions prior to implementation.  
In many conservation settings, those responsible for implementing rule enforcement 
have little control over the size of penalties but may influence the probability that 
non-compliance will be detected, for instance through greater investment in patrolling. 
Hence, it is important to understand the effect that increasing the probability of 
detecting rule breaking will have on compliance. In the lab, studies have shown that 
subjects respond more to changes in the severity of sanctions than they do to the 
probability of detection (Ostmann, 1998; Beckenkamp & Ostmann, 1999). Currently, 
in the context of field based experimental games, there has been little work focused 
on this question. This chapter seeks to address that omission by considering two 
exogenous enforcement regimes: one mimicking the conditions often found in 
developing country conservation settings in which the probability of detection is low 
and one mimicking a situation in which conservation managers have invested in 
enforcement and increased the probability of detection.  
On the other side of the incentives scale, there is evidence that rewards can be highly 
effective at inducing cooperation when the allocation of rewards is decided externally, 
without cost to the recipients (Vollan, 2008; Travers et al., 2011; Narloch et al., 2012). 
As with sanctions, there is a risk that exogenously awarded rewards may undermine 
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existing norms and serve to crowd out inherent cooperation (Frey & Jegen, 2001). In a 
survey of attitudes regarding the site of a proposed noxious facility in Switzerland, 
Frey and Oberhozer-Gee (1997) found that the offer of incentives as compensation 
crowded out feelings of civic duty, resulting in lower levels of support. Conversely, 
appropriation was reduced by an exogenous reward system in a CPR game amongst 
pastoralists in Namibia and South Africa (Vollan, 2008). This effect was unchanged 
even if a minority of the group voted in support of rewards when given the option of 
voting for the different institutions within the game. In another study, Travers et al. 
(2011) investigated collectively conditional rewards, whereby the reward was 
conditional on aggregate group extraction falling within certain thresholds. It was 
demonstrated that the level of conditionality (i.e. the group extraction threshold on 
which rewards were conditional) was important in determining the effectiveness of 
the rewards, with higher conditionality leading to more restraint in extraction. In 
situations where participants have been allowed to choose between enforcement and 
rewarding institutions, rewards have been found to be preferred (e.g. Vollan, 2008; 
Sutter et al., 2010). 
In this chapter, I examine the effect of two exogenous penalty and reward payment 
regimes, as both stand alone and interacting interventions, on individual behaviour. 
While the effect on extraction from a CPR of both enforcement and reward payment 
regimes has been considered previously, here I investigate behaviour when both 
conditions are present. This allows the study of potential interactions between the 
disincentives created through enforcement and the positive incentives offered through 
reward payments. This has particular relevance for conservation policy-making, as the 
potentially conflicting interactions from different but simultaneously applied 
interventions are rarely considered, despite their ubiquitous use in actual conservation 
interventions (for example PES schemes within protected areas; Clements et al. 2010).  
5.2. A common pool resource game 
The CPR game used in this research was framed around the extraction of fish from a 
communal pond (see Appendix C for the game script used). The harvesting of fish 
was selected because fish is an important household resource and familiar to all 
participants. Two other options were piloted (a generic, unitless resource and 
bamboo) but feedback from the pilot suggested participants were better able to 
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understand the dilemma when it was presented in terms of harvesting fish. 
Participants were split into groups of 10, (𝑛 = 10), and instructed that they would 
make a series of decisions regarding the number of fish to harvest individually from a 
communal pond. Each individual, 𝑗 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}, could harvest 𝑥 fish to a maximum of 
10, 𝑥 ∈ {0,… ,10}, each round, 𝑡 ∈ {1,… ,5}. In contrast to some other studies that 
used non-linear payoff structures to model returns from extraction of a CPR (e.g. 
Ostrom et al., 1992; Cardenas, 2000), a linear payoff structure was used because 
initial piloting had shown that participants had difficulty understanding the 
complexities of non-linear payoff structures. For each fish that an individual harvested 
from the pond, they received 100 Riel with nobody else in the group benefitting. Each 
fish left in the pond at the end of every round earned 12 Riel for all group members. 
This was explained as the future benefit to the group of having fish in the pond. This 
created a Pareto optimum at which no fish were harvested and a unique Nash 
equilibrium at which every participant chose to harvest the full quota available to 
them (10 fish). In total, 10 different experimental treatments were considered. For 
certain treatments, participants could be subject to enforcement penalties for each fish 
above a set threshold, e, with a probability of detection, λ, or reward payments, p (see 
Table 5.1 for parameters used in each treatment). The individual payoff 𝜋𝑗  as 
described by these rules is given by the following equation (see Appendix C for 
specific payoff equations for each treatment): 
 𝜋𝑗 = 100𝑥𝑗 + 12(100 − ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) - λe + p  Eq. 5.1 
Table 5.1: Treatment options for the CPR game. All treatments were played by 80 participants 
with the exception of the private treatment, which was played by 360 participants. Treatment 
parameters are given for the payoff equation (Equation 5.1). 
Treatment Policy instrument  e λ p 
private  - - - - 
peer-pressure business as usual - - - 
weak enforcement law enforcement 125 0.1 - 
strong enforcement law enforcement 125 0.4 - 
individual payments PES - - 250 
individual payments & weak enforcement PES with law enforcement 125 0.1 250 
individual payments & strong enforcement PES with law enforcement 125 0.4 250 
collective payments PES - - 250 
collective payments & weak enforcement PES with law enforcement 125 0.1 250 
collective payments & strong enforcement PES with law enforcement 125 0.4 250 
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Private treatment 
The private treatment was played in anonymous conditions, such that no individual 
was aware of who else was in their group. After each round, participants were 
privately told their own payoff, plus the total group extraction. Illiterate participants 
were assisted in this. No communication between participants was allowed and 
participants were made to sit apart. As such, this treatment provided a measure of the 
internalised preferences of each participant in the absence of external controls on 
behaviour. 
Communication & peer-pressure treatment 
In this treatment, participants were separated into two groups of 10 individuals. 
Before individual decisions were taken, the group discussed the level of individual 
extraction they thought acceptable, with any outcomes of the discussion non-binding. 
They were then asked whether they had reached a group decision on the number of 
fish that each person should take and, if so, that decision was recorded. Once 
individual decisions had been made and the payoffs calculated, each participant read 
out how much they had chosen to extract and their payoff. As such, the treatment 
conditions allowed for individuals to experience shame, which has been shown to 
increase pro-social behaviour in a social dilemma (Lopez et al.. 2012). Participants 
were not permitted to lie to other group members at this stage. In this way, all 
participants were made aware of the decisions and earnings of other group members. 
This treatment served as a control for all further treatments, which were structured in 
a similar manner in known groups of 10 individuals with group decision-making and 
payoff reporting. 
External enforcement treatments 
In the external enforcement treatments, participants were subject to an imposed rule 
enforced by an external agent. In this case, the rule was structured such that any 
individual “caught” harvesting more than two fish per round would incur a penalty. 
The threshold of two fish was set so that a small harvest was still seen as legitimate, 
as past experience had shown that participants can struggle to understand the payoffs 
if they are not allowed to harvest anything. This reflects conditions in many 
conservation scenarios, in which only a certain level of appropriation is permissible. 
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The penalty was set at 125 Riel, 1.25 times the value of a harvested fish, for each fish 
individuals harvested above the threshold of two. This was set to mimic the 
enforcement regime for illegal harvest of natural resources in the study site, where 
penalties are rarely enforced beyond confiscation of illegal harvests and tools. Once 
individual decisions had been made and decisions and earnings read out, each 
individual was asked to roll a ten-sided die, the outcome of which would determine 
whether or not they were monitored that round. If they were monitored and were 
found to have harvested more than the threshold, then they received the proportional 
penalty of 125 Riel per fish. Two treatments were used: for the weak enforcement 
treatment, the probability of being monitored was set at 0.1 and for the stronger 
treatment the probability of being monitored was four times greater at 0.4. For 
example, if an individual chose to harvest four fish during the weak enforcement 
treatments and rolled a 2 on the die, they would not be monitored and their non-
compliance would go unpunished. If they behaved in the same way during the strong 
enforcement treatments, they would be monitored and would be fined 250 Riel (125 
Riel for each fish harvested above the threshold of two).  
Individual payments treatments 
For the individual payments treatments, participants were offered reward payments if 
they kept their harvest to two fish or fewer. Compliant participants were eligible to 
receive a bonus payment of 250 Riel, equivalent to 2.5 times the value of a single fish. 
The bonus was set in this way so that the individual opportunity cost of not harvesting 
at or close to the Nash equilibrium was not met by the bonus. This was intended to 
mimic the level of potential incentive payments in the study site, which are unlikely to 
cover the full opportunity cost incurred by foregoing extraction. In this case, it was 
assumed that monitoring would be perfect. For the two treatments that combined the 
individual payments treatment with the two external enforcement treatments, 
participants could receive a payment for keeping extraction below the threshold but 
also faced the possibility of a penalty for over-extraction.  
Collective payments treatment 
In the collective payments treatments, participants were again offered incentive 
payments but this time the payments were conditional on aggregate group behaviour. 
 
91 
If the total group extraction was equal to or less than 20 fish, every individual would 
receive a bonus payment of 250 Riel. If the total harvest was greater than this 
threshold, none of the participants would receive a payment, irrespective of their 
individual harvest. This treatment modelled incentive schemes where participants are 
contracted on a collective basis rather than individually. Again, it was assumed that 
monitoring was perfect. For the two treatments that combined the collective payments 
treatment with the two external enforcement treatments, participants could receive a 
payment if the group kept extraction below the threshold but also faced the possibility 
of a penalty for over-extraction.  
5.3. Theoretical prediction and hypotheses 
In this section, the behaviour predicted by the standard model of rational self-interest 
is presented, as well as a priori hypotheses regarding the expected behaviour under 
different treatments of the CPR game that follow from the background literature 
presented in Section 5.1.  
Standard theory prediction 
Under the standard Homo economicus model of rational, selfish behaviour, 
participants of the CPR game described in Section 5.2 should remain unaffected by 
the different treatments. For the control peer-pressure and private treatments, in which 
there were no reward payments or penalties, the Nash Equilibrium is for all 
individuals to extract 10 fish, the maximum possible. For the enforcement treatments, 
the marginal expected penalty for extraction is lower than the marginal return (even 
under the higher probability of detection), and therefore does not alter predicted 
behaviour. Likewise, the theoretical prediction for the payment treatments remains 
unchanged, as the payment received for extracting below the threshold is lower than 
the individual return of extracting the full allowance.  
Hypotheses 
H5.1: probability of detection in rule enforcement 
H5.1.1 As the probability of detection is increased, the expected penalty for non-
compliance increases also. As discussed above, under institutional conditions that 
allow for the enforcement of rules with penalties, the behaviour of risk neutral 
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individuals conforming to the model of rational self-interest would be expected to be 
unaffected by changes to the probability of detection, provided that the expected 
penalty remained less than the marginal return of non-compliance. As such, for the 
experimental conditions described above, it is expected that, under enforcement 
conditions only, there will be no significant difference in extraction from the pond 
between the two enforcement treatments.  
H5.1.2 Previous studies have found evidence to suggest that crowding out of intrinsic 
motivation is likely to occur when weak exogenous rule enforcement conditions are 
imposed (e.g. Cardenas et al., 2000). However, only weak evidence of such an effect 
was found by Travers et al. (2011) under similar conditions as those studied here. 
Therefore, it is expected that no crowding out will be observed under enforcement 
conditions only, compared to the extraction based on intrinsic motivations observed in 
the control. 
H5.2: individual vs collective payment structure 
H5.2.1 Both payment structures tested are expected to result in significant reductions 
in extraction in comparison with that observed for the control treatment. Given that 
the experimental design of this research closely matches that of Travers et al. (2011), 
which found no significant difference between two individual and collective payment 
structures in the effect on extraction from a common pool resource, the individual and 
collective treatments are expected to perform similarly in reducing extraction.  
H5.2.2 It is also predicted, following the results of Travers et al. (2011), that the 
collective payment treatment will have secondary benefits, such as carry over effects 
into subsequent treatments, which are not observed under the individual payments 
treatment.  
H5.3: combined payments and penalties 
It has been shown that the phenomenon of crowding out is more likely in situations in 
which pro-social behaviour would otherwise be strongest (Vollan, 2008). As such, it 
is expected that combining the payment-based treatments, which are expected to 
promote pro-social behaviour, with the two enforcement institutions will result in 
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crowding out and increased levels of extraction in comparison with the payment 
structures operating in isolation.  
5.4. Methodology 
The CPR game was conducted in 13 villages between March and April 2012. Each 
village was categorised a priori into one of three village types using two key variables 
for guidance: distance to the nearest all-day market and the proportion of Bunong 
households in the village (for values of selection variables for each village see 
Appendix C; Table C.1). These variables are thought to influence a range of village 
characteristics, including poverty, livelihood strategies and village cohesion. Access 
to each village plays an important role in governing livelihood decisions as it has a 
strong effect on the sale price of different commodities and the cost of transporting 
goods to market. In reality, access is a combination of distance and the quality of road, 
but road quality is particularly difficult to measure as it varies annually and 
throughout each year. While many of Cambodia’s minority indigenous peoples have 
become integrated into Khmer society, often to the point where they identify 
themselves as Khmer, the Bunong have maintained many of their customary practices, 
including their own language. The proportion of Bunong households in a village, 
therefore, provides a useful proxy measure of the level of integration with Khmer 
society. 
For each village type, 120 villagers were selected to participate in the games. 
Households were selected at random from a list kept by the village chief. The head of 
each household was then contacted by the village chief and invited to participate in 
the games. If they were unavailable or chose not to play, another adult was invited 
from the same household. It was made clear to all selected households that they were 
not required to participate, and a member of the research team was present to ensure 
that no household was coerced. A reserve list of randomly selected households was 
produced to ensure that 20 individuals agreed to play each session in case households 
were unavailable or chose not to participate. As there were fewer than six villages in 
two of the three village types, the number of participants was higher for some villages 
than for others. Sample sizes were approximately proportional to population size. 
Participants were all aged over 18 and where possible only one person per household 
participated. In certain cases, this was not possible due to the small size of some of the 
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study villages and, in those cases, members of the same household played on the same 
day but never interacted in the game. The experiments were held in the local school 
for the majority of study villages. In some villages, however, there was no school or 
the school was not available. In such cases, appropriate houses were identified with 
sufficient space for participants to sit in groups or separate for the private treatment.  
The CPR game followed a similar experimental design to that described in Travers et 
al. (2011). It was conducted over 18 separate days, with 360 participants (20 per day). 
Each participant played three different treatments: the private treatment plus two 
others. The order in which the treatments were played was changed for each session 
to control for possible ordering and earnings effects. To avoid individuals’ decisions 
being governed by repeatedly playing with the same people, group composition was 
controlled to minimise the number of participants who played each treatment in the 
same group. All treatments were repeated for a total of five rounds. Payments for all 
rounds were made after the game had finished to avoid payoff effects influencing 
behaviour. Each individual was given a payoff sheet on which the payoffs earned in 
previous treatments were written and was paid privately, with the majority of earnings 
totalling between four and six US dollars. Daily farm wages in the study area are 
usually five dollars so the game payments were roughly equivalent to paid labour. All 
sections of the experiment were run by a team of four: the lead author, two Khmer 
research assistants and a Bunong translator to assist participants with lower Khmer 
skills. 
After an explanation of the game, two practice rounds were played following the same 
format as the private treatment. Participants marked decisions by circling the number 
of fish they wanted to harvest (see Appendix C for individual decision sheet). 
Individual earnings and total group extraction were written on all sheets after each 
round. Once the practice rounds were completed, participants were asked five 
multiple-choice questions to test their understanding of the main principles of the 
dilemma. On completion of this test, the answers were explained to help those 
participants that still had problems with understanding. Individual scores from these 
tests were checked in the regression analysis described below but were found not to 
be significantly correlated with game behaviour. During the experiment, the private 
treatment was played in a single room and all other treatments were played in separate 
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rooms such that it was not possible for different groups to hear what was happening in 
groups other than their own.  
5.5. Results  
Generalised linear mixed effects models (GLMMs; Zuur et al., 2009) were 
constructed to analyse the results of the game2. The logit link function was used due 
to the binomial error structure of the number of fish taken by an individual, with 
Laplace approximation used to estimate the model parameters (Bolker et al, 2009). 
Model selection for fixed effects was carried out by comparing Akaike information 
criterion values (AIC; Akaike, 1974). The final model was selected using step-wise 
selection and comparing ∆AIC values. Following Burnham and Anderson (2002), if 
the difference in AIC values between models was less than two, the most 
parsimonious model was selected. If the ∆AIC values were greater than two, the 
model with the lower AIC value was selected. The random effect structure, including 
variables for village, day number, group and individual, was investigated using 
likelihood ratio tests (Bolker et al, 2009). Once both the random and fixed effect 
structures had been selected, visual validation was conducted to check for residual 
normality, heteroskedasticity and for possible correlations between fixed effects and 
the residuals. Each model was also checked for over-dispersion by comparing the sum 
of squared Pearson residuals with the approximate residual degrees of freedom. 
The results of the CPR game are best compared against the baseline created by the 
control peer-pressure treatment. In this treatment, the mean individual extraction was 
4.9 fish per round. This closely matches the results of Travers et al. (2011). As 
expected, the majority of treatments performed better than the control at reducing 
extraction from the CPR (Table 5.2; Appendix C, Figures C1-C3). Whilst some 
treatments achieved an equilibrium state with average harvest remaining effectively 
constant over the five rounds, extraction in other treatments had not reached 
equilibrium at the end of the game.  
                                                 
2 All models were analysed using R version 2.12.0 (R Core Development, 2010) in 
the open source software package RStudio version 0.96.228 (RStudio, 2012). Within 
R, the lme4 package version 0.999375-36 (Bates & Maechler, 2012) was used to code 
the GLMMs. 
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics for key explanatory variables. Sample standard errors are shown 
in parentheses. 
Variable Statistic 
male participants 45% 
Bunong participants 62.9% 
mean age 37.5 (13.4) 
mean years in education 2.6 (3.2) 
  
mean number of fish taken during each treatment:  
practice rounds 4.5 (2.1) fish 
private 5.5 (3.0) fish 
peer-pressure 4.9 (2.8) fish 
weak enforcement 4.5 (2.9) fish 
strong enforcement 5.9 (2.8) fish 
individual payments 2.2 (1.9) fish 
individual payments & weak enforcement 3.8 (2.8) fish 
individual payments & strong enforcement 3.1 (2.7) fish 
collective payments 2.1 (2.2) fish 
collective payments & weak enforcement 2.9 (2.4) fish 
collective payments & strong enforcement 2.6 (1.6) fish 
  
discussion periods ending in decision 97.1% 
The effect of treatment and socio-demographics on individual extraction 
The model for the individual number of fish harvested each round shows a mixed 
picture, with the private and both enforcement treatments having no significant effect 
on individual extraction compared to the peer pressure control treatment (Table 5.3, 
column 2; difference in fish = -0.1 and 0.4 for the weak and strong enforcement 
treatments respectively). This matches the prediction made under hypothesis H5.1.1 
that increasing the probability of detection, without the expected penalty being higher 
than the marginal gain in harvesting extra fish, would not result in a significant 
change in extraction behaviour. Conversely, all treatments that included individual or 
collective payments resulted in reductions in extraction. For the two payment 
structures in the absence of enforcement, there was no significant difference between 
their effects on extraction; with the mean reduction in individual extraction estimated 
to be 2.6 fish (SE = ±0.4) for individual payments and 2.2 fish (SE = ±0.4) for the 
collective payments (Wald test, P = 0.447). This supports the prediction made in 
hypothesis H5.2.1 that no significant difference would be observed in extraction 
under the two payment structures. 
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Table 5.3: Parameter estimates for the selected CPR game generalised linear mixed models, with 
the number of fish harvested by an individual in a single round as the response variable. The 
difference in the number of fish taken was found by calculating the expected number of fish 
taken for each variable and comparing this with the number expected for the intercept. Standard 
errors in terms of number of fish are shown in parentheses. A comparison of the effect of each 
treatment for round 1 and round 4 is given in Supplementary Materials Table C.4. The full list of 
variables modelled, plus their explanations, are given in Supplementary Materials Table C.2. 
Significance values: ns = not significant; (*) = P < 0.1; * = P < 0.05; ** = P < 0.01; *** = P < 0.001. 
Reference level treatment indicated by ref. 
Explanatory variables 
Peer pressure treatment 
as ref 
Individual 
payments & strong 
enforcement as ref 
Estimate P Estimate P 
intercept 3.938 (0.724) * 2.815 (0.634) ** 
     
treatment:     
peer pressure  ref - +1.123 (0.806) ns 
private -0.105 (0.643) ns +1.018 (0.641) (*) 
weak enforcement -0.097 (0.838) ns +1.026 (0.839) * 
strong enforcement +0.383 (0.852) ns +1.506 (0.810) ns 
individual payments -2.567 (0.434) *** -1.444 (0.457) ** 
collective payments -2.243 (0.514) *** -1.121 (0.549) (*) 
individual payments & 
weak enforcement 
-1.927 (0.575) *** -0.804 (0.608) ns 
individual payments & 
strong enforcement 
-1.123 (0.709) (*) ref - 
collective payments & 
weak enforcement 
-1.774 (0.641) ** -0.651 (0.602) ns 
collective payments & 
strong enforcement 
-2.252 (0.534) *** -1.129 (0.508) * 
     
education +0.056 (0.022) ** +0.048 (0.019) ** 
     
decision -0.750 (0.185) *** -0.614 (0.147) *** 
     
practice +0.191 (0.038) *** +0.163 (0.033) *** 
     
round:     
round 2 +0.855 (0.081) *** +0.755 (0.074) *** 
round 3 +0.577 (0.080) *** +0.503 (0.072) *** 
round 4 +1.009 (0.081) *** +0.898 (0.076) *** 
round 5 +0.835 (0.081) *** +0.736 (0.075) *** 
random effect:   
individual SD = 0.484 SD = 0.484 
group SD = 0.561 SD = 0.561 
session SD = 0.591 SD = 0.591 
The picture becomes more complicated when the treatments integrating payments 
with enforcement regimes are considered. For the treatments with individual 
payments, enforcement appeared to undermine the incentives for extraction reduction, 
with both levels of enforcement producing a weaker effect on extraction than the 
payments on their own. This crowding out was more severe for the stronger 
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enforcement regime (1.1 fewer fish extracted than in the control, compared to 2.6 
fewer for individual payments alone) than the weaker one (1.9 fewer fish). For the 
collective payment treatments, no undermining effect was observed for either of the 
two enforcement regimes (1.8 fewer fish than the control with weak enforcement and 
2.3 fewer fish with strong enforcement, rather than 2.2 fewer with just collective 
payments).  
Running the model again with the individual payment with strong enforcement as the 
reference level provides a clearer picture of the relative performance of the different 
payment treatments (Table 5.3, column 3). This shows that adding strong enforcement 
to individual payments significantly increased individual extraction relative to the 
individual payments treatment (1.4 fewer fish under individual payments alone than 
payments with strong enforcement), collective payments treatment (1.1 fewer fish) 
and collective payments with strong enforcement treatment (1.1 fewer fish). On this 
basis, it appears that although there was no difference between the performance of 
individual and collective payments under zero enforcement, performance for 
individual payments was crowded out slightly under weak enforcement and 
significantly under stronger enforcement regimes. Under no combination was there 
any meaningful increase in compliance under integrated treatments relative to the two 
payment treatments. This matches the effect expected under hypothesis H5.3, with 
exogenous enforcement crowding out the strong pro-social behaviour observed when 
payments were offered with no enforcement. However, the lack of an effect when rule 
enforcement was added to collective payments is contrary to predictions and suggests 
that further thought is required to understand why crowding out occurs under some 
conditions and not others. 
In addition to the treatment played, a number of individual demographic and 
livelihood variables were tested, of which only one was included in the final selected 
model. This was the number of years of education that each participant had received. 
Despite the fact that a logistic regression was used in the analysis, the effect of 
education was linear over the range of years spent in education observed for the 
sample. As such, each additional year in education was found to result in a small 
increase in the number of fish taken (diff. in fish = 0.06). None of the other variables 
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tested were included in the final model, meaning that no effect was found for 
participant age, gender, ethnicity or any of the livelihood variables considered.  
Two other variables were found to have a significant effect on individual extraction. 
Group decision-making (i.e. when a group made a collective decision during the 
discussion period) resulted in a reduction of 0.8 fish per group member when a 
decision was recorded, mirroring a similar result to that found in Travers et al. (2011). 
This shows the strong impact that collective decision-making can have on individual 
harvesting decisions. Finally, the mean individual extraction from the two practice 
rounds was also found to be significantly and approximately linearly correlated with 
extraction during the game itself. This suggests that behaviour within the game was 
governed not only by the conditions of each treatment but also by inherent 
preferences. Participants, who took more than others during the practice, also took 
more in the other treatments they played, irrespective of the difference in conditions. 
Three random effects were also included in the selected model: individual, group and 
session. The variation explained by each random effect was roughly comparable 
(Table 5.3). This indicates the importance not just of individual decision-making but 
also of group interaction, with both the groups in which participants played individual 
treatments and the group of 20 participants selected to play the CPR game for a single 
day session included in the model. This matches a similar result in Hayo and Vollan 
(2012), who found that adding a group dummy variable to their analysis of CPR 
extraction in Southern African rangelands improved the explanatory power of their 
model.  
One variable that was found to be important by Travers et al. (2011), but was not 
included in the selected model here, was the previous treatment played. Previously, it 
was found that individual extraction was significantly reduced after participants had 
played treatments that promoted a degree of self-organisation within each group. 
Under the conditions presented by the set of treatments considered here, this would 
suggest that the three collective payment treatments would reduce extraction in 
subsequent treatments played. The difference between the AIC of a model containing 
a variable for the previous treatment played and the selected model was 6.3, which 
suggests that the previous treatment played has no effect on extraction. A closer look 
at the parameter estimates of each individual treatment confirms that only one 
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treatment had any meaningful effect on extraction in future treatments; the simple 
collective payments treatment (diff. in fish = -2.1, p = 0.004). This is comparable with 
the effect size found in the previous study, and supports hypothesis H5.2.2 that 
although performance under the two payment structures was not significantly 
different, collective payments offer secondary benefits that are not observed for 
individual payments. The fact that no effect was recorded for the combined collective 
treatments suggests that, although overall performance was not reduced, integrating 
enforcement with an payment-based intervention can crowd out at least one of the 
positive effects of self-organising.  
5.6. Discussion 
This chapter builds upon existing research that investigates how different institutional 
arrangements affect individual extraction behaviour in a CPR scenario. By 
investigating behaviour under more complex and realistic institutional conditions, in 
which both payments and penalties are applied simultaneously and separately, it has 
been possible to examine how individuals respond to such conditions, particularly 
whether penalties can crowd out the pro-social behaviour observed under reward 
payment treatments.  
The fact that little difference was found in performance when the two payment types 
(collective and individual) were considered in isolation may have implications for the 
structuring of payments in the study site and more widely. Collective payments are 
thought to offer potential advantages over individual contracts, such as reduced 
transaction costs (Wunder, 2007), and to encourage cooperation through peer 
monitoring and peer pressure to comply. Structuring payments collectively can also 
generate secondary benefits because of the institutions created to manage them 
(Clements et al., 2010). Collective payments are, however, potentially less appealing 
to recipients where social cohesion is low, as the ability to control the extraction of 
others in their group is likely to be weak. Should individuals within the group ignore 
the incentive, their behaviour has the potential to impact upon compliant individuals. 
This may in turn lead to the non-compliance of individuals who would have 
cooperated if contracted individually, as they are faced with incurring the opportunity 
cost of foregoing extraction with little hope of receiving the compensatory payment.  
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The more simplistic individual payments are less vulnerable to the concerns raised for 
collective payments and, consequently, offer the potential for improved performance 
in situations where social cohesion is low. This reflects the results of Narloch et al. 
(2012), who found that individual payments improved contributions in a public goods 
game but that collective payments were ineffective. In that study, groups were unable 
to make agreements or discuss behaviour, which is likely to limit social cohesion. 
However, the set-up in this research led to similar results from both individual and 
collective payments, although the transactions costs of setting up individual incentive 
agreements are likely to be higher than those for collective payments in the Eastern 
Plains Landscape. A preference for collective over individual payments in this system 
is further supported by the carry-over effects observed for collective payments. The 
lower extraction recorded for treatments following collective payments suggests that 
participants were able to maintain the same level of cooperation even after the offer of 
a payment had been removed. Although the mechanism for this carry over effect is 
currently unclear, Travers et al. (2011) observed the same effect in treatments thought 
to promote self-organisation amongst game participants. This supports the notion that 
structuring payments collectively has the potential to empower recipients and, hence, 
may lead to a more sustainable solution than if payments were simply contracted on 
an individual basis.  
The role of enforcement and crowding out 
Neither of the two external enforcement treatments achieved a significant reduction in 
extraction over the control. This follows theoretical predictions, as the incentives in 
both treatments were insufficient to move the Nash Equilibrium away from each 
individual extracting the maximum possible. Both treatments resulted in lower social 
efficiencies than found for the control, with the stronger treatment lowest due to the 
higher penalty rate. Even though participants would have been aware that these 
treatments were resulting in lower individual payoffs, the penalties were insufficient 
to reduce extraction. This corresponds to the findings of a number of other studies (e.g. 
Ostmann, 1998; Cardenas et al., 2000). There was, however, no evidence that the 
enforcement treatments in isolation led to crowding out of the baseline cooperation 
measured in the control, despite the generally strong social cohesion of the subject 
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pool. This is at apparent odds with the findings of Vollan (2008) that crowding out 
occurs when people have strong social cohesion and are subject to external penalties.  
The effect of enforcement on the cooperation achieved under the two payment 
structures is more informative. It is rare for incentive schemes in conservation to 
operate in isolation, without some form of enforcement (often imposed by an external 
agent). As such, it is important to understand how these different policy instruments 
interact. None of the treatments that combined enforcement with payments improved 
on the performance of payments alone. In many ways, this is unsurprising as both the 
collective and individual payment treatments lowered mean extraction to 
approximately two fish per round for each individual, the same as the threshold for 
receiving a payment. Given that the enforcement regimes used the same threshold, 
improvements in performance would have been expected to be restricted only to those 
individuals who took more than the threshold.   
In the case of the weaker enforcement regime, adding complexity to the institutional 
conditions experienced by the participants appears to have weakened the response to 
the incentives created by the two payment structures, as both saw a slight decline in 
their effectiveness. This is an example of how externally imposed rules have the 
potential to crowd out cooperation achieved under other conditions. Other authors (e.g. 
Cardenas et al., 2000) have suggested that this crowding out effect is caused by 
externally imposed rules promoting individualistic behaviour, thereby undermining 
cooperative behaviour. This was supported by the way in which participants 
responded to the enforcement mechanism during the game, with several participants 
commenting during the discussion periods that extraction decisions should be up to 
the individual because of the risk of being penalised.  
For the individual payment treatment, the crowding out effect was strongest when 
combined with the stronger enforcement regime. In some sense this is counter to 
expectations, as increasing the probability of detection reduces the expected payoff of 
breaking the rule limiting extraction. One possible explanation for this result is that 
the high probability of monitoring acted to highlight the importance of the 
enforcement mechanism in participants’ minds and, hence, further promote 
individualistic behaviour. Participants understood that group members who took more 
than the threshold of two fish did so at their own risk, thus reducing the incentive for 
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group decision-making and individual compliance. The response to the strong 
enforcement regime when coupled with collective payments was very different. In 
this case, several participants were observed using the presence of penalties in the 
treatment as a means to encourage non-compliers to cooperate. By so doing, they 
were using an externally imposed institution to promote behaviour in the group’s best 
interest, an action for which there was little incentive in the case of the individual 
payments.  
This apparent difference in how the two payment structures interacted with the 
enforcement regimes demonstrates the potential for individuals to respond very 
differently to seemingly similar sets of incentives. In the case of individual payments, 
increasing the probability of rule breaking detection strengthened the crowding out 
effect, and increased extraction, but the same mechanism served to strengthen group 
decision-making for collective payments. This finding builds on the work of Vollan 
(2008), as it shows that crowding out can occur when both supportive and controlling 
institutions are present, but only under certain conditions.  
Policy implications 
Whilst many previous studies have investigated the effect of both positive and 
negative sets of incentives on extraction behaviour in the commons, the results 
presented here have built up a more complex picture by comparing the effects of 
multiple simultaneous interventions, including several that integrate seemingly 
opposing sets of incentives. These results can help guide policy decision-making. 
One of the principal dilemmas facing conservation organisations is how to provide 
incentives to change illegal behaviour. Typically, this has been attempted through the 
implementation of various enforcement measures but there are a number of barriers to 
successful implementation of such measures. These include, amongst others, weak 
local institutions (Barrett et al., 2001), poor support for natural resource laws from 
national governments and logistical and financial constraints. More positive measures 
can be employed but this raises questions about the value and form of possible 
incentives. Some authors have argued that it is necessary to compensate the full 
opportunity costs of foregoing the illegal behaviour but this approach has clear issues 
associated with it. In particular, the opportunity costs of many illegal activities, such 
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as the clearance of forest for commercial agriculture, may be prohibitively high. The 
results of the payment treatments are encouraging in this respect, as all treatments, 
including those integrated with enforcement regimes, resulted in significant 
reductions in individual extraction, and yet only covered 31% of the individual 
opportunity cost of not harvesting the full 10 fish. This suggests that, contrary to the 
model of selfish rationality, individuals will alter their behaviour even when the pure 
financial incentives are insufficient to suggest that they would do so.  
The results of the integrated payment and enforcement treatments are of greater policy 
relevance. These demonstrate that focussing solely on the effects of positive 
incentives may overestimate the impact of such policies by failing to take account of 
the possible crowding out effect of also providing negative incentives by externally 
imposed enforcement of rules. There is also evidence here to suggest that these risks 
can be minimised by adopting a collective payment structure rather than an individual 
structure. This would also offer the advantage of promoting a greater degree of self-
organisation amongst resource users and lowering transaction costs. In the context of 
payments for environmental services, collective payments may therefore provide a 
more effective solution for encouraging reductions in individual resource use.   
Finally, in this chapter, I have considered a series of exogenous conservation 
interventions that might be employed to encourage pro-conservation behaviour in the 
study area. In the context of Seima Protection Forest, the results presented suggest 
that certain policy options could be used to reduce extraction from the reserve. Both 
the individual and collective payment treatments brought considerable reductions in 
comparison to the baseline behaviour. Conversely, increasing investment in patrolling 
may not bring about any significant benefits or could even be counter-productive if 
combined with individual payment schemes designed to encourage resource 
conservation. Consequently, it is recommended that careful consideration be given to 
possible unwanted effects, such as crowding out, during the design phase of future 
payments schemes proposed for the site.  
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Chapter 6 
6. Investigating incentive based approaches to biodiversity 
conservation through scenarios 
6.1. Introduction 
It has long been understood that local communities shoulder a disproportionate share 
of the costs of biodiversity conservation, whilst benefits accrue largely at national or 
global scales (Wells, 1992; Balmford & Whitten, 2003). The establishment of 
protected areas (PAs), for example, is often driven by values surrounding the 
importance of endangered species or habitats, which may not be shared by those most 
affected by conservation activities (Roe & Elliott, 2006). Conversely, PAs have often 
been associated with displacement, food insecurity and the loss of livelihoods 
(Ghimire & Pimbert 1997; Adams et al., 2004; Colchester, 2004; Brockington & Igoe, 
2006; Cernea & Schmidt-Soltau, 2006), with significant negative impacts for local 
people. Recognition of this inequality and the resentment it can create has helped to 
give rise to a raft of incentive based approaches to conservation. Notable examples 
include integrated conservation and developments projects (ICDPs; Wells & Brandon, 
1993; Barrett & Arcese, 1995), community based natural resource management 
(CBNRM; Kellert et al., 2000; Singleton, 2000) and payments for ecosystem services 
(PES; Ferraro & Kiss, 2002; Wunder, 2007; Engel et al., 2008). While the motivation 
behind these different approaches may vary, the principle that local people are 
incentivised to cooperate with conservation efforts is common to all. However, 
despite the long period of interest in incentives and their increasing use in 
conservation, questions remain about how best they might be structured. For instance, 
should incentives be collective or targeted at individuals? Are direct payments 
preferable to in-kind support? How do the effects of using payments compare with 
those of alternative top-down approaches, such as law enforcement? These are all 
questions that should be answered prior to the implementation of conservation 
policies, and yet their answers are not clear-cut.  
For contexts in which the use of resources is restricted or illegal, such as within 
protected areas, the appropriateness of using incentives as a means to encourage pro-
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conservation behaviour has been questioned. Concerns have been raised regarding 
both the additionality and validity of providing incentives to discourage a behaviour 
that is already illegal (Börner & Wunder, 2008). However, where resources are 
lacking for effective protected area management, incentive schemes may still be a 
legitimate means of changing behaviour (Clements, 2010; Petheram & Campbell, 
2010). In such cases, it may not be necessary or appropriate to cover full opportunity 
costs, as incentives can augment existing preferences to obey the law. In this context, 
it has been suggested that in-kind support, such as the setting up of a community fund 
for infrastructural development or livelihood enhancement (e.g. agri-environmental or 
alternative livelihood schemes) to increase the profitability of existing land uses, is 
preferable to direct payments (Wunder, 2005; Asquith et al., 2008). There is a 
corresponding risk, however, that such an approach could weaken the conditionality 
attached to the provision of incentives, as such support could be difficult to withdraw 
(Sommerville et al., 2010), and would also vary in the extent to which different 
resource users benefit (Lee & Mahanty, 2009).  
Assessing the future response of those targeted by conservation programmes is not an 
easy task, particularly for contexts, such as those commonly found in developing 
countries, in which institutions are weak (Barrett et al., 2001) and property rights ill-
defined (Geist & Lambin, 2002). Consequently, decision-making under different 
economic incentives is often conceptualised in terms of maximising utility (Barrett & 
Arcese, 1998; Damania et al. 2005). However, this approach is problematic. Whilst 
decision-makers are commonly modelled as rational actors, who seek only to 
maximise their own benefit, empirical evidence suggests that most decision-making is 
influenced by other-regarding preferences (Gintis, 2000). For environments where 
property rights are uncertain, such as for many common property resources, 
predictions of behaviour become particularly complex. Similarly, the opportunity 
costs borne through cooperating with conservation initiatives not only incorporate 
tangible financial costs, such as those of lost earnings through restricted access of 
resources, but may also include other elements (such as foregone recognition of 
tenure), which are harder to quantify. Issues such as these, coupled with a paucity of 
data relating to potentially unknown factors that influence decision-making, can make 
predicting behaviour more challenging. Similarly, testing approaches in real life is 
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also difficult, as pilots can be prohibitively expensive and experimental approaches, 
such as randomised controlled trials, even more so (Agrawal, 2014). 
One way to overcome the difficulties in predicting behaviour is to turn to methods, 
such as scenario-based interviewing, which allow for the investigation of decision-
making under a range of credible futures prior to the implementation of an 
intervention. While predicting future behaviour is problematic, placing limits on the 
length of time and changes considered can act to reduce the complexity and produce 
meaningful results (Gordon, 1992). Scenarios presented in the form of qualitative 
narratives (e.g. Cinner, 2009) have the advantage that they can be easily understood 
and, therefore, allow for the exploratory examination of behaviour in contexts where 
respondents may struggle to place values on complex hypothetical situations (as in 
contingent valuation). Discussing the future in this way provides valuable insight into 
not only how people are likely to respond to the scenarios presented, but also the 
reasons why they might respond that way.  
Such approaches may also serve to help minimise the risks presented by heterogeneity 
amongst the target populations for conservation policies, or by exogenous changes 
such as external market fluctuations. Accounting for such complexity is one of the 
principal challenges facing conservation; something that integrated conservation and 
development projects are often said to have failed to do (McShane & Newby, 2004; 
Blom et al., 2010; Waylen et al., 2012). In part, this is because conservation often 
operates within highly complex socio-ecological systems in which relationships 
between society and natural systems are dynamic and multi-scale (Berkes, 2004). 
Even at the site level, heterogeneity within target populations may be high (Chan et 
al., 2007; Waylen et al., 2013). Scenario approaches enable the response to 
conservation policies by different agents to be tested and, hence, the extent of 
homogeneity of response to be estimated for a target group.  
In this chapter, scenario interviews are used to examine the potential outcomes of 
different approaches to changing incentives within Seima Protection Forest. This is 
done through an analysis of the stated responses of smallholder farmers from several 
villages within the project area to seven future scenarios, which include exogenous 
changes to the sale price of cassava (the dominant agricultural commodity in the area) 
and different intervention options aimed at reducing deforestation at the site 
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(increased enforcement effort, communal and individual conditional payments and a 
village fund for infrastructural development). For each scenario, interview 
respondents were asked how their land use and livelihood practices might change and, 
hence, the responses given provide an indication of the expected variation in farmer 
reactions to the intervention options under consideration for the study site. Within this 
methodological framework, the predicted effectiveness of each option for 
incentivising pro-conservation behaviour (in this case, reduced forest clearance) is 
investigated and compared against the response to exogenous changes in the price of 
cassava. By analysing responses at the household level but within three distinct 
livelihood zones, the effect of economic well-being, livelihood strategy and socio-
demographic variables on the responses given to each scenario are examined. In this 
way, I seek to identify whether, in the context of this case study, opportunities exist to 
target interventions towards those households or livelihood zones most likely to 
respond positively.  
6.2. The Seima Protection Forest REDD+ Demonstration Project 
Proposals for the REDD+ project at Seima Protection Forest are well advanced and 
focus on the core protection zone, with 20 participating villages located within or in 
close proximity to this zone. Household livelihoods within the project area are based 
on subsistence agriculture and the collection of forest products (Evans et al., 2003). 
Increasingly, however, farmers are turning towards the production of cash crops, such 
as cassava and cashew, and encroaching further into the protected area (Chapter 4). 
Immigration of households seeking land from neighbouring provinces has helped to 
drive expansion of agricultural land and fuel encroachment (Chapter 3; Chapter 4; 
Milne, 2013). Whilst these two processes are helping to drive deforestation within the 
proposed REDD+ project area, the rate and extent of change vary between villages.  
A programme of participatory tenure reform is currently underway or complete in 15 
of the project villages (A. Diment, pers. comm.). Under this scheme, communal land 
title is granted to each officially recognised indigenous community, with land inside 
village boundaries divided into different use areas. Land use inside the communal title 
is governed by a set of rules designed to protect customary practices and ensure long-
term sustainable use of communal land. Clearance of forest is only permitted inside 
designated community areas. Hence, clearance outside the titled area is illegal and 
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subject to enforcement by PA authorities, whilst clearance inside community areas is 
governed by village institutions. Clearance rates are high both inside and outside titled 
areas (see Chapter 4), and detection probabilities are low. At the point of writing, six 
indigenous communities living within the boundaries of the protected area have 
received official communal land titles. With the exception of the initial pilot village, 
assistance for land use planning and land titling has been prioritised in villages near 
the district capital because land and forest resources were judged to be under the 
greatest threat, as they are located close to good quality roads and, therefore, subject 
to both high immigration and increasing commercialisation of agriculture. This has 
added to the institutional complexity across the study site, as different villages are 
now at various points along the tenure reform process. 
The area is characterised into three livelihood zones in which different livelihood 
activities dominate: a cash crop zone, a lowland paddy zone and an upland zone. 
These zones have repeatedly been referred to in project documentation and reflect the 
major inter-community heterogeneity with respect to bio-physical characteristics, 
institutional framing, opportunity costs of stopping deforestation and economic well-
being. As such, the majority of variation in clearance behaviour due to the conditions 
in which decisions are made is expected to be represented by these zones. The cash 
crop zone is centred around the district capital of Keo Seima and is characterised by 
easy road access and mature cash crop markets. This area is also currently 
experiencing the highest rate of land conversion (WCS, 2013). The lowland paddy 
zone is located in the most remote part of the protected area. Access to this area is 
difficult (particularly during the wet season) and the dominant livelihood strategy is 
centred on the cultivation of paddy rice, supported by liquid resin collection from 
native dipterocarp trees. The upland zone is also located further from market centres, 
although access is largely better than for the paddy zone. In this zone, households 
cultivate a greater diversity of crops and have recently made the transition towards 
commercial production. 
Variation in economic well-being between the three livelihood zones has previously 
been assessed using a participatory poverty index, which was calculated following the 
basic necessity survey method (see Chapter 3 for an explanation of this method). 
Across the 622 households sampled, the household poverty score ranged from 0.10 to 
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0.82, with a mean of 0.44 (SE = 0.13). After correcting for other household 
demographic and socio-economic variables, a significant difference was found 
between the mean poverty score of households from villages in each of the three 
livelihood zones. As expected, communities in the cash crop zone had the highest 
mean household poverty score (0.10 higher than the mean score for villages in the 
paddy zone (p < 0.001) and 0.04 higher than the mean score for villages in the upland 
zone (p = 0.054)), indicating that these households are on average better off than 
households from villages in the other two zones. The livelihood zone with the lowest 
mean household poverty score was the lowland paddy zone (mean score for villages 
was 0.06 lower than the mean score for villages in the upland zone (p = 0.016)), 
which again was as expected as this is the most remote zone with fewer income 
generating livelihood opportunities available to the people who live there. Within 
each zone, there was little difference in heterogeneity at the household level. The 
standard errors for household poverty scores in all three zones are comparable, with 
the least variation in the upland zone and the most in the cash crop zone (SEcash = 0.14, 
SEpaddy = 0.14, SEupland = 0.12).  
6.3. Methods 
All households surveyed as part of this research had previously participated in the 
basic necessity survey. As such, it was possible to stratify each household by two 
variables: poverty score and livelihood zone. Sampling for the scenario interviews 
was spread equally across poverty score terciles, which were derived for the whole 
survey area, and the three livelihood zones, such that an equal proportion of 
households from the three poverty score terciles were interviewed for each zone. In 
total, 49 households were interviewed: four households to pilot the method and 
another five households for each poverty score tercile in each livelihood zone. In 
cases where the household head was not present in the village at the time that the 
survey was carried out, a replacement household was selected randomly from a list of 
all households within the village. Rather than sample households from each of the 20 
REDD+ villages, two or three villages were selected for each livelihood zone in such 
a way as to cover the full range of conditions found in villages within each zone.  
Interviews were semi-structured, with respondents presented with a baseline business 
as usual scenario and a further six scenarios in which one aspect of future conditions 
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was changed. Each scenario was presented one by one and the respondent asked to 
qualitatively explain how they would react over the next five years with regards to 
their agricultural and other livelihood activities. Follow-up questions were asked to 
ensure that the respondent had fully understood the scenario, to explore responses in 
greater detail and to triangulate between responses to different scenarios. As land-use 
is a potentially sensitive issue in Cambodian protected areas, respondents were 
assured that all data collected would be confidential. A subsample of responses from 
two villages was validated by comparing landholdings reported during the scenario 
interviews with those reported in Chapter 4, with all responses comparing favourably.    
Interview responses to the six future scenarios were compared against those to the 
baseline business as usual scenario. Responses were then coded into different 
categories depending on their likely impact on forest cover. In certain cases, in which 
direct changes in clearance behaviour were not described, coding was based on 
existing understanding and knowledge of land use practices within the study area. For 
example, where respondents intended to buy land already in use, this was coded as a 
resultant increase in forest clearance based on existing understanding of clearance 
processes in sampled villages. In this case, it is reportedly common practice for 
individuals to clear forest specifically for sale or to sell land within village boundaries 
but subsequently clear additional forest to compensate for the loss (Milne, 2013). In 
both instances, the act of buying land fuels additional indirect clearance. Where the 
conditions presented within a scenario were contingent on the behaviour of others, 
interview respondents were asked to describe their response to the scenario based on 
whether others in their group cleared. Responses were then coded as conditional or 
unconditional depending on whether they were contingent on the behaviour of others 
or not. 
There follows a description of the conditions presented by each scenario. A priori 
hypotheses are included for each of the six scenarios in which the conditions were 
different to those of the business as usual baseline scenario and are based on prior 
understanding of behaviour within the study villages and existing literature.  
Baseline business as usual scenario 
In this scenario, it was explained that current conditions would stay constant over the 
next five years. All average prices would remain at a stable level, although there 
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would be some small variation between each year. Law enforcement effort would 
remain constant but, in cases where indigenous land title had yet to be granted, tenure 
reforms would progress as currently planned.  
Performance payments 
In these three scenarios, respondents were offered the option of receiving an annual 
payment of $200 in return for agreeing not to clear any additional land, including 
inside areas designated for use under communal land title. Payments were set at $200 
as this was felt to be representative of the likely sum offered in the future as part of 
the REDD+ project (T. Evans, pers. comm.). In the first of these scenarios, payments 
were to be made on an individual basis and were dependent solely on the compliance 
of the household interviewed. In the second scenario, payments would be made based 
on the behaviour of groups of ten individual households from within the same 
neighbourhood as the respondent household. Each household would receive $200 if 
all households in the group chose not to clear any additional land, otherwise they 
would receive nothing. In the third of these scenarios, the money would be paid into a 
village level development fund to support infrastructural development or other 
development projects identified by the community instead of the $200 being paid to 
each individual household. These payments would again be dependent on the 
collective behaviour of groups of ten households from the same neighbourhood. 
Hypothesis H6.1: the offer of conditional payments will reduce the number of 
households who predict that they will expand their agricultural land relative to a) the 
business as usual baseline, and b) the increased enforcement effort scenario. 
Hypothesis H6.2: the offer of conditional payments will more strongly reduce the 
number of households who predict that they will expand their agricultural land when 
payments are conditional on group-level compliance than when they are conditional 
solely on individual compliance, but the type of collective payment offered will not 
make a difference to land expansion. 
Increase in enforcement effort 
In this scenario, respondents were told that enforcement effort within the study site 
would be doubled, such that it would be twice as likely that illegal land clearance 
would be detected. The likelihood of prosecution once caught was unaffected. This 
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additional enforcement activity would be restricted to conservation areas, i.e. 
clearance inside titled areas designated for communal agricultural use would not be 
subject to increased law enforcement as these areas are subject to community 
management.  
Hypothesis H6.3: doubling the probability of detection will decrease the number of 
households who predict that they will expand their agricultural land relative to the 
business as usual baseline. 
Increase and decrease in cassava price 
For these two scenarios, respondents were asked to imagine that the price of cassava 
halved or doubled over the next five years, with some small yearly variation. Cassava 
has quickly become the dominant commercial crop grown in most areas of the study 
site and many farmers report that the price at which they are able to sell this crop is of 
particular importance in determining future land use (H. Travers, pers. obs.). However, 
the cassava market in the project area is imperfect and prices can be volatile. These 
two scenarios were included to explore the effect that a consistent increase or 
decrease in average cassava prices would have on future smallholder land use and to 
compare the effect of such changes against those resulting from conservation 
interventions.  
Hypothesis H6.4: doubling the price of cassava will increase the number of 
households who predict that they will expand their agricultural land relative to the 
business as usual baseline. 
Hypothesis H6.5: halving the price of cassava will decrease the number of households 
who predict that they will expand their agricultural land relative to the business as 
usual baseline. 
Statistical analysis 
A series of generalised linear mixed effects models were constructed to analyse the 
probability of pro-conservation behaviour under the different scenarios considered. 
Two response variables were considered. The first of these was a dichotomous 
variable describing whether or not a household would follow pro-conservation 
behaviour under the conditions presented by each scenario. In this context, pro-
 
114 
conservation behaviour was defined as reducing clearance relative to the baseline 
business as usual scenario, but including those who did not clear forest in either the 
treatment or baseline scenario. The second response variable, a subset of the first, was 
a dichotomous variable describing whether or not a household stated it would reduce 
its clearance relative to the baseline scenario (i.e. excluding those who did not clear in 
the baseline scenario). For both response variables, models were considered for 
conditional (those dependent on reciprocation) and unconditional (those independent 
of reciprocation) responses. Model selection was carried out using backwards 
stepwise selection on the basis of corrected Akaike information criterion (AICc; 
Akaike, 1979) values. Following Burnham and Andersen (2002), the most 
parsimonious candidate models with a ΔAICc value of less than two were selected, 
otherwise the model with the lowest AICc was selected. In each model, an individual 
random effect was included to account for multiple responses by each individual. 
Inclusion of a village random effect was tested using likelihood ratio tests and 
rejected for all models (Bolker et al., 2009). Explanatory variables included livelihood 
zone, poverty score and demographic variables, such as age, sex and ethnicity (see 
Appendix D for details). 
6.4. Results 
Under the baseline business as usual scenario, 82% of respondents declared that they 
would continue to increase their agricultural land over the next five years, while the 
remaining 18% stated that they had no intention of expanding their land. This shows 
the high level of smallholder farmer involvement in forest clearance in the study site. 
The stated reactions of each household to the scenarios presented were coded relative 
to those under the baseline scenario (Figure 6.1). This showed significant variation in 
the reported responses to each scenario, ranging from a large increase in the rate of 
forest clearance under increased cassava prices to a potentially large decrease under 
collective payments or a village development fund. Overall, however, a high 
proportion of respondents reported that their behaviour would be unaffected by the 
conditions presented to them in a given scenario. This proportion was particularly 
high for both the enforcement and individual payment scenarios, for which only 11% 
of respondents reported that they would change their proposed clearance behaviour 
relative to business as usual. The results of the logistic mixed effects models of pro-
 
115 
conservation behaviour and reduced clearance under different scenarios confirm many 
of the observational results above (Table 6.1). The scenario presented was a 
significant determinant of stated behaviour in both models. 
 
Figure 6.1 Proportion of coded responses for the business as usual baseline scenario and each of 
the six future scenarios. Conditional behaviour refers to behaviour that is contingent on 
reciprocation.  
Options for benefit sharing 
With respect to the different options considered for benefit sharing, the two collective 
payment scenarios performed significantly better than individually contracted 
payments, provided that others in the group reciprocated. The probability of behaving 
in a pro-conservation manner increased relative to the baseline scenario by 0.53 for 
the collective payments scenario and 0.35 for the village fund scenario, but only by 
0.03 for the individual payment scenario (Table 6.1, column 1). When only 
unconditional responses were considered, all of the benefit sharing scenarios 
considered had only a negligible effect on response relative to the business as usual 
baseline, even though the clearance rate reduced significantly under the village fund 
scenario (Table 6.1, column 2). With respect to reductions in forest clearance, 
collective payments significantly out-performed individual payments. With payment 
into a village fund as the reference, the probability that a household would reduce 
clearance under individual payments was 0.58 lower than for collective payments 
(Table 6.1, column 3). The probability that individual payments would reduce 
household agricultural expansion was only 0.05. As such, there is mixed support for 
hypothesis H6.1a but strong support for hypothesis H6.2.  
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Table 6.1: Parameter estimates for the pro-conservation and clearance reduction models considering conditional and unconditional responses. The difference in the 
probability of acting in a pro-conservation manner or reducing clearance relative to the baseline scenario was found by calculating the expected probability for 
each variable and comparing this with the probability expected for the intercept. The full list of variables modelled, plus their explanations, are given in Appendix 
D; Table D.1. Significance values: ns = not significant; (*) = P < 0.1; * = P < 0.05; ** = P < 0.01; *** = P < 0.001. Reference level treatment indicated by ref. 
Variable Pro-Conservation Model Clearance Reduction Model 
 conditional unconditional conditional unconditional 
intercept 
0.007 (0.010) *** 0.001 (0.003) *** 
0.435 (0.121) ns 0.041 (0.040) *** 
     
scenario:     
baseline ref ref   
cassava up -0.006 (0.002) * -0.001 (0.000) * -0.430 (0.011) *** -0.040 (0.004) ** 
cassava down 0.067 (0.072) ** 0.021 (0.029) *** -0.327 (0.071) *** 0.011 (0.050) ns 
enforcement 0.026 (0.035) * 0.006 (0.010) * -0.389 (0.040) *** -0.023 (0.020) ns 
individual 0.026 (0.035) * 0.006 (0.010) * -0.389 (0.040) *** -0.023 (0.020) ns 
collective 0.532 (0.186) *** 0.004 (0.007) * +0.191 (0.114) ns -0.023 (0.020) ns 
fund 0.353 (0.192) *** 0.016 (0.023) *** ref ref 
     
zone:     
cash 0.535 (0.180) *** 0.584 (0.252) ***   
upland 0.019 (0.025) (*) 0.008 (0.022) (*)   
paddy ref ref   
     
random effect:     
individual (SD)  1.387 2.213 2.054 2.906 
     
AICc 253.8 210.8 234.1 182.0 
N 315 315 270 270 
  
 
117 
As with pro-conservation behaviour, the probability that households would reduce 
clearance relative to the baseline scenario was significantly higher for both collective 
reward scenarios if conditional behaviour was considered than when only 
unconditional behaviour was considered (Table 6.1, columns 3 and 4). As such, these 
results show that the offer of collective payments to individual households or to a 
village development fund had the potential to be the most effective benefit sharing 
option with respect to reducing forest clearance but, crucially, a high proportion of 
respondents stated that their decision to stop or reduce clearance was conditional on 
the cooperation of others. Within this group the extent of their cooperation was 
roughly evenly split into two categories: those households who would only stop 
clearing provided that most or all others in their group reciprocated and those who 
would only continue to clear if most or all others in their group did likewise. 
Consequently, whilst both scenarios offer a potentially significant reduction in 
clearance, there is a risk that compliance with the conditions of the payments would 
be undermined: first by the minority of respondents who rejected the payment outright 
and subsequently by those respondents who would only cooperate if everyone else in 
the group did so.  
Responses to the individual payments treatment were similarly nuanced. While the 
majority of respondents rejected the offer of $200 in return for not clearing, the 
reasons for doing so varied. For many, the equation was simple: the $200 payment 
offered was insufficient to compensate them for the opportunity costs they would 
experience by halting agricultural expansion. Another commonly voiced reason was 
that if respondents did not clear any more land, the land currently in use would 
gradually lose fertility and at present they had insufficient land to rotate cultivation. In 
these cases, some respondents reported that they would be happy to agree to the 
conditions of the payment once they had secured sufficient land. In other cases, 
however, respondents rejected the conditions of the payment even though the 
projected earnings of the land they proposed to clear (based on current earnings from 
the land they held already) were lower than the payment offered. For these households, 
the reasons for clearing related less to the potential income that they could generate 
from the land but rather to securing land for their family for the future. Concerns were 
frequently raised that unless they cleared the five hectares allowed under community 
rules as part of the communal land titling process, the land was more vulnerable to 
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seizure from outside interests, a significant issue across the country. A similar concern 
related to whether there would be sufficient land available for their children when 
they married (i.e. whether the allowance made under communal titling for future 
expansion of the village was sufficient) and that it was better to clear the land now to 
secure their children’s future. In these cases, the opportunity cost of not clearing 
related less to the potential annual income that could be generated from the land than 
to perceived failures in the long-term management of the land titling process.  
Enforcement vs. benefit sharing 
One of the decisions facing PA authorities in Seima is how best to invest REDD+ 
revenues to reduce forest clearance. To this end, investment in the most effective 
benefit sharing option, collective payments, was compared with additional 
enforcement effort. The results of the pro-conservation model show that doubling the 
detection rate for people who clear forest illegally resulted in a negligible effect on 
response (0.03 increase in the probability of acting in a pro-conservation manner 
relative to the baseline; Table 6.1, column 1). The probability that a household would 
reduce agricultural expansion as result of increased enforcement effort was estimated 
to be 0.04. This provides only very weak support for hypothesis H6.3 that doubling 
the rate of detection would reduce the number of households expanding their 
agricultural lands relative to the business as usual baseline. In this regard, the 
enforcement scenario performed poorly in comparison to collective payments 
(probability of reducing clearance 0.39 lower than for collective payments; Table 6.1, 
column 3). As such, assuming that cooperation is reciprocated amongst groups under 
the collective payment scenario, increasing enforcement effort was found to be a poor 
alternative to benefit sharing, which provides strong support for hypothesis H6.1b.  
One of the reasons behind the lack of effectiveness of the enforcement scenario lies in 
the recent land tenure reforms that have been implemented throughout the study area. 
In all but one of the villages sampled, indigenous communal land title has been 
granted or is in the process of being applied for. Consequently, land has been 
identified for future expansion of agricultural activities in each village. As such, any 
infraction within this land is not subject to law enforcement by protected area staff, 
but governed by community land use rules drawn up by the overseeing village 
committee. Interview respondents were, therefore, able to claim that they would be 
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unaffected by increased law enforcement effort as none of their proposed expansion 
would encroach conservation areas.  
Conservation interventions vs. exogenous price changes 
Another issue facing managers at the study site is the rapid commercialisation of 
agriculture. While this has resulted in significantly increased household incomes in 
the areas that have benefited from it (Chapter 3), the rate of change threatens to 
swamp interventions aimed at controlling the expansion of agricultural land. 
Respondents were presented with only one change from business as usual in each 
scenario in order to keep the exercise simple for the respondents (i.e. no scenario 
contained both price changes and a new conservation intervention). Despite this, it is 
informative to compare responses under the exogenous price changes scenarios and 
the most effective conservation intervention, collective payments.  
Whilst the two scenarios that presented exogenous changes related to the sale price of 
cassava resulted in negligible differences to the probability of acting in a pro-
conservation manner relative to the business as usual baseline (-0.01 for the cassava 
up scenario and 0.07 for the cassava down scenario; Table 6.1, column 1), the picture 
this paints is slightly misleading. For the scenario in which the sale price doubled, 
over 40% of respondents reported that they would increase their intended clearance 
relative to the business as usual baseline, which is comparable to the 58% of 
respondents that said they would reduce clearance under the collective payments 
scenario assuming others reciprocated. A chi-squared test of responses to the cassava 
up scenario shows that a significant proportion of the population would increase 
clearance relative to business as usual if the price of cassava doubled (chi-squared test, 
df = 1, p = 1.5e-6), providing strong support for hypothesis H6.4. Not only does this 
illustrate the significant impact that this one crop has on the landscape, but it also 
highlights the risk of the positive effects of investment in benefit sharing being 
undermined by exogenous changes in the study villages. There are also implications 
for any potential livelihood intervention aimed at improving the profitability of the 
cassava crop as a way of reducing the need to deforest, as there is a distinct risk that 
this would perversely increase the incentive to clear land. It is also worth noting that 
the scenario in which the cassava price halved had the highest proportion of all 
scenarios of respondents unconditionally stopping or reducing their proposed 
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agricultural expansion, which supports hypothesis H6.5. As such, an exogenous price 
reduction resulted in greater reductions in clearance than both the enforcement and 
individual payment scenarios. Conditional responses to the collective payments still 
led to significantly higher reduction in clearance than that resulting in price reductions, 
however. The majority of respondents reported that their income would suffer under 
cassava price reductions, as alternative livelihood options available to them are less 
profitable.  
Heterogeneity of Response 
Understanding how the response to different scenarios varies with changing 
conditions and household characteristics may help to identify opportunities for 
targeting interventions in specific areas or at different groups. Separating scenario 
interview responses by livelihood zone revealed significant differences between the 
responses of households in each zone, with households in the cash crop zone reporting 
very different behaviour to the other two zones (Figure 6.2, row 1). The greatest 
difference resulted from over 50% of the respondents in this zone reporting that they 
would not clear or buy any further land under business as usual conditions, either 
because they felt that they already had sufficient land, there was no land available to 
be cleared or they did not want to clear land illegally.  
As expected from the observational results, the logistic mixed effects regression found 
pro-conservation behaviour to be significantly affected by livelihood zone, with the 
probability that households from the cash crop zone would act in a pro-conservation 
manner predicted to be 0.54 higher than households in the remote paddy zone (Table 
6.1, column 1). Unlike the conservation interventions considered, this effect was 
maintained when only unconditional behaviour was considered (0.58 increase in 
probability; Table 6.1, column 2). This result comes from households stating that they 
had no plans to expand their fields even under the baseline scenario and so would 
behave in a pro-conservation manner no matter which intervention was put into place. 
From the perspective of understanding which interventions would be the most 
effective at reducing clearance and where those interventions should be targeted to 
have the greatest impact, this is not particularly helpful. However, livelihood zone 
was not included as an explanatory variable in the selected model for the two models 
that considered whether households would actively reduce clearance relative to the 
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baseline scenario. This suggests that, even though pro-conservation behaviour is 
predicted to be higher in the cash crop zone, there is no zonal effect on the 
effectiveness of different interventions with respect to active reductions in forest 
clearance.  
In contrast to separating responses by livelihood zone, very little difference was 
apparent between the response of households from different basic necessity survey 
terciles (Figure 6.2, row 2). Household poverty score and other demographic variables 
also did not feature in the selected models explaining clearance behaviour. This 
suggests that differences between the conditions in the three livelihood zones may be 
a more important factor influencing decision-making than individual household 
heterogeneity.   
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Figure 6.2: Proportion of coded responses for the business as usual baseline scenario and each of the six future scenarios stratified by livelihood zone (row 1) and 
household poverty score terciles (row 2). Conditional behaviour refers to responses that are contingent on reciprocation. 
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6.5. Discussion 
Intervention effectiveness 
The results of the scenario interviews show that investment of REDD+ revenues can 
dramatically reduce the number of smallholder households involved in agricultural 
expansion, and in turn reduce clearance of biodiversity rich forest. Both of the 
collective benefit sharing options (collective payments and payments into a village 
fund) resulted in significant reported reductions in agricultural expansion. The caveat 
to this result, however, is that these reductions were only observed if conditional 
behaviour was included in the analysis. This finding is similar to several previous 
studies of collective action which have found that within a population, whilst a 
minority will either chose to cooperate or not in most situations, the majority are 
classified as ‘conditional cooperators’, who will only cooperate provided that other 
people reciprocate (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Rustagi et al., 2010). This suggests that 
compliance with the terms of a conditional payment would be dependent on 
facilitating a strong sense of collective action within each village, possibly by 
maximising opportunities for dialogue within the community by undertaking a 
genuinely participatory approach to designing the benefit sharing system.  
The results also demonstrate the risk of investing in activities that may prove 
ineffective at changing the incentives for households to reduce expansion. Neither 
doubling current levels of law enforcement, nor offering payments to individual 
households had any meaningful effect on pro-conservation behaviour and both 
performed poorly in comparison to the two collective benefit sharing scenarios at 
reducing overall clearance. With respect to enforcement, the results of the scenario 
interviews confirm previous studies, which suggest that the effectiveness of law 
enforcement in Cambodia is weak in situations where expected penalties are low 
(Claridge et al., 2005). This is unsurprising in a country such as Cambodia, where the 
“rule of law” generally is weak and corruption levels high (Kheang, 2006). It is 
possible, however, that the effectiveness of increasing law enforcement effort may 
have been underestimated, as respondents were able to claim that they planned all 
future clearance inside community boundaries. As already shown by the results 
presented in Chapter 4, compliance with community boundaries is far from perfect 
even amongst households with less than 5 ha (i.e. those households with less than 
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their allocation for land within community titled areas). Hence, respondents may have 
been over-reporting their intention to clear in titled areas. With respect to individual 
incentive payments, these have been found to be more effective than collective 
payments in some other contexts (e.g. Narloch et al., 2012). From this previous work 
it might easily be assumed that individual payments are a viable or superior 
alternative to collective payments for Seima, yet this has been shown not to be the 
case in this instance. This result highlights the value of using approaches, such as 
scenario interviews, to investigate possible responses to newly introduced policies 
prior to their implementation in different contexts.  
Finally, the results of the two scenarios in which the price of cassava was changed 
offer some perspective on the risk of assuming the continuation of business as usual 
conditions when planning conservation interventions. Until 2005, cassava made up a 
negligible proportion of total cultivated area in the study site. Since that time, the area 
of land under cassava cultivation has increased exponentially and many households 
now only grow cassava (see Chapter 4). The unforeseen introduction of a new cash 
crop has, in just a short space of time, had a dramatic influence on both the landscape 
and people’s livelihoods. This is a salutary lesson in how quickly the context in which 
conservation interventions are implemented can change. In this research, the choice of 
scenario was restricted by possible futures that interview respondents could conceive 
of sufficiently in order to be able to predict their behaviour, which precluded 
unfamiliar changes. However, from the observed effects of increasing the price of 
cassava it is evident that exogenous changes may bring about differences in future 
clearance rates that are comparable to those achieved by planned interventions. 
Similarly, planned changes to the profitability of cassava, for example through 
proposed agricultural intensification (Milne et al., 2012), could result in perverse 
effects as has been found in other contexts (Angelsen & Kaimowitz, 1999; Damania 
et al., 2005) 
Intervention interaction with communal land titling 
One of the challenges facing the developers of the REDD+ demonstration project in 
Seima is the design of benefit sharing with respect to existing activities, such as the 
conservation-led indigenous communal land titling process. In the majority of villages 
within the study area, community managed agricultural areas have either been 
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approved or applied for. These areas are designated for agricultural purposes and yet, 
in many villages, the main land cover within these areas is still forest. Clearance 
within these areas will, therefore, count against the REDD+ project and reduce 
revenues. In the benefit sharing options considered in this research, benefits were 
made conditional on households ceasing all clearance, irrespective of where that 
clearance might take place. This has the advantage of disincentivising all clearance 
but carries with it the risk that some households will feel it necessary to expand their 
land anyway because they have insufficient land to provide for themselves. An 
alternative option, in which payments are only contingent on not clearing outside of 
the indigenous communal land title, would allow households to clear up to 5 ha within 
titled areas, essentially writing off the forest within these areas, but would provide 
clear incentives for title boundaries to be respected3. This option would also improve 
integration with law enforcement activities, which focus only on clearance outside of 
the community areas.  
This ties in strongly with the differences in responses for households from different 
livelihood zones. In the cash crop zone, tenure reform has progressed the furthest, 
with the majority of villages having now received communal title. Villages in this 
zone have also experienced the greatest level of encroachment on their land and, as 
such, there is now little legal land available in these villages. Much of the clearance 
and agricultural expansion in this area is now, therefore, illegal. These conditions are 
likely to reduce the available options for households that are unwilling to break the 
law and may not be able to afford the high land prices that result from the scarcity of 
available land. It is, however, doubtful that clearance rates in this zone would be 
lower in reality, as much of the clearance experienced is due to migrants moving to 
the study area. For the remaining two zones, the majority of villages have only 
recently had boundaries agreed as part of their application for communal tenure, 
particularly in the case of the paddy zone. Commonly expressed sentiments were the 
need to clear to protect community land from outside interests and the right of each 
household to cultivate up to five hectares of land. This is reflected both in the low 
                                                 
3 Subsequent to the completion of this chapter, a Verified Carbon Standard audit of 
the REDD+ project required that areas under communal management, including all 
ICT areas, be withdrawn from project boundaries, as suggested here. 
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number of responses that indicated an unconditional reduction in clearance in 
response to the different scenarios and by the 100% of respondents in these two zones 
reported their intention to expand their land holdings under the baseline scenario. 
Fears regarding their security of tenure are driving households to clear more land than 
they might otherwise. As such, it may be better to make benefits conditional only on 
clearance outside community areas, which would allow households to secure their 
titled land from possible land grabbing in the future. If payments are made conditional 
on halting all clearance, they may be perceived as being unfair, even if they are 
voluntary.  
Despite some obvious differences in responses between the three livelihood zones, no 
significant difference was found with respect to the effectiveness of different 
interventions to reduce agricultural expansion. Similarly, no effect on response was 
found for different household characteristics, including household poverty score. This 
consistent response across different zones and households suggests that, in this 
instance, few opportunities exist for targeting interventions in specific places or at 
specific groups. Whilst this simplifies implementation, as the same level of benefits 
can be offered to every household across the landscape, these results suggest that 
there will be some households that, initially at least, will choose not to cooperate with 
the REDD+ project and will continue to clear no matter what conservation 
intervention is implemented. The key, however, will be to mobilise conditional 
cooperators to support the conservation intervention.  
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Chapter 7 
7. Discussion 
7.1. Benefit sharing for REDD+ 
“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely” 
Baron Acton (1834–1902) 
One of the principal narrative strands relating to the implementation of REDD+ 
regards the opportunities for the delivery of co-benefits for both biodiversity and local 
livelihoods alongside the primary goal of reducing carbon emissions (Brown et al., 
2008; Stickler et al., 2009), such that successful projects could result in win-win-wins. 
This is not an easy task and the history of conservation is littered with poorly 
conceived policy initiatives that have failed to balance the need for trade-offs between 
seemingly conflicting objectives (Blom et al., 2010, McShane et al., 2011). In this 
study, I have focussed on analysing the possible future effects of different 
interventions under consideration at one REDD+ site in order to understand which of 
these would have the greatest impact on resource use if implemented. This process 
has generated results that will directly feed into the design of conservation activities at 
that site, yet there are wider lessons to be learnt.  
The most widely applicable lesson regards the structure of performance payments as 
part of a benefit sharing system, and the institutions that are created or adapted to 
manage them at the local level. The results of Chapters 5 and 6 both suggest that 
collective payments are preferable to individual payments either outright (Chapter 6) 
or because of associated added benefits, such as carry over effects or positive 
interactions with enforcement (Chapter 5). Responses to the scenario interviews in 
Chapter 6 also suggested that collective payments were most effective when disbursed 
as cash rather than contributions to a village-level development fund. These predictive 
results are supported by the findings of recent work undertaken in protected areas in 
the Northern Plains Landscape of Cambodia, which investigated the effectiveness of 
pilot incentive schemes similar in structure to those considered here (Clements et al., 
2010; Clements, 2012; Clements & Milner-Gulland, in press).  
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These are useful results that can help guide policy setting for REDD+ projects, yet 
there are also implications for how such payments are managed. One of the reasons 
payments were preferred to contributions was a widely held scepticism that a village 
fund, managed by the indigenous community committee in each village, would be 
free from corruption or invested in projects that would benefit everyone. This echoes 
the results of Chapter 4, which showed that members of the management committee 
in O Rona were amongst the worst offenders with respect to non-compliance with 
community land use regulations and were regarded poorly by other members of the 
indigenous community. This issue cuts deeper than simple elite capture of resources, a 
phenomenon commonly encountered by community style interventions (Mansuri & 
Rao, 2004; Platteau, 2004). In Seima, the Bunong have strong traditional institutions, 
which are tied to their animist belief system and interactions with the natural 
environment (UNDP, 2010). It is convenient for conservation interventions that 
require management at the local level, such as land use planning or village 
development funds, to link into these institutions, as it is commonly perceived to 
afford them added legitimacy (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Berkes, 2004). Yet, this 
approach fundamentally alters the role of traditional village authorities, which can 
dramatically change the way in which they are perceived (as seen in O Rona; Chapter 
4). Consequently, there is a risk that the implementation of conservation interventions 
can act to undermine traditional authority and erode cultural well-being (Jones et al., 
2008); impacts that may go unnoticed, as they are particularly difficult to quantify or 
measure (Milner-Gulland et al., 2014). Conversely, collective benefits have, in some 
instances, been found to strengthen local institutions (e.g. Clements et al., 2010).  
Another lesson regards the extent to which interventions should be targeted at specific 
groups. Part of the value of approaches such as economic games (Chapter 5) and 
scenario interviews (Chapter 6) lies not only in being able to assess the relative 
effectiveness of different policy options but also in identifying sections of a 
population that may be particularly responsive to interventions. However, beyond the 
headline results of which intervention might bring about the greatest behavioural 
change, the results of Chapters 5 and 6 showed that there was a great deal of 
consistency observed in responses between groups for each approach. While there is 
significant diversity across the study site with respect to livelihood opportunities, 
economic well-being, ethnicity and culture, the two approaches found little evidence 
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to suggest that response to the different benefit sharing options considered would vary 
across the population. This was found to be true even in situations where overall 
behaviour differed, such as the difference in pro-conservation behaviour observed 
between different livelihood zones in Chapter 6. This is encouraging because it 
suggests that, in this instance, an egalitarian approach to benefit sharing, in which the 
same benefits are offered to every household, is appropriate. This is important, as it 
runs counter to the commonly heard suggestion that approaches that improve equity 
outcomes, which can add legitimacy to conservation efforts (Skutsch et al., 2011), 
sacrifice efficiency (Alix-Garcia et al., 2008; Proctor et al., 2009; Pascual et al., 2010). 
However, the results of Chapter 3 show that, while overall household economic well-
being increased from 2007 to 2012, certain groups remain disadvantaged. 
Consequently, there is an argument for focussing benefit sharing on vulnerable groups, 
or at the very least ensuring that such groups do not lose out. 
Finally, since the increased interest in conserving forest resources generated by the 
emergence of REDD+, there have been fears of a revival of green-grabbing, and a 
recentralisation of forest management (Phelps et al., 2010). These fears have been 
supported by the emergence of evidence that the rate of decentralisation of forest 
management has slowed significantly in recent years (RRI, 2014). Yet, in Seima, 
where indigenous communities are receiving title over their customary lands (as 
described in Chapter 4), titled areas are being removed from the REDD+ project 
because the project applicant (the Cambodian government) does not have full 
management rights to that land. This has created a bizarre situation in which project 
proponents have followed widely held recommendations to secure legal recognition of 
the customary rights of local people and obtained free, prior, informed consent from 
all villages identified as having land or extracting resources from within the project 
boundary, yet those areas have now been excluded from the project. As such, any 
incentives created to reduce clearance by local people must focus on illegal expansion 
beyond titled areas. It may be that this would be a more effective approach than 
providing incentives to reduce clearance inside titled areas (as discussed in Chapter 6), 
but it reopens the debate about the equity of benefit sharing because households living 
in participating villages, in effect, have no more right to exploit resources within 
project boundaries or receive benefits from the project than immigrant households 
moving to the area from other provinces.    
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7.2. Experimental games vs. scenario interviews 
Two of the approaches used in this study, experimental games (Chapter 5) and 
scenario interviews (Chapter 6), evaluated the potential effectiveness of interventions 
under consideration at the study site. While the application of neither of these 
approaches to investigating the likely effects of conservation interventions is entirely 
novel, no other study has applied both approaches to the investigation of policy 
effectiveness in the same contextual setting. It is instructive, therefore, to look at how 
each of these two approaches performs in comparison with the other, and consider 
whether the combined results allow for greater confidence regarding the external 
validity of the individual approaches and conclusions.  
Combined, the two approaches offer considerable complementarity. One advantage of 
the qualitative approach taken during the scenario interviews is the ability to follow 
lines of enquiry as they develop during the interviews. The experimental setting of the 
CPR game allows for fewer opportunities to query the thought behind individual 
decisions. Although each participant was interviewed at the end of every experimental 
session, they often found it difficult to remember how they felt during each round or 
explain their motivations behind each decision. The scenario interviews, therefore, 
offer greater scope for interrogating the reasons why responses to the different 
interventions vary. Scenario interviews also allow for greater complexity to be 
included in the policy context considered, as descriptive narratives are often easier to 
understand than the stylised conditions of experimental games. For this study, this 
meant that land clearance, which was considered too complex to be understandable in 
the context of the CPR game, could be investigated using scenario interviews. On the 
other hand, the results of the CPR game allow for direct comparisons in the 
magnitude of response to different policy options, rather than simply the number of 
households that would alter their behaviour. Combined, therefore, the two approaches 
provide a framework to investigate future policy effectiveness in both a quantitative 
and qualitative manner.  
However, both of these two approaches have had criticisms levelled at them regarding 
the external validity of the results obtained through their application. While 
experimental games have been increasing applied to understanding behaviour within a 
commons or other social dilemma, there have been surprisingly few studies that have 
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investigated external validity in an empirically rigorous manner (Levitt & List, 2007; 
Martin, 2013). Following the taxonomy of experiments devised by Harrison and List 
(2004), framed experiments are considered to have greater validity than artefactual 
experiments and field experiments greater validity than lab experiments. Framed field 
experiments, such as described in Chapter 5, are therefore expected to offer greater 
validity than experiments involving volunteers in a lab setting. Yet, the limited 
evidence that exists in regard to experimental external validity is mixed. For example, 
in one of the most controlled comparisons between real life and experimental 
behaviour made to date, Voors et al. (2012) found no meaningful correlation between 
behaviour in a context-free public goods game and response to a real life development 
intervention in the same subject pool of individuals in Sierra Leone. Yet, in a 
comparison between behaviour in a framed CPR game and three real life incentive 
payment schemes, Martin (2013) found that those individuals who were characterised 
as co-operators or conditional co-operators in the CPR game in Cambodia were less 
likely to clear land illegally (and, thus, break the terms of the PES agreements) than 
those individuals characterised as free-riders from their behaviour during the game. 
As such, doubts remain as to whether or not the results of experimental games should 
be used to guide policy decision-making. 
For scenario interviews, the major concern relates to the hypothetical nature of the 
approach and the potential for disparity between stated and observed behaviour. 
Participants in an experimental game are placed in a real social dilemma, no matter 
how stylised, in which the decisions they make will affect the size of payoff they 
receive at the end of the experiment; an approach that is considered critical to the 
validity of the results (Croson, 2005). Yet, this control is lacking for scenario 
interviews. The potential for disparity between observed behaviour and that stated in 
an interview setting has been particularly investigated for contingent valuation (e.g. 
Neill et al., 1994; Brown et al., 1996; Loomis et al., 1996; Foster et al., 1997), a 
method used to estimate an individual’s willingness to pay or accept different futures 
from their stated preferences, with stated willingness to pay found to be higher than 
observed willingness to pay in the majority of studies (Venkatachalam, 2004). Again, 
this potential for misleading results may cast doubt on the suitability of using 
responses to hypothetical scenarios to help guide policy making. 
 
132 
Given these questions regarding the validity of the two approaches, it is worthwhile 
comparing the results presented in Chapters 5 and 6. For the three common policy 
options considered, the results of the two approaches are closely matched for 
increased enforcement effort and collective payments and produce different results for 
individual payments. Of the matched results, increased enforcement effort was found 
to be ineffective for both approaches while collective payments were found to 
significantly reduce resource use, even though the size of the payment offered should 
have been insufficient to offset forgone income from extraction. It is particularly 
encouraging that the results of both approaches identify collective payments as being 
the most effective at changing behaviour from that predicted under business as usual 
conditions. Triangulated in this way, the fact that the two sets of results compare so 
strongly lends confidence to the validity of the conclusions drawn. 
However, before this triangulation of results can be accepted, it is also important to 
consider the differences in the findings for individual incentive payments, which were 
found to be largely ineffective using scenario interviews but significantly reduced 
resource appropriation in the CPR game. Specifically, how might the differences in 
approach used explain the apparent disparity between strong agreement for collective 
payments and disagreement for individual payments? For collective payments, the 
principal mechanism by which cooperation is elicited is through peer-pressure and 
fear of disapproval or hope of approval. In the CPR game, this effect was directly 
realised through disclosure of individual decisions to the rest of the group. During the 
scenario interviews, while respondents were not directly subject to peer-pressure, they 
were made aware of the implications of their decisions during questioning. For 
individual payments, while there was no direct peer-pressure to act in any particular 
way, participants in the CPR game were able to discuss their options with the rest of 
their group and still faced public disclosure of their decisions. But respondents of the 
scenario interviews made their decisions individually with neither assistance nor 
disclosure. In this respect, the game participants were able to draw upon greater 
collective decision-making than respondents to the scenario interviews. As group 
based decision-making has been shown previously to lead to more advantageous 
results for individuals (Kocher & Sutter, 2004), this could explain why the results of 
the two approaches match for collective payments but differ for individual payments. 
However, further evidence would be required to support this explanation.  
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Overall, then, the results of the two approaches offer significant complementarity but, 
while there is some commonality in findings, there was insufficient agreement to be 
able to triangulate results as a proof of the external validity of these methods. 
7.3. Complexity in conservation policy research 
“In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is King” 
Desiderius Erasmus (1466 – 1536) 
One of the major challenges facing conservation policy makers is predicting the likely 
impact of new interventions implemented within complex institutional settings 
(Hirsch et al., 2010; Game et al., in press). The institutional context in which resource 
use decisions are taken has a significant impact on outcomes, yet it is rare for the 
effect of interactions between interventions, which add greatly to contextual 
complexity, to be investigated. In this study, I have shown that this is an omission that 
should be corrected in the future.  
As discussed above, the interaction between the creation of land use boundaries under 
indigenous communal titling and the effects of performance payments made 
conditional on clearance reductions (presented in Chapter 6) have implications that go 
beyond the effect on resource use. Similarly, the results of Chapter 4 underlined the 
important interaction between the indigenous land titling process and law enforcement 
efforts. In both of the villages studied in Chapter 4, there was significant illegal 
household land clearance outside of titled areas, although the extent and proportion of 
households involved were both significantly greater in O Rona. In O Rona, the land 
titling process was also being undermined by the high level of immigration and illegal 
land grabbing within community titled areas. These results highlight a failure by 
protected area authorities, and the wider Cambodian legal system, on the one hand to 
protect the legal rights of Seima’s indigenous communities and on the other to 
prosecute those individuals guilty of illegally clearing protected forest. The 
effectiveness of indigenous land titling, and participatory land use planning 
approaches more generally, in reducing uncontrolled land clearance stems from two 
principal tenets: security of tenure and defined boundaries clearly delineating areas 
where clearance is permitted and where it is not. The results of Chapter 3 show that, 
although many households attribute natural resource security to the conservation 
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programme, over 50% of households do not feel secure about their resources. If 
security of tenure cannot be assured because communities are not provided with 
assistance in protecting their land and encroachment of protected forest is allowed to 
go unchecked, it becomes significantly more difficult to predict whether participatory 
land use policies will be successful.  
The results of the experimental games presented in Chapter 5 provide further support 
for the need to consider interactions between interventions carefully, by illustrating 
the potentially nuanced effects such interactions can have on resource user behaviour. 
While it has previously been shown that weak enforcement of resource restrictions 
can undermine existing norms, such that extraction increases relative to that 
experienced in the absence of enforcement (Cardenas et al., 2000; Vollan, 2008), this 
undermining effect has not previously been observed to reduce the performance of 
positive incentives such as payments. The fact that this crowding out effect was only 
observed when payments were offered to individuals, but not groups, further 
demonstrates the potential pitfalls of considering interventions in isolation.  
Given the potential for interactions between conservation interventions to add 
contextual complexity or have unexpected effects on behaviour, coupled with the 
general confounding effect that institutional complexity can have on policy setting, 
there is cause to consider the trade-off in research between the desire for increased 
contextual relevance and the risk of parochialism. In part this represents a trade-off 
between the desire of researchers to be able to draw wide-reaching lessons from their 
work and the requirements of practitioners, who want results to be directly applicable 
to the context in which they are working. Several of the results presented in this study 
are potentially limited to the institutional context found in Seima Protection Forest, or 
even specific villages. For instance, the results of Chapter 4 show that the difference 
in the conditions found in the two villages had a significant impact on household 
compliance, and hence the success of indigenous land titling in reducing illegal 
clearance. Whilst it is still possible to tease out lessons that apply more widely, there 
is a risk that in so doing those lessons may not apply to other contexts. For example, 
one of the main results of this study is to show that collective payments are more 
effective at reducing resource use than individual payments, but in another context 
Narloch et al. (2012) found that individual payments were more effective. Given the 
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difficulties in applying lessons learned from behavioural research to other contextual 
settings and the potential benefits of in-depth studies, which are better able to take 
account of the multi-faceted nature of local context (Drury et al., 2011), I would argue 
that the charge of parochialism seems a small price to pay for gaining a more precise 
understanding of behaviour, albeit within a more restricted context.  
7.4. Opportunities for future research 
The results presented in this thesis have for the most part focussed on conservation-
driven institutional change to reduce resource extraction, particularly that of 
smallholder land clearance. And yet, the mechanisms by which the interventions 
considered affect the decision-making processes that lead smallholders to clear remain 
poorly understood. In Seima, the decision regarding whether or not to clear additional 
land is influenced by a wide variety of factors, including but not limited to labour 
availability (both within and outside the household), tenure concerns and the 
perceived profitability of agricultural land use and alternative livelihood options, as 
well as the institutional settings in which the decision is taken. It is doubtful, however, 
that these decisions are made completely rationally, but that individuals instead rely 
on simple heuristics to help guide them (Simon, 1972). Increased understanding of 
how land use decisions are taken at the household level, and the factors that are 
considered, would give greater confidence in the results presented here regarding the 
relative effectiveness of different policy options, and would also allow for further 
refinement of the options considered.     
One of the leading approaches with respect to understanding underlying decision-
making processes is agent-based modelling, a computational modelling technique 
which allows researchers to study a heterogeneous set of evolving, autonomous 
decision-making entities (agents) that interact with their environment and other 
decision-makers (Janssen, 2005). In allowing agents to interact in this way, agent-
based models provide a potentially powerful tool for examining behaviour and, 
consequently, have been used in a wide array of disciplines in the social and 
environmental sciences (Matthews et al., 2007). In particular, the development of 
multi-agent systems, which combine agent-based and cellular models, has heralded 
new opportunities to investigate the underlying processes of land use change within 
complex socio-ecological systems (Wooldridge, 2002). 
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One of the key choices facing researchers using agent-based models is how to define 
the interaction between agents and with the environment (Janssen, 2005). A 
commonly applied approach is to follow the theory of bounded rationality (Simon, 
1972), which sets out the idea that people often rely on simple heuristics rather than 
optimisations as the basis of decision-making. Similarly, agents often make decisions 
on the basis of imperfect information and preferences can change as new information 
becomes available through interactions with other agents and the environment 
(Heckbert et al., 2010). Defining rules for agent interactions and strategies can, 
therefore, be particularly challenging in complex socio-ecological systems, in which 
individual decision-making can produce significant externalities for other 
stakeholders. It is for this reason that multi-agent systems are increasingly combined 
with empirical methods to define agent behaviour within the particular system of 
interest. Robinson et al. (2007) list five methods of empirical methods that have been 
used in conjunction with agent-based models; sample surveys (Berger & 
Schreinemachers, 2006), participant observation (Huigen, 2004), field and laboratory 
experiments (Castillo & Saysel, 2005; Evans et al., 2006), companion modelling 
(Castella et al., 2005; Barnaud et al., 2008) and GIS and remotely sensed data 
analysis (Deadman et al., 2004). These methods differ significantly in their approach, 
scale and ability to supply data on social and biophysical processes but can all be used 
to provide information relating to macro-level phenomena and micro-level processes. 
At the macro-level, this information is most widely used for comparison with model 
results as a means of validation, whereas micro-level information is collected with the 
intention of informing model coding.  
The empirical approaches used in this study - household surveys (Chapter 3), GIS 
analysis of land use change (Chapter 4), experimental games (Chapter 5) and scenario 
interviews (Chapter 6), have the potential to inform the development of an agent-
based model of smallholder land clearance. Despite the examples listed above of 
experimental games being combined with agent-based models, efforts in this direction 
have so far been limited and have not made use of the advances made in recent years 
in taking games out of the lab into the field. In so doing, future research could 
advance the field of land use multi-agent systems by modelling real world agents and 
their environment and directly parameterising agent characteristics using the 
behavioural preferences elicited through the use of experimental games and scenarios. 
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The creation of such a model would enable the investigation of the decision-making 
processes underlying smallholder land clearance, with the associated potential for the 
refinement of conservation interventions that this offers.   
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Appendix A 
8. Supplementary material for Chapter 3 
Table A.1: Items included in the household poverty score, with the weighting used for each item, 
percentage of households that reported owning or having access to each item and whether each 
item was included in calculating the reduced poverty score used for comparison between 2006/7 
and 2012. 
Basic necessity survey item Weights 
Own/have 
access to 
Reduced 
score 
three meals per day 100.0% 79.4% no 
VCD player 63.7% 30.1% no 
mosquito net for all household members 99.5% 84.7% no 
able to attend all weddings invited to 95.8% 64.6% no 
car battery (more than 40 A) 86.8% 29.7% yes 
two draft animals 89.1% 25.7% yes 
120L water jar 98.2% 54.2% yes 
access to electricity (public supply or generator) 95.2% 12.4% no 
thick blanket for all household members 91.6% 21.1% no 
long knife 98.6% 92.1% no 
motorised tiller (koyun) 78.1% 12.2% no 
axe 98.7% 90.5% no 
hand pump well at home 95.7% 12.9% no 
home toilet 93.7% 9.2% yes 
wooden wardrobe 78.1% 10.3% no 
access to car taxi service 85.4% 19.3% no 
motorbike 98.9% 81.7% yes 
zinc/fibro/tile roof 99.8% 84.7% yes 
wooden walls 99.7% 69.0% yes 
television 81.0% 30.1% yes 
mobile phone 90.2% 72.0% yes 
homestead land at least 0.5ha 96.3% 26.0% yes 
at least 3 ha chamkar 99.7% 38.9% yes 
water supply to home 98.9% 0.3% no 
able to send children to school to grade 9 96.3% 11.7% no 
ability to attend all traditional ceremonies 98.6% 72.2% no 
two sets of clothes for every household member 95.3% 28.0% no 
synthetic tent for sleeping in the forest 93.6% 41.2% no 
hammock with mosquito net 96.6% 35.5% no 
ox cart 75.1% 20.4% no 
strimmer 84.6% 29.7% no 
kettle 93.4% 86.5% no 
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Table A.2: Variables used in statistical modelling in Chapter 3. 
Variable Data type Variable type Description 
poverty_score continuous response/explanatory poverty score of respondent household 
adj_score continuous response/explanatory reduced poverty score of respondent household 
resin binary response/explanatory whether or not the respondent household owned any resin trees 
trees categorical response/explanatory quantity of resin trees owned (0-50, 51-150,>150) 
log_area continuous response/explanatory ln(total area of land claimed by respondent household) 
ntfp_collect binary response/explanatory whether or not the respondent household collected non-liquid resin NTFPs 
wild_meals count response number of meals eaten in previous week containing wild meat 
widow binary explanatory whether or not the respondent household was widow headed 
dependent binary explanatory whether or not the respondent household consisted totally of dependents (<15s or >65s) 
landless binary explanatory whether or not the respondent household owned any productive land 
age continuous explanatory age of household head 
yrs_village continuous explanatory number of years respondent had lived in village 
gender categorical explanatory gender of respondent 
indigenous binary explanatory whether or not the the head of the respondent household was an IP 
AME continuous explanatory household adult male equivalence calculated using Barba and Cabrera (2008)  
hh_size continuous explanatory total number of members in respondent household 
education continuous explanatory number of years spent in education by the household head 
km continuous explanatory distance to nearest all day market [km] 
position binary explanatory whether or not the respondent household held a formal position of authority 
labour binary explanatory whether or not the respondent household was involved in wage labour 
shop binary explanatory whether or not the respondent household operated a shop 
employed binary explanatory whether or not a member of respondent’s household was employed 
service binary explanatory whether or not the respondent’s household operated a village service 
debt binary explanatory whether or not the respondent household was in debt 
hh_labour binary explanatory whether or not the respondent household felt they had sufficient labour within the household 
labour_avail binary explanatory whether or not the respondent household felt their was sufficient labour available  
security binary explanatory whether or not the respondent household felt their natural resources were secure 
core binary explanatory whether or not the village was located in the core zone 
year categorical explanatory year of survey 
village categorical random village in which respondent household lived 
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Appendix B 
9. Supplementary material for Chapter 4 
Calculation of adjusted household poverty score 
The basic necessity survey provides a locally defined poverty index, which can be 
used to score households sampled in the area of the survey (Davies, 1997). In Chapter 
4, the results of the large scale socio-economic survey described in Chapter 3, which 
was undertaken in Seima Protection Forest (SPF) at the time of the measurement of 
land use in the two villages and contained a basic necessity component, were used.  
The basic necessity component of this survey consisted of a series of 40 household 
items, assets and services. Respondent households were asked whether or not they 
owned the items on the list or, in the case of services, whether they had access to 
those services. For example one of the questions on the list asked whether the 
respondent household had access to a car-taxi service to and from the district capital 
or nearest market town. Respondents were also asked whether or not they believed 
that each item on the list was a basic necessity, which was defined to them (following 
the adapted definition used by Clements et al. (in press)) as the “minimum 
requirement for living that all households of the community should have and no-one 
should not have.” 
The list was created at a one-day workshop, held at the SPF headquarters of the 
Forestry Administration in April 2012, and to which representatives of different 
livelihood zones within SPF and different wealth bands were invited. These 
representatives were selected by FA or WCS staff, who were able to identify suitable 
candidates for participation. Over the course of the one-day workshop, participants 
were introduced to the concept of basic necessities and compiled the list of items. The 
list was proportionally populated with (i) items that everyone thought were basic 
necessities and that everyone would have (or would have access to) (ii) items that 
everyone thought were basic necessities, and around half of all people would have, 
but would get as they became richer and services improved (iii) items that everyone 
thought were basic necessities, but only some people would have, but might get as 
they became richer and services improved (iv) items <50% of people thought were 
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basic necessities. The list was populated in this way to ensure that there was a good 
level of differentiation between households, that respondents were made to think 
whether or not each item really met the definition of a basic necessity and that the 
same list of items could be used again in the future after incomes were anticipated to 
rise. 
Once the survey instrument had been compiled, it was piloted in three villages to 
ensure that the items fell roughly in proportion to the different categories identified. 
No items were changed following the pilot and the survey was conducted in a further 
17 villages across the SPF locality, covering a total of 622 households. A household 
poverty score was calculated for each household using only those items that over 50% 
of sampled households thought were basic necessities (in this case 31 items). Scores 
were weighted by the proportion of the sample that thought each item met the 
definition of a basic necessity and these scores were summed over the full list of 31 
items for each household to produce a household poverty score. For example, if 95% 
of the sample thought that a sharp knife was a basic necessity, the score for owning a 
sharp knife would be 0.95.  
In this analysis, asset data was collectedfor a smaller list of assets and then used these 
assets to calculate an adjusted poverty score based on the coefficient estimates of a 
LMM, with household poverty score as the response variable. This model was run for 
the sample of 622 households that participated in the full basic necessity survey 
(Table B.1). For the purposes of this analysis, the original household poverty scores 
were recalculated after removing those items that corresponded to the items that data 
were collected on. Model selection was undertaken using the method described in the 
main text. From this, it was possible to calculate adjusted poverty scores for each 
household sampled in the land use survey, based on the asset data collected. 
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Table B.1: Parameter estimates for the selected adjusted household poverty score GLMM, with a 
the recalculated poverty score as the response. One random effect was included in the selected 
model: village (SD= 0.532). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Variable Estimate t values 
intercept 4.460 (2.192) 2.035 
roof_type2 -1.791 (0.536) -3.341 
roof_type 3 -1.296 (0.437) -2.968 
roof_type 4 -0.334 (0.613) -0.545 
walls_type 1 3.121 (2.183) 1.430 
walls_type 2 4.040 (2.513) 1.608 
walls_type 3 3.092 (2.282) 1.355 
walls_type 4 4.543 (2.644) 1.719 
walls_type 5 3.476 (2.162) 1.608 
owns_2cattle 0.162 (0.024) 6.665 
owns_moto 0.724 (0.244) 2.969 
owns_mobile 0.978 (0.226) 4.323 
owns_dvdplayer 1.338 (0.209) 6.400 
owns_strimmer 0.643 (0.219) 2.928 
owns_wardrobe 0.805 (0.370) 2.176 
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Figure B.1: Map of household land use in Andong Kraloeng for the 43 households sampled. The area surrounding the residential and agricultural zones is 
community NTFP forest in which all clearance is illegal. 
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Figure B.2: Map of household land use in O Rona for the 70 households sampled. The area outside of the village boundary is all under protection (either as part of 
SPF or SWS) and, hence, clearance is restricted.  
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Table B.2: Variables used in statistical modelling. 
Variable Data type Variable type Description 
log_area continuous response ln(total area of land claimed by respondent household) 
log_ill_area continuous response ln(total area of illegal land claimed by respondent household) 
law_compliance binary response whether or not the respondent household was compliant with the 2001 Land Law 
reg_compliance binary response 
whether or not the respondent household was compliant with the five community 
regulations considered 
age continuous explanatory age of respondent 
yrs_village continuous explanatory number of years respondent had lived in village 
gender categorical explanatory gender of respondent 
indigenous binary explanatory whether the head of the respondent household was an IP 
AME continuous explanatory 
household adult male equivalence with recommended daily allowances taken from 
Barba and Cabrera (2008)  
hh_size continuous explanatory total number of members in respondent household 
immigrant binary explanatory whether or not the respondent household lived in the village at the time of ICT 
community binary explanatory whether or not the respondent household is a member of the village IC 
position binary explanatory whether or not the respondent held a formal position of authority 
labour binary explanatory whether or not the respondent was involved in wage labour 
shop binary explanatory whether or not the respondent household operated a shop 
employed binary explanatory whether or not a member of respondent’s household was employed 
service binary explanatory whether or not the respondent’s household operated a village service 
poverty_score continuous explanatory adjusted household poverty score of respondent household 
settlement categorical random sub-village settlement in which respondent household lived 
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Table B.3: Parameter estimates for the selected legal compliance GLMM, with a binary 
compliance variable as the response. P values significant at the 95% confidence level are shown 
in bold. One random effect was included in the selected model: settlement. The full list of 
variables modelled, plus their explanations, are given in Appendix B; Table B.2.  
Variable Estimate SE P Values 
intercept -2.953 1.224 0.016 
community 3.502 1.411 0.013 
ln(area + 0.125) -1.345 0.432 0.002 
Table B.4: Parameter estimates for the selected community regulation compliance GLMM, with 
a binary compliance variable as the response. P values significant at the 95% confidence level are 
shown in bold. One random effect was included in the selected model: settlement. The full list of 
variables modelled, plus their explanations, are given in Appendix B; Table B.2. 
Variable Estimate SE P Values 
intercept 1.375 0.677 0.042 
community 2.479 0.762 0.001 
ln(area + 0.125) -1.685 0.432 << 0.000 
law_comp -1.342 0.651 0.039 
References 
Barba, C. & Cabrera, M. (2008) Recommended Dietary Allowances harmonization in 
Southeast Asia. Asia Pacific Journal of Clinical Nutrition. 17 (S2), 405-408. 
Davies, R. (1997) Beyond wealth ranking: The democratic definition and 
measurement of poverty. Briefing note. ODI workshop "Indicators of Poverty: 
Operational Significance", London. 
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Appendix C 
Supplementary material for Chapter 5 
Table C.1: Key village type selection criteria by village. Household data from Pollard & Evans 
(2009). O Am household data (*) from the national commune database (NCDD, 2008). Bunong % 
refers to the percentage of Bunong households within each village. Type gives the a priori 
characterisation of each village.  
Village No. HHs Bunong % Km to market Type Sample size 
Chakchar 124 87% 60 1 n = 20 
Gati 54 94% 22 1 n = 20 
Kmoum 62 100% 55 1 n = 20 
O Chrar 27 93% 18 1 n = 20 
Rokathmei 51 92% 40 1 n = 20 
Sre Andoal 50 100% 48 1 n = 20 
Andong Kraleung 107 95% 25 2 n = 20 
Pu Char 66 92% 14 2 n = 20 
Pu Haim 252 90% 19 2 n = 20 
Sre Levi 28 100% 10 2 n = 20 
Sre Preah 112 66% 12 2 n = 40 
O Am  733* 0% 0 3 n = 80 
O Rona 160 46% 8 3 n = 40 
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CPR game script 
[Introductions] 
Before I begin to explain what we are going to do today I would like to make a few 
general comments. I will then explain the basic principles of the games that we are 
going to play. After I have finished this explanation I will take you through four 
simple examples and then we will play some practice games to help you to understand 
the process. 
We will be playing games for cash. Any money that you receive in the games is yours 
to keep and take home. This will be given to you at the end of the day. How much 
money you receive is dependent on how you play the games, and how other people 
who are playing with you play. The money for these games has been supplied to 
undertake scientific research. If at any time you find that this is something that you do 
not wish to participate in for any reason, you are of course free to leave whether we 
have started the game or not. If you choose to leave after you have played some of the 
games, you will be paid the money that you have earned. 
It is important that when you are sitting in the group like this you do not discuss the 
game or how you think you should play the game. Please feel free to talk amongst 
yourselves but do not discuss the games themselves. This can spoil the game for 
everyone. If it happens we may not be able to play the game with you today.   
[If this is the second or third day of the games within the village add the following:  
“You are going to play a very different game than the games played before. If you 
have heard comments about other games from people who have played games on 
previous days, whatever they have mentioned might not apply today. If you follow 
their advice you may end up earning less money than you could do so please just 
listen to my explanation and play the game how you think best.”] 
We will be playing three games today. We will then individually ask you some 
questions about your thoughts on the day. We should be finished by about 5pm. If you 
think you will not be able to stay that long please let us know now.  
Each game follows the same basic principles which I will explain now. It is important 
that you listen as closely as possible as you will need to understand how the games 
work if you are to receive any money. We will run through a number of different 
examples for you to help you understand how the games are played. If you have any 
questions about how to play the games once they have been explained please put your 
hand up and we will try to answer them.  
I am now going to explain the game.  
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Explanation 
In all the games we are going to play you will be in groups of 10 other people from 
this village. In some games you will know who is in your group and in other games 
you won’t. In each game there are 100 fish in a communal pond from which the 
people in your group can harvest. You will be asked to individually decide on the 
number of fish that you want to harvest. You can decide to harvest a maximum of 10 
fish and a minimum of 0. For each fish that you harvest you will receive 100 KHR. 
However, harvesting from the pond reduces the availability of fish for the village. The 
number of fish left at the end of the season is an indication of the future value of the 
fish to your group. At the end of each season the number of unharvested fish will be 
counted. Everyone in your group will receive 12 KHR for every fish remaining. So, to 
summarise, if a fish is unharvested everyone in your group benefits but if a fish is 
harvested only the person who harvested it receives any benefit.  
[Show poster to show value of fish to individual and fish in the village] 
We will play each game for 5 seasons. The number of fish in the communal pond will 
be the same for every season that we play no matter how the group behaved in 
previous seasons. 
You will be asked to signal your choice by circling the number of fish that you want 
to harvest on the sheet of paper that you have in front of you. Please have a look at 
this sheet of paper now. As you can see there is a row for each season. Each season 
has an option for you to select a harvest of 0 to 10 fish. So if you want to harvest four 
fish, circle four pictures. If you decide to harvest eight fish, circle eight pictures. If 
you decide not to harvest, circle the zero. [Holds up example] The top row on your 
sheet has been filled out for you as an example to show how to select your choice. In 
this case you can see that a harvest of four fish has been selected. Once you have 
made your choice for the season we will collect your paper so that we can calculate 
the total harvest for the group. We will then tell you the total harvest for that season 
and tell you your individual winnings for that season.  
After we have played 5 seasons the game will end. 
[Play two practice rounds as per the control] 
You should all now have a completed practice round sheet. As you can see we have 
filled out the two boxes at the end of the row. The number in the first box is the total 
number of fish taken out of the pond by your group. So this is the number of fish 
circled by each member of your group all added up together. The second number is 
the money that you receive from the round. Now remember that this is a practice 
round so the money in that box won’t go towards your earnings at the end of the day. 
We calculate this number by giving you 100 KHR for each of the fish you have 
circled. We then give you 12 KHR for each of fish left unharvested after every 
member of the group has selected their individual harvest.  
I will now take you through four simple examples to show you the range of behaviour 
possible: 
Example 1: All members take 0 fish – payoff = 1200 KHR 
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Example 2: All members take 10 fish – payoff = 1000 KHR 
Example 3: 9 take 10 fish/1 takes 0 fish – payoff = 1120/120 KHR 
Example 4: 1 takes 10 fish/9 take 0 fish – payoff = 2080/1080 KHR 
Before we start to play the game for real I would just like to ask you some simple 
questions to make sure that you understand how the game works and how to use the 
payoff and answer sheets. Please circle the correct answer on this question sheet for 
each question. For all questions, assume that the other people in the group take the 
same number of fish no matter what you choose to do. 
[Hand out question sheets. Go through each question, making sure that people look at 
their own sheet only. Once everyone has answered all the questions, collect the sheets 
and mark down a score on each. Then go through the answers] 
1. Do you earn more if you harvest 3 or 8 fish? 
2. Do you earn more if you harvest 7 or 2 fish? 
3. Do you earn more if the group total is 55 or 85? 
4. Do you earn more if the group total is 22 or 62? 
5. If the group total is 67, do other people earn more if you harvest 8 or 4 fish? 
We should now be ready to play the first game. If anyone still has any questions, 
please ask now. Remember if you feel that this is not something that you wish to take 
part in you are free to leave at any time and any money that you have earned up to the 
point you leave will be given to you.  
Control 
[Prepare the room for the control treatment. Arrange the desks in straight lines facing 
the front of the room. Place a results sheet and desk number at each seat, making sure 
to write the desk number on the results sheet. Invite the participants to sit down] 
Ok, we are now ready to play the [game number] game. Let’s quickly run over the 
details. You will be asked to decide how many fish you want to harvest each season 
from the communal pond. You can decide to harvest a maximum of 10 fish and a 
minimum of 0. For each fish that you decide to harvest you will receive 100 KHR. 
This is the same for every member of your group. Everyone in the group benefits 
from having fish remaining unharvested at the end of the season so that you will each 
receive 12 KHR for each fish left in the communal pond. 
This game is played in private, which means that you will not know who is in your 
group. It is very important that you do not talk to each other during this game as this 
will spoil the game for everybody. We will ask you to decide how many fish you want 
to harvest for and to mark your decision on the sheet in front of you. We will then 
calculate the total harvest for the group and your individual payoffs. Nobody else will 
be told how much you have chosen to harvest or how much you have received. We 
will play the game for 5 seasons which will probably last for about an hour.  
We are now ready to start the game. From now on all the decisions that you make will 
count towards the game. Please now decide how many fish you would like to harvest 
in the first season and mark your decision on your sheet.  
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[Check that people only look at their own sheet. Help anyone who is having trouble. 
Once everyone has marked their decision collect all the sheets and total the group 
clearance. Then calculate each individual’s earnings and write both on each sheet. 
Return the sheets to the respective participants] 
As you can see, we have filled out the two boxes from that round. Remember the top 
box shows you the amount cleared by the rest of your group and the lower box gives 
you your earnings from that round.  
[Repeat until all 5 seasons have been played making sure to say which number season 
is currently being played when asking players to make their decision. Collect the 
results sheets at the end of the game] 
Peer-pressure  
[Prepare the rooms for the single group treatments. Arrange all desks in a circle 
facing each other. Place a results sheet on each desk and ask participants to sit in 
ascending numerical order. Make sure that the correct number is on each sheet] 
Ok, we are now ready to play the [game number] game. Let’s quickly run over the 
details. You will be asked to decide how many fish you want to harvest each season 
from the communal forest. You can decide to harvest a maximum of 10 fish and a 
minimum of 0. For each fish you decide to harvest you will receive 100 KHR. This is 
the same for every member of your group. Everyone in the group benefits from 
having fish remaining unharvested at the end of the season so that you will each 
receive 12 KHR for each fish left in the pond. 
In this game you will know who is in your group and the number of days you choose 
to harvest will not be private. Before each round you will be given a few minutes in 
which you are free to discuss your decision and the decisions of the other players with 
the rest of your group. You can also make agreements about how many fish you think 
each individual should be allowed to harvest although these agreements are not 
binding. Once this period is over we will ask you to individually decide how many 
fish you want to harvest and to mark your decision on the sheet in front of you as 
before. We will then calculate the total harvest for your group and your individual 
payoffs. Once we have handed back your sheets we will ask each of you individually 
to tell the other members of the group how much you chose to harvest.  
We will repeat this game for 5 seasons. After each season you have a few minutes to 
talk about the game with the other members of the group before beginning the next 
season. Once all 5 seasons have been played, the game will end. 
Ok, now we are ready to start the game. Please discuss amongst yourselves how many 
fish you think each person should be allowed to harvest.  
[Allow group discussion for as long as the participants choose to talk. Once the 
discussion has stopped, ask the group whether or not they have reached a group 
decision. Accept any uncontested answer and ask what decision has been reached. If 
there is a disagreement about whether a decision has been reached, allow the 
participants the opportunity to resolve the disagreement. If they resolve the 
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disagreement, ask what decision has been reached. If it is unresolved, note down the 
values discussed] 
Now you have finished your discussion, please decide how many fish you would like 
to harvest in the first season and mark your decision on your sheet. Remember that the 
group decision is not binding and you can choose any harvest from 0 to 10 fish. 
[Check that people only look at their own sheet. Help anyone who is having trouble. 
Once everyone has marked their decision collect all the sheets and total the group 
clearance. Then calculate each individual’s earnings and write both on each sheet. 
Return the sheets to the respective participants] 
As you can see, we have filled out the two boxes from that round. Remember the top 
box shows you the amount cleared by the rest of your group and the lower box gives 
you your earnings from that round.  
[Help each individual to read out their earnings for that season. Repeat until all 5 
seasons have been played making sure to say which number season is currently being 
played when asking players to make their decision. Select a different player each time 
to begin declaring their decision for the season. Collect the results sheets and 
feedback sheets at the end of the game.] 
Weak enforcement  
[Prepare the rooms for the single group treatments. Arrange all desks in a circle 
facing each other. Place a results sheet on each desk and ask participants to sit in 
ascending numerical order. Make sure that the correct number is on each sheet] 
Ok, we are now ready to play the [game number] game. Let’s quickly run over the 
details. You will be asked to decide how many fish you want to harvest each season 
from the communal pond. You can decide to harvest a maximum of 10 fish and a 
minimum of 0. For each fish that you decide to harvest you will receive 100 KHR. 
This is the same for every member of your group. Everyone in the group benefits 
from having fish remaining unharvested at the end of the season so that you will each 
receive 12 KHR for each fish left in the communal pond. 
In this game you will know who is in your group and the number of days you choose 
to harvest will not be private. Before each round you will be given a few minutes in 
which you are free to discuss your decision and the decisions of the other players with 
the rest of your group. You can also make agreements about how much fish you think 
each individual should be allowed to harvest although these agreements are not 
binding. Once this period is over we will ask you to individually decide how many 
fish you want to harvest and to mark your decision on the sheet in front of you as 
before. We will then calculate the total harvest for your group and your individual 
payoffs. Once we have handed back your sheets we will ask each of you individually 
to tell the other members of the group how much you chose to harvest.  
For this game, an external authority has made a rule that you are not allowed to 
extract more than two fish from the pond in any single season. If you choose to fish, 
there is a chance that your decision will be penalised. At the end of each season we 
will roll a ten-sided dice, which will determine who in the group is monitored. There 
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will be a 1 in 10 chance that the external authority will monitor you. If you are 
monitored and you have decided to do any fishing in the season you will be fined 125 
KHR for each fish that you harvest over the permitted threshold of two fish. This 
means that if, for example, you are monitored and have chosen to harvest four fish, 
you will be fined 250 KHR (125 KHR for the two fish you harvested above the 
threshold of two). 
We will repeat this game for 5 seasons. After each season you have a few minutes to 
talk about the game with the other members of the group before beginning the next 
season. Once all 5 seasons have been played, the game will end. 
Ok, now we are ready to start the game. Please discuss amongst yourselves how many 
fish you think each person should be allowed to harvest.  
[Allow group discussion for as long as the participants choose to talk. Once the 
discussion has stopped, ask the group whether or not they have reached a group 
decision. Accept any uncontested answer and ask what decision has been reached. If 
there is a disagreement about whether a decision has been reached, allow the 
participants the opportunity to resolve the disagreement. If they resolve the 
disagreement, ask what decision has been reached. If it is unresolved, note down the 
values discussed] 
Now you have finished your discussion, please decide how many fish you would like 
to harvest in the first season and mark your decision on your sheet. Remember that the 
group decision is not binding and you can choose any harvest from 0 to 10 fish and 
that if you harvest more than the two fish you are allowed to, you may be fined. 
[Check that people only look at their own sheet. Help anyone who is having trouble. 
Once everyone has marked their decision collect all the sheets and total the group 
clearance. Then calculate each individual’s earnings and write both on each sheet. 
Return the sheets to the respective participants] 
As you can see, we have filled out the two boxes from that round. Remember the top 
box shows you the amount cleared by the rest of your group and the lower box gives 
you your earnings from that round.  
[Help each individual to read out their earnings for that season. Ask each participant 
to roll the die. If they roll a 1, they will be monitored and fined 125 KHR for each fish 
they harvest above two. Correct their payoff and announce the new amount to the rest 
of the group. Repeat until all 5 seasons have been played making sure to say which 
number season is currently being played when asking players to make their decision. 
Select a different player each time to begin declaring their decision for the season. 
Collect the results sheets at the end of the game] 
Strong enforcement  
[Prepare the rooms for the single group treatments. Arrange all desks in a circle 
facing each other. Place a results sheet on each desk and ask participants to sit in 
ascending numerical order. Make sure that the correct number is on each sheet] 
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Ok, we are now ready to play the [game number] game. Let’s quickly run over the 
details. You will be asked to decide how many fish you want to harvest each season 
from the communal pond. You can decide to harvest a maximum of 10 fish and a 
minimum of 0. For each fish that you decide to harvest you will receive 100 KHR. 
This is the same for every member of your group. Everyone in the group benefits 
from having fish remaining unharvested at the end of the season so that you will each 
receive 12 KHR for each fish left in the communal pond. 
In this game you will know who is in your group and the number of days you choose 
to harvest will not be private. Before each round you will be given a few minutes in 
which you are free to discuss your decision and the decisions of the other players with 
the rest of your group. You can also make agreements about how much fish you think 
each individual should be allowed to harvest although these agreements are not 
binding. Once this period is over we will ask you to individually decide how many 
fish you want to harvest and to mark your decision on the sheet in front of you as 
before. We will then calculate the total harvest for your group and your individual 
payoffs. Once we have handed back your sheets we will ask each of you individually 
to tell the other members of the group how much you chose to harvest.  
For this game, an external authority has made a rule that you are not allowed to 
extract more than two fish from the pond in any single season. If you choose to fish, 
there is a chance that your decision will be penalised. At the end of each season we 
will roll a ten-sided dice, which will determine who in the group is monitored. There 
will be a 4 in 10 chance that the external authority will monitor you. If you are 
monitored and you have decided to do any fishing in the season you will be fined 125 
KHR for each fish that you harvest over the permitted threshold of two fish. This 
means that if, for example, you are monitored and have chosen to harvest four fish, 
you will be fined 250 KHR (125 KHR for the two fish you harvested above the 
threshold of two). 
We will repeat this game for 5 seasons. After each season you have a few minutes to 
talk about the game with the other members of the group before beginning the next 
season. Once all 5 seasons have been played, the game will end. 
Ok, now we are ready to start the game. Please discuss amongst yourselves how many 
fish you think each person should be allowed to harvest.  
[Allow group discussion for as long as the participants choose to talk. Once the 
discussion has stopped, ask the group whether or not they have reached a group 
decision. Accept any uncontested answer and ask what decision has been reached. If 
there is a disagreement about whether a decision has been reached, allow the 
participants the opportunity to resolve the disagreement. If they resolve the 
disagreement, ask what decision has been reached. If it is unresolved, note down the 
values discussed] 
Now you have finished your discussion, please decide how many fish you would like 
to harvest in the first season and mark your decision on your sheet. Remember that the 
group decision is not binding and you can choose any harvest from 0 to 10 fish and 
that if you harvest more than the two fish you are allowed to, you may be fined. 
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[Check that people only look at their own sheet. Help anyone who is having trouble. 
Once everyone has marked their decision collect all the sheets and total the group 
clearance. Then calculate each individual’s earnings and write both on each sheet. 
Return the sheets to the respective participants] 
As you can see, we have filled out the two boxes from that round. Remember the top 
box shows you the amount cleared by the rest of your group and the lower box gives 
you your earnings from that round.  
[Help each individual to read out their earnings for that season. Ask each participant 
to roll the die. If they roll a 1, 2, 3 or 4 they will be monitored and fined 125 KHR for 
each fish they harvest above two. Correct their payoff and announce the new amount 
to the rest of the group. Repeat until all 5 seasons have been played making sure to 
say which number season is currently being played when asking players to make their 
decision. Select a different player each time to begin declaring their decision for the 
season. Collect the results sheets at the end of the game] 
Individual payments  
[Prepare the rooms for the single group treatments. Arrange all desks in a circle 
facing each other. Place a results sheet on each desk and ask participants to sit in 
ascending numerical order. Make sure that the correct number is on each sheet] 
Ok, we are now ready to play the [game number] game. Let’s quickly run over the 
details. You will be asked to decide how many fish you want to harvest each season 
from the communal pond. You can decide to harvest a maximum of 10 fish and a 
minimum of 0. For each fish that you decide to harvest you will receive 100 KHR. 
This is the same for every member of your group. Everyone in the group benefits 
from having fish remaining unharvested at the end of the season so that you will each 
receive 12 KHR for each fish left in the communal pond. 
In this game you will know who is in your group and the number of days you choose 
to harvest will not be private. Before each round you will be given a few minutes in 
which you are free to discuss your decision and the decisions of the other players with 
the rest of your group. You can also make agreements about how much fish you think 
each individual should be allowed to harvest although these agreements are not 
binding. Once this period is over we will ask you to individually decide how many 
fish you want to harvest and to mark your decision on the sheet in front of you as 
before. We will then calculate the total harvest for your group and your individual 
payoffs. Once we have handed back your sheets we will ask each of you individually 
to tell the other members of the group how much you chose to harvest.  
In addition, for this game there is an opportunity to earn a bonus payment from an 
external organisation. These payments are designed to reduce the number of fish that 
the group harvests. If you choose to harvest two fish or fewer each season, you will be 
rewarded by a bonus payment of 250 KHR. This is irrespective of how other people in 
your group behave. If you harvest more than two fish, you will not be eligible for the 
bonus. 
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We will repeat this game for 5 seasons. After each season you have a few minutes to 
talk about the game with the other members of the group before beginning the next 
season. Once all 5 seasons have been played, the game will end. 
Ok, now we are ready to start the game. Please discuss amongst yourselves how many 
fish you think each person should be allowed to harvest.  
[Allow group discussion for as long as the participants choose to talk. Once the 
discussion has stopped, ask the group whether or not they have reached a group 
decision. Accept any uncontested answer and ask what decision has been reached. If 
there is a disagreement about whether a decision has been reached, allow the 
participants the opportunity to resolve the disagreement. If they resolve the 
disagreement, ask what decision has been reached. If it is unresolved, note down the 
values discussed] 
Now you have finished your discussion, please decide how many fish you would like 
to harvest in the first season and mark your decision on your sheet. Remember that the 
group decision is not binding and you can choose any harvest from 0 to 10 fish. 
Remember also that in this game if you choose to harvest two fish or fewer you will 
be rewarded with a bonus payment of 250 KHR. 
[Check that people only look at their own sheet. Help anyone who is having trouble. 
Once everyone has marked their decision collect all the sheets and total the group 
clearance. Then calculate each individual’s earnings and write both on each sheet. 
Return the sheets to the respective participants] 
As you can see, we have filled out the two boxes from that round. Remember the top 
box shows you the amount cleared by the rest of your group and the lower box gives 
you your earnings from that round.  
[Help each individual to read out their earnings for that season. Repeat until all 5 
seasons have been played making sure to say which number season is currently being 
played when asking players to make their decision. Select a different player each time 
to begin declaring their decision for the season. Collect the results sheets at the end of 
the game.] 
Individual payments with weak enforcement 
[Prepare the rooms for the single group treatments. Arrange all desks in a circle 
facing each other. Place a results sheet on each desk and ask participants to sit in 
ascending numerical order. Make sure that the correct number is on each sheet] 
Ok, we are now ready to play the [game number] game. Let’s quickly run over the 
details. You will be asked to decide how many fish you want to harvest each season 
from the communal pond. You can decide to harvest a maximum of 10 fish and a 
minimum of 0. For each fish that you decide to harvest you will receive 100 KHR. 
This is the same for every member of your group. Everyone in the group benefits 
from having fish remaining unharvested at the end of the season so that you will each 
receive 12 KHR for each fish left in the communal pond. 
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In this game you will know who is in your group and the number of days you choose 
to harvest will not be private. Before each round you will be given a few minutes in 
which you are free to discuss your decision and the decisions of the other players with 
the rest of your group. You can also make agreements about how much fish you think 
each individual should be allowed to harvest although these agreements are not 
binding. Once this period is over we will ask you to individually decide how many 
fish you want to harvest and to mark your decision on the sheet in front of you as 
before. We will then calculate the total harvest for your group and your individual 
payoffs. Once we have handed back your sheets we will ask each of you individually 
to tell the other members of the group how much you chose to harvest.  
For this game, an external authority has made a rule that you are not allowed to 
extract more than two fish from the pond in any single season. If you choose to fish, 
there is a chance that your decision will be penalised. At the end of each season we 
will roll a ten-sided dice, which will determine who in the group is monitored. There 
will be a 1 in 10 chance that the external authority will monitor you. If you are 
monitored and you have decided to do any fishing in the season you will be fined 125 
KHR for each fish that you harvest over the permitted threshold of two fish. This 
means that if, for example, you are monitored and have chosen to harvest four fish, 
you will be fined 250 KHR (125 KHR for the two fish you harvested above the 
threshold of two). 
In addition, for this game there is an opportunity to earn a bonus payment from an 
external organisation. These payments are designed to reduce the number of fish that 
the group harvests. If you choose to harvest two fish or fewer each season, you will be 
rewarded by a bonus payment of 250 KHR. This is irrespective of how other people in 
your group behave. If you harvest more than two fish, you will not be eligible for the 
bonus. 
We will repeat this game for 5 seasons. After each season you have a few minutes to 
talk about the game with the other members of the group before beginning the next 
season. Once all 5 seasons have been played, the game will end. 
Ok, now we are ready to start the game. Please discuss amongst yourselves how many 
fish you think each person should be allowed to harvest.  
[Allow group discussion for as long as the participants choose to talk. Once the 
discussion has stopped, ask the group whether or not they have reached a group 
decision. Accept any uncontested answer and ask what decision has been reached. If 
there is a disagreement about whether a decision has been reached, allow the 
participants the opportunity to resolve the disagreement. If they resolve the 
disagreement, ask what decision has been reached. If it is unresolved, note down the 
values discussed] 
Now you have finished your discussion, please decide how many fish you would like 
to harvest in the first season and mark your decision on your sheet. Remember that the 
group decision is not binding and you can choose any harvest from 0 to 10 fish. 
Remember also that in this game if you choose to harvest two fish or fewer you will 
be rewarded with a bonus payment of 250 KHR and that if you harvest more than the 
two fish you are allowed to, you may be fined. 
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[Check that people only look at their own sheet. Help anyone who is having trouble. 
Once everyone has marked their decision collect all the sheets and total the group 
clearance. Then calculate each individual’s earnings and write both on each sheet. 
Return the sheets to the respective participants] 
As you can see, we have filled out the two boxes from that round. Remember the top 
box shows you the amount cleared by the rest of your group and the lower box gives 
you your earnings from that round.  
[Help each individual to read out their earnings for that season. Ask each participant 
to roll the die. If they roll a 1 they will be monitored and fined 125 KHR for each fish 
they harvest above two. Correct their payoff and announce the new amount to the rest 
of the group. Repeat until all 5 seasons have been played making sure to say which 
number season is currently being played when asking players to make their decision. 
Select a different player each time to begin declaring their decision for the season. 
Collect the results sheets at the end of the game.] 
Individual payments with strong enforcement 
[Prepare the rooms for the single group treatments. Arrange all desks in a circle 
facing each other. Place a results sheet on each desk and ask participants to sit in 
ascending numerical order. Make sure that the correct number is on each sheet] 
Ok, we are now ready to play the [game number] game. Let’s quickly run over the 
details. You will be asked to decide how many fish you want to harvest each season 
from the communal pond. You can decide to harvest a maximum of 10 fish and a 
minimum of 0. For each fish that you decide to harvest you will receive 100 KHR. 
This is the same for every member of your group. Everyone in the group benefits 
from having fish remaining unharvested at the end of the season so that you will each 
receive 12 KHR for each fish left in the communal pond. 
In this game you will know who is in your group and the number of days you choose 
to harvest will not be private. Before each round you will be given a few minutes in 
which you are free to discuss your decision and the decisions of the other players with 
the rest of your group. You can also make agreements about how much fish you think 
each individual should be allowed to harvest although these agreements are not 
binding. Once this period is over we will ask you to individually decide how many 
fish you want to harvest and to mark your decision on the sheet in front of you as 
before. We will then calculate the total harvest for your group and your individual 
payoffs. Once we have handed back your sheets we will ask each of you individually 
to tell the other members of the group how much you chose to harvest.  
For this game, an external authority has made a rule that you are not allowed to 
extract more than two fish from the pond in any single season. If you choose to fish, 
there is a chance that your decision will be penalised. At the end of each season we 
will roll a ten-sided dice, which will determine who in the group is monitored. There 
will be a 4 in 10 chance that the external authority will monitor you. If you are 
monitored and you have decided to do any fishing in the season you will be fined 125 
KHR for each fish that you harvest over the permitted threshold of two fish. This 
means that if, for example, you are monitored and have chosen to harvest four fish, 
you will be fined 250 KHR (125 KHR for the two fish you harvested above the 
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threshold of two). 
In addition, for this game there is an opportunity to earn a bonus payment from an 
external organisation. These payments are designed to reduce the number of fish that 
the group harvests. If you choose to harvest two fish or fewer each season, you will be 
rewarded by a bonus payment of 250 KHR. This is irrespective of how other people in 
your group behave. If you harvest more than two fish, you will not be eligible for the 
bonus. 
We will repeat this game for 5 seasons. After each season you have a few minutes to 
talk about the game with the other members of the group before beginning the next 
season. Once all 5 seasons have been played, the game will end. 
Ok, now we are ready to start the game. Please discuss amongst yourselves how many 
fish you think each person should be allowed to harvest.  
[Allow group discussion for as long as the participants choose to talk. Once the 
discussion has stopped, ask the group whether or not they have reached a group 
decision. Accept any uncontested answer and ask what decision has been reached. If 
there is a disagreement about whether a decision has been reached, allow the 
participants the opportunity to resolve the disagreement. If they resolve the 
disagreement, ask what decision has been reached. If it is unresolved, note down the 
values discussed] 
Now you have finished your discussion, please decide how many fish you would like 
to harvest in the first season and mark your decision on your sheet. Remember that the 
group decision is not binding and you can choose any harvest from 0 to 10 fish. 
Remember also that in this game if you choose to harvest two fish or fewer you will 
be rewarded with a bonus payment of 250 KHR and that if you harvest more than the 
two fish you are allowed to, you may be fined. 
[Check that people only look at their own sheet. Help anyone who is having trouble. 
Once everyone has marked their decision collect all the sheets and total the group 
clearance. Then calculate each individual’s earnings and write both on each sheet. 
Return the sheets to the respective participants] 
As you can see, we have filled out the two boxes from that round. Remember the top 
box shows you the amount cleared by the rest of your group and the lower box gives 
you your earnings from that round.  
[Help each individual to read out their earnings for that season. Ask each participant 
to roll the die. If they roll a 1, 2, 3 or 4 they will be monitored and fined 125 KHR for 
each fish they harvest above two. Correct their payoff and announce the new amount 
to the rest of the group. Repeat until all 5 seasons have been played making sure to 
say which number season is currently being played when asking players to make their 
decision. Select a different player each time to begin declaring their decision for the 
season. Collect the results sheets at the end of the game.] 
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Collective payments 
[Prepare the rooms for the single group treatments. Arrange all desks in a circle 
facing each other. Place a results sheet on each desk and ask participants to sit in 
ascending numerical order. Make sure that the correct number is on each sheet] 
Ok, we are now ready to play the [game number] game. Let’s quickly run over the 
details. You will be asked to decide how many fish you want to harvest each season 
from the communal pond. You can decide to harvest a maximum of 10 fish and a 
minimum of 0. For each fish that you decide to harvest you will receive 100 KHR. 
This is the same for every member of your group. Everyone in the group benefits 
from having fish remaining unharvested at the end of the season so that you will each 
receive 12 KHR for each fish left in the communal pond. 
In this game you will know who is in your group and the number of days you choose 
to harvest will not be private. Before each round you will be given a few minutes in 
which you are free to discuss your decision and the decisions of the other players with 
the rest of your group. You can also make agreements about how much fish you think 
each individual should be allowed to harvest although these agreements are not 
binding. Once this period is over we will ask you to individually decide how many 
fish you want to harvest and to mark your decision on the sheet in front of you as 
before. We will then calculate the total harvest for your group and your individual 
payoffs. Once we have handed back your sheets we will ask each of you individually 
to tell the other members of the group how much you chose to harvest.  
For this game, an external authority has made a rule that you are not allowed to 
extract more than two fish from the pond in any single season. If you choose to fish, 
there is a chance that your decision will be penalised. At the end of each season we 
will roll a ten-sided dice, which will determine who in the group is monitored. There 
will be a 1 in 10 chance that the external authority will monitor you. If you are 
monitored and you have decided to do any fishing in the season you will be fined 125 
KHR for each fish that you harvest over the permitted threshold of two fish. This 
means that if, for example, you are monitored and have chosen to harvest four fish, 
you will be fined 250 KHR (125 KHR for the two fish you harvested above the 
threshold of two). 
In addition, for this game there is an opportunity to earn a bonus payment from an 
external organisation. These payments are designed to reduce the number of fish that 
the group harvests. Whether you receive the bonus is dependent on the total group 
harvest. If at the end of the season the total harvest is equal or less than 20 fish, 
everyone in the group will receive a bonus payment of 250 KHR. If the total group 
harvest is more than 20 fish then nobody will receive a bonus payment. So for 
example if you only harvest a single fish but the total group harvest is 27 fish then 
you will not receive a bonus payment, but if you were to harvest four fish and total 
group harvest was 18, say, then you would receive a bonus. 
We will repeat this game for 5 seasons. After each season you have a few minutes to 
talk about the game with the other members of the group before beginning the next 
season. Once all 5 seasons have been played, the game will end. 
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Ok, now we are ready to start the game. Please discuss amongst yourselves how many 
fish you think each person should be allowed to harvest.  
[Allow group discussion for as long as the participants choose to talk. Once the 
discussion has stopped, ask the group whether or not they have reached a group 
decision. Accept any uncontested answer and ask what decision has been reached. If 
there is a disagreement about whether a decision has been reached, allow the 
participants the opportunity to resolve the disagreement. If they resolve the 
disagreement, ask what decision has been reached. If it is unresolved, note down the 
values discussed] 
Now you have finished your discussion, please decide how many fish you would like 
to harvest in the first season and mark your decision on your sheet. Remember that the 
group decision is not binding and you can choose any harvest from 0 to 10 fish. 
Remember also that in this game if the total group harvest is 20 fish or fewer 
everyone in the group will be rewarded with a bonus payment of 250 KHR.  
[Check that people only look at their own sheet. Help anyone who is having trouble. 
Once everyone has marked their decision collect all the sheets and total the group 
clearance. Then calculate each individual’s earnings and write both on each sheet. 
Return the sheets to the respective participants] 
As you can see, we have filled out the two boxes from that round. Remember the top 
box shows you the amount cleared by the rest of your group and the lower box gives 
you your earnings from that round.  
[Help each individual to read out their earnings for that season. Repeat until all 5 
seasons have been played making sure to say which number season is currently being 
played when asking players to make their decision. Select a different player each time 
to begin declaring their decision for the season. Collect the results sheets at the end of 
the game.] 
 Collective payments with weak enforcement 
[Prepare the rooms for the single group treatments. Arrange all desks in a circle 
facing each other. Place a results sheet on each desk and ask participants to sit in 
ascending numerical order. Make sure that the correct number is on each sheet] 
Ok, we are now ready to play the [game number] game. Let’s quickly run over the 
details. You will be asked to decide how many fish you want to harvest each season 
from the communal pond. You can decide to harvest a maximum of 10 fish and a 
minimum of 0. For each fish that you decide to harvest you will receive 100 KHR. 
This is the same for every member of your group. Everyone in the group benefits 
from having fish remaining unharvested at the end of the season so that you will each 
receive 12 KHR for each fish left in the communal pond. 
In this game you will know who is in your group and the number of days you choose 
to harvest will not be private. Before each round you will be given a few minutes in 
which you are free to discuss your decision and the decisions of the other players with 
the rest of your group. You can also make agreements about how much fish you think 
each individual should be allowed to harvest although these agreements are not 
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binding. Once this period is over we will ask you to individually decide how many 
fish you want to harvest and to mark your decision on the sheet in front of you as 
before. We will then calculate the total harvest for your group and your individual 
payoffs. Once we have handed back your sheets we will ask each of you individually 
to tell the other members of the group how much you chose to harvest.  
For this game, an external authority has made a rule that you are not allowed to 
extract more than two fish from the pond in any single season. If you choose to fish, 
there is a chance that your decision will be penalised. At the end of each season we 
will roll a ten-sided dice, which will determine who in the group is monitored. There 
will be a 4 in 10 chance that the external authority will monitor you. If you are 
monitored and you have decided to do any fishing in the season you will be fined 125 
KHR for each fish that you harvest over the permitted threshold of two fish. This 
means that if, for example, you are monitored and have chosen to harvest four fish, 
you will be fined 250 KHR (125 KHR for the two fish you harvested above the 
threshold of two). 
In addition, for this game there is an opportunity to earn a bonus payment from an 
external organisation. These payments are designed to reduce the number of fish that 
the group harvests. Whether you receive the bonus is dependent on the total group 
harvest. If at the end of the season the total harvest is equal or less than 20 fish, 
everyone in the group will receive a bonus payment of 250 KHR. If the total group 
harvest is more than 20 fish then nobody will receive a bonus payment. So for 
example if you only harvest a single fish but the total group harvest is 27 fish then 
you will not receive a bonus payment, but if you were to harvest four fish and total 
group harvest was 18, say, then you would receive a bonus. 
We will repeat this game for 5 seasons. After each season you have a few minutes to 
talk about the game with the other members of the group before beginning the next 
season. Once all 5 seasons have been played, the game will end. 
Ok, now we are ready to start the game. Please discuss amongst yourselves how many 
fish you think each person should be allowed to harvest.  
[Allow group discussion for as long as the participants choose to talk. Once the 
discussion has stopped, ask the group whether or not they have reached a group 
decision. Accept any uncontested answer and ask what decision has been reached. If 
there is a disagreement about whether a decision has been reached, allow the 
participants the opportunity to resolve the disagreement. If they resolve the 
disagreement, ask what decision has been reached. If it is unresolved, note down the 
values discussed] 
Now you have finished your discussion, please decide how many fish you would like 
to harvest in the first season and mark your decision on your sheet. Remember that the 
group decision is not binding and you can choose any harvest from 0 to 10 fish. 
Remember also that in this game if the total group harvest is 20 fish or fewer 
everyone in the group will be rewarded with a bonus payment of 250 KHR and that if 
you harvest more than the two fish you are allowed to, you may be fined.  
[Check that people only look at their own sheet. Help anyone who is having trouble. 
Once everyone has marked their decision collect all the sheets and total the group 
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clearance. Then calculate each individual’s earnings and write both on each sheet. 
Return the sheets to the respective participants] 
As you can see, we have filled out the two boxes from that round. Remember the top 
box shows you the amount cleared by the rest of your group and the lower box gives 
you your earnings from that round.  
[Help each individual to read out their earnings for that season. Ask each participant 
to roll the die. If they roll a 1 they will be monitored and fined 125 KHR for each fish 
they harvest above two. Correct their payoff and announce the new amount to the rest 
of the group. Repeat until all 5 seasons have been played making sure to say which 
number season is currently being played when asking players to make their decision. 
Select a different player each time to begin declaring their decision for the season. 
Collect the results sheets at the end of the game.] 
 Collective payments with strong enforcement 
[Prepare the rooms for the single group treatments. Arrange all desks in a circle 
facing each other. Place a results sheet on each desk and ask participants to sit in 
ascending numerical order. Make sure that the correct number is on each sheet] 
Ok, we are now ready to play the [game number] game. Let’s quickly run over the 
details. You will be asked to decide how many fish you want to harvest each season 
from the communal pond. You can decide to harvest a maximum of 10 fish and a 
minimum of 0. For each fish that you decide to harvest you will receive 100 KHR. 
This is the same for every member of your group. Everyone in the group benefits 
from having fish remaining unharvested at the end of the season so that you will each 
receive 12 KHR for each fish left in the communal pond. 
In this game you will know who is in your group and the number of days you choose 
to harvest will not be private. Before each round you will be given a few minutes in 
which you are free to discuss your decision and the decisions of the other players with 
the rest of your group. You can also make agreements about how much fish you think 
each individual should be allowed to harvest although these agreements are not 
binding. Once this period is over we will ask you to individually decide how many 
fish you want to harvest and to mark your decision on the sheet in front of you as 
before. We will then calculate the total harvest for your group and your individual 
payoffs. Once we have handed back your sheets we will ask each of you individually 
to tell the other members of the group how much you chose to harvest.  
In addition, for this game there is an opportunity to earn a bonus payment from an 
external organisation. These payments are designed to reduce the number of fish that 
the group harvests. Whether you receive the bonus is dependent on the total group 
harvest. If at the end of the season the total harvest is equal or less than 20 fish, 
everyone in the group will receive a bonus payment of 250 KHR. If the total group 
harvest is more than 20 fish then nobody will receive a bonus payment. So for 
example if you only harvest a single fish but the total group harvest is 27 fish then 
you will not receive a bonus payment, but if you were to harvest four fish and total 
group harvest was 18, say, then you would receive a bonus. 
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We will repeat this game for 5 seasons. After each season you have a few minutes to 
talk about the game with the other members of the group before beginning the next 
season. Once all 5 seasons have been played, the game will end. 
Ok, now we are ready to start the game. Please discuss amongst yourselves how many 
fish you think each person should be allowed to harvest.  
[Allow group discussion for as long as the participants choose to talk. Once the 
discussion has stopped, ask the group whether or not they have reached a group 
decision. Accept any uncontested answer and ask what decision has been reached. If 
there is a disagreement about whether a decision has been reached, allow the 
participants the opportunity to resolve the disagreement. If they resolve the 
disagreement, ask what decision has been reached. If it is unresolved, note down the 
values discussed] 
Now you have finished your discussion, please decide how many fish you would like 
to harvest in the first season and mark your decision on your sheet. Remember that the 
group decision is not binding and you can choose any harvest from 0 to 10 fish. 
Remember also that in this game if the total group harvest is 20 fish or fewer 
everyone in the group will be rewarded with a bonus payment of 250 KHR and that if 
you harvest more than the two fish you are allowed to, you may be fined.  
[Check that people only look at their own sheet. Help anyone who is having trouble. 
Once everyone has marked their decision collect all the sheets and total the group 
clearance. Then calculate each individual’s earnings and write both on each sheet. 
Return the sheets to the respective participants] 
As you can see, we have filled out the two boxes from that round. Remember the top 
box shows you the amount cleared by the rest of your group and the lower box gives 
you your earnings from that round.  
[Help each individual to read out their earnings for that season. Ask each participant 
to roll the die. If they roll a 1, 2, 3 or 4 they will be monitored and fined 125 KHR for 
each fish they harvest above two. Correct their payoff and announce the new amount 
to the rest of the group. Repeat until all 5 seasons have been played making sure to 
say which number season is currently being played when asking players to make their 
decision. Select a different player each time to begin declaring their decision for the 
season. Collect the results sheets at the end of the game.] 
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CPR treatment payoff equations 
Enforcement treatments (λ = 0.1 or 0.4): 
𝜋𝑗 =
{
 
 100𝑥𝑗 + 12 ( 100 −∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
)                                                               if 𝑥𝑗  ≤  2
100𝑥𝑗 + 12 ( 100 −∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
) −  125λ                                             otherwise
  
Individual payment treatment: 
𝜋𝑗 =
{
 
 100𝑥𝑗 + 12 ( 100 −∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
) + 250                                                 if 𝑥𝑗  ≤  2
100𝑥𝑗 + 12 ( 100 −∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
)                                                             otherwise
  
Individual payment plus enforcement treatments (λ = 0.1 or 0.4): 
𝜋𝑗 =
{
 
 100𝑥𝑗 + 12 ( 100 −∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
) + 250                                                if 𝑥𝑗  ≤  2
100𝑥𝑗 + 12 ( 100 −∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
) −  125λ                                           otherwise
  
Collective payments treatment: 
𝜋𝑗 =
{
 
 100𝑥𝑗 + 12 ( 100 −∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
) + 250                                 if ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 ≤  20 
100𝑥𝑗 + 12 ( 100 −∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
)                                                            otherwise
  
Collective payment plus enforcement treatments (λ = 0.1 or 0.4): 
𝜋𝑗 =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 100𝑥𝑗 + 12 ( 100 −∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
) + 250                     if ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
≤ 20, 𝑥𝑗 ≤ 2
100𝑥𝑗 + 12 ( 100 −∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
) +  250 − 125𝜆    if ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
≤ 20, 𝑥𝑗 > 2
100𝑥𝑗 + 12 ( 100 −∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
)                                  if ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
> 20, 𝑥𝑗 ≤ 2
100𝑥𝑗 + 12 ( 100 −∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
) − 125𝜆                  if ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
> 20, 𝑥𝑗 > 2
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Table C.2: Variables used in statistical modelling of the CPR game. 
Variable Data type Variable type Description 
fish bounded proportional response number of fish taken by one subject 
treatment categorical explanatory experimental treatment played 
previous categorical explanatory experimental treatment played previously 
age continuous explanatory age of subject 
yrs_village continuous explanatory number of years subject had lived in village 
education continuous explanatory number of years in education 
literacy binary explanatory whether or not subject was literate 
gender categorical explanatory gender of subject 
head binary explanatory whether or not the subject was the head of family 
ethnicity categorical explanatory ethnicity of subject 
dependency  continuous explanatory dependency ratio of household 
gender_hhh categorical explanatory gender of household head 
understanding bounded proportional explanatory number of correct answers to understanding questions 
numeracy categorical explanatory scored ability to correctly identify and order series of numbers 
position binary explanatory whether or not the subject held a formal position of authority 
decision binary explanatory whether or not a group decision was made  
livelihood continuous explanatory number of livelihood activities followed by household 
round categorical explanatory number of the round played 
game categorical explanatory when in the day the observation was recorded 
day categorical explanatory which day in the village the observation was recorded 
village categorical random effect village in which the observation was recorded 
session categorical random effect day on which the observation was recorded 
group categorical random effect group from which the observation was recorded 
individual categorical random effect subject from which the observation was recorded 
 
183 
Table C.3: Parameter estimates for the selected CPR game GLMM, with the number of fish 
harvested in a round as the response variable. The difference in the number of fish taken was 
found by calculating the expected number of fish taken for each variable and comparing this 
with the number expected for the intercept.  P values significant at the 95% confidence level are 
shown in bold. Three random effects were included in the model: individual (SD = 0.484), group 
(SD = 0.561) and session number (SD = 0.591). The full list of variables modelled, plus their 
explanations, are given in Supplementary Materials Table C.2. 
Variable Estimate SE No. of fish Diff in no. fish P values 
intercept -0.431 0.296 3.938 - 0.145 
private -0.044 0.265 3.833 -0.105 0.868 
weak enforcement -0.041 0.343 3.841 -0.097 0.905 
strong enforcement 0.158 0.343 4.321 +0.383 0.644 
individual payments -1.408 0.326 1.371 -2.567 << 0.001 
collective payments -1.158 0.329 1.695 -2.243 0.001 
ind. w. weak enf. -0.948 0.326 2.011 -1.927 0.004 
ind. w. strong enf. -0.506 0.329 2.815 -1.123 0.124 
coll. w. weak enf. -0.855 0.345 2.164 -1.774 0.013 
coll. w. strong enf. -1.164 0.341 1.686 -2.252 < 0.001 
education 0.024 0.009 3.994 +0.056 0.009 
decision -0.328 0.084 3.188 -0.750 << 0.001 
practice 0.079 0.016 4.129 +0.191 << 0.001 
round 2 0.349 0.032 4.793 +0.855 << 0.001 
round 3 0.237 0.032 4.515 +0.577 << 0.001 
round 4 0.410 0.032 4.947 +1.009 << 0.001 
round 5 0.340 0.032 4.773 +0.835 << 0.001 
 
Table C.4: Comparison of the predicted difference in the number of fish taken by an individual 
for different treatments between round 1 (Table 5.2) and round 4 (the treatment for which the 
estimated effect is most different from round 1). 
Treatment 
Difference in fish taken 
in round 1 
Difference in fish taken in 
round 4 
intercept (peer pressure) - - 
private -0.11 -0.11 
weak enforcement -0.10 -0.10 
strong enforcement +0.38 0.40 
individual payments -2.57 -3.02 
collective payments -2.24 -2.60 
ind. w. weak enf. -1.93 -2.20 
ind. w. strong enf. -1.12 -1.23 
coll. w. weak enf. -1.77 -2.01 
coll. w. strong enf. -2.25 -2.61 
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Figure C.1: Average individual extraction per round during the enforcement treatments of the CPR game 
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Figure C.2: Average individual extraction per round during the individual payments treatments of the CPR game. 
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Figure C.3: Average individual extraction per round during the collective payments treatments of the CPR game. 
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Appendix D 
Supplementary material for Chapter 6 
Scenarios script 
Interview Introduction 
[Introduce research team] 
I would like you to think about the future and what you would do if different things 
changed. I will present different possible futures to you and I would like you to 
imagine how you and your household would respond to the conditions in those 
scenarios. Each scenario will cover a period of five years and only one condition will 
be different to now. 
For example, I might present you with a scenario of the future in which the price of 
cassava has increased to double its current value but everything else was the same as 
it is now. I would then want you to think about how that would affect you and the rest 
of your household. For, instance if the price of cassava was double what you are paid 
now, could you afford to hire more labour? Would you want to change the area of 
land that you own by, for example, clearing or buying more land, or even selling your 
land? Would you change the proportion of your land on which you grow cassava? 
Would you change the proportion of your labour that you devote to farming as 
opposed to other activities, such as resin collection? How do you think it would 
change your relationship with other families in the village? 
Or maybe you would not do anything different to what you do currently. If that was 
the case, would there be anything stopping you from making changes? For example, 
would it be possible for you to hire more labour than there is available to you now? Is 
it possible to buy/sell or clear more land?   
So what I am asking you to do is to think about how you might react to changes in the 
future.  
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Scenarios 
Cassava Price Increase 
I want you to imagine that as, with our example, the price at which you can sell your 
cassava doubles. This means that the cassava trader pays you twice as much as they 
pay you this year. Imagine that this change continues for five years - how do you 
think this will affect you? Remember in this future, everything else will remain as it is 
now. 
Cassava Price Decrease 
I want you to imagine that the price at which you can sell your cassava halves. This 
means that the cassava trader pays you half as much as they pay you this year. 
Imagine that this change continues for five years - how do you think this will affect 
you? Remember in this future, everything else will remain as it is now. 
Law Enforcement Effort Increase 
I want you to imagine that the protected area authorities, the Forestry Administration, 
increase the number of law enforcement patrols targeting forest clearance and fields 
located within the protected area. This extra effort means that the patrols are four 
times more likely to catch illegal land clearance. Imagine that this change continues 
for five years - how do you think this will affect you? Remember in this future, 
everything else will remain as it is now. 
Individual Payments to Reduce Forest Clearance 
Now, I want you to imagine that the protected area authorities are offering another 
type of payments to your village for people not to clear forest. This payment will be 
worth $200 to everyone who receives it and if you receive it you will be given money 
directly. Imagine you will receive a payment if you do not clear forest around your 
fields or the village land. This payment is only dependent on your own behaviour. 
That means that if you do not clear forest you will receive the payment. Imagine that 
this change continues for five years - how do you think this will affect you? 
Remember in this future, everything else will remain as it is now. 
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Communal Payments to Reduce Forest Clearance 
Now, I want you to imagine that the protected area authorities are offering payments 
to your village for people not to clear forest. This payment will be worth $200 to 
everyone who receives it and if you receive it you will be given money directly. 
Imagine you and the other members of your krom will receive a payment if there is no 
forest clearance around your fields or the village land. This payment is dependent on 
the behaviour of everybody, not just you. That means that if other people from your 
krom clear but you do not, you will not receive the payment. Similarly, if other people 
from your krom did not clear but you did, that would mean that nobody would receive 
the payment. Only if nobody in your krom, including you, did not clear would 
everybody receive the payment. Imagine that this change continues for five years - 
how do you think this will affect you? Remember in this future, everything else will 
remain as it is now. 
Payment to a Village Fund 
Finally, I want you to imagine that protected area authorities are again offering 
payments to your village for people not to clear forest. This time the payments will be 
made into a village fund to pay for improved village infrastructure, such as roads, 
drainage, schools or health clinics. The money paid into this fund will be dependent 
on the village on there being no forest clearance by anyone in the village. If people 
choose to clear forest, there will be less money paid into the village fund and it will 
take longer to pay for improvements to village infrastructure. Imagine that this change 
continues for five years - how do you think this will affect you? Remember in this 
future, everything else will remain as it is now. 
  
 
190 
Table D.1: Variables used in statistical modelling in Chapter 6. 
Variable Data type Variable type Description 
pro binary response whether or not respondent acted in a pro-conservation manner 
reduced binary response whether or not the respondent reduced clearance relative to baseline 
scenario categorical explanatory scenario for which behaviour was predicted 
age continuous explanatory age of respondent 
log_area continuous explanatory natural logarithm of area of productive land held by household 
yrs_village continuous explanatory number of years respondent had lived in village 
education continuous explanatory number of years in education 
gender categorical explanatory gender of respondent 
indigenous binary explanatory whether or not the respondent belonged to IP 
hh_size  continuous explanatory number of members of household 
labour binary explanatory whether or not the respondent household was involved in wage labour 
shop binary explanatory whether or not the respondent household operated a shop 
employed binary explanatory whether or not a member of respondent’s household was employed 
service binary explanatory whether or not the respondent’s household operated a village service 
poverty_score continuous explanatory household poverty score 
livelihood_zone categorical explanatory livelihood zone in which village was situated 
individual categorical random effect subject from which the observation was recorded 
 
